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vABSTRACT
The use of formal methods in software development seeks to increase our confidence in the
resultant system. Their use often requires tool support, so the integrity of a development using
formal methods is dependent on the integrity of the tool-set used. Specifically its integrity
depends on the theorem prover, since in a typical formal development system the theorem
prover is used to establish the validity of the proof obligations incurred by all the steps in the
design and refinement process.
In this thesis we are concerned with tool-based formal development systems that are used to
develop high-integrity software. Since the theorem prover program is a critical part of such a
system, it should ideally have been itself formally verified. Unfortunately, most theorem provers
are too complex to be verified formally using currently available techniques. An alternative
approach, which has many advantages, is to include a proof checker as an extra component in
the system, and to certify this.
A proof checker is a program which reads and checks the proofs produced by a theorem prover.
Proof checkers are inherently simpler than theorem provers, since they only process actual
proofs, whereas much of the code of a theorem prover is concerned with searching the space
of possible proofs to find the required one. They are also free from all but the simplest user
interface concerns, since their input is a proof produced by another program, and their output
may be as simple as a ‘yes/no’ reply to the question: Is this a valid proof? plus a list of
assumptions on which this judgement is based.
When included in a formal development system a stand-alone proof checker is, in one sense,
superfluous, since it does not produce any proofs – the theorem prover does this. Instead
its importance is in establishing the integrity of the results of the system – it provides extra
assurance. A proof checker provides extra assurance simply by checking the proofs, since all
proofs have then been validated by two independent programs. However a proof checker can
provide an extra, and higher, level of assurance if it has been formally verified.
In order for formal verification to be feasible the proof checker must be as simple as possible.
In turn the simplicity of a proof checker is dependent on the complexity of the data which it
v
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processes, that is, the representation of the proofs that it checks. This thesis develops a repre-
sentation of proofs that is simple and generic. The aim is to produce a generic representation
that is applicable to the proofs produced by a variety of theorem provers. Simplicity facilitates
verification, while genericity maximises the return on the effort of verification.
Using a generic representation places obligations on the theorem provers to produce a proof
record in this format. A flexible recorder/translator architecture is proposed which allows
proofs to be recorded by existing theorem provers with minimal changes to the original code.
The prover is extended with a recorder module whose output is then, if necessary, converted to
the generic format by a separate translator program.
A formal specification of a checker for proofs recorded in this representation is given. The
specification could be used to formally develop a proof-checker, although this step is not taken in
this thesis. In addition the characteristics of both the specification and possible implementations
are investigated. This is done to assess the size and feasibility of the verification task, and also
to confirm that the design is not over-sensitive to the size of proofs. This investigation shows
that a checker developed from the specification will be scalable to handle large proofs.
To investigate the feasibility of a system based on this architecture prototype proof recorders
were developed for the Ergo 5 and Isabelle 98 theorem provers. In addition a prototype checker
was written to check proofs in the proposed format. This prototype is compatible with the
formal specification. The combined system was tested successfully using existing proofs for
both the Ergo 5 and Isabelle 98 theorem provers.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Computer technology is a feature of everyday life. In the developed world the personal computer
is a consumer item, and microprocessors and embedded software are ubiquitous in manufactured
products. In particular computer software is common in high-integrity applications. It can be
found controlling manufacturing plants, railway signalling networks, ‘fly-by-wire’ aircraft and
large financial processing systems. This trend will continue with the emergence of ‘e-commerce’
as a new paradigm for doing business and the spread of such security-critical technologies as
the ‘smartcard’ and ‘electronic purse’. The integrity, safety and reliability of such systems is of
major importance since failure can cause human or financial disaster. Unfortunately software
failure is not uncommon, and better methods of software development are constantly being
sought.
Since their origins in the 1940s computer science and the technology of computation have evolved
in parallel. In the 1960s some computer scientists began to develop the theory of what is now
called formal methods, whereby programs are described or constructed by mathematical means.
Practical work in this field has required the use of computer tools to handle the associated
mathematics and logic. Thus two complementary parts of the discipline of computer science
are the application of mathematical logic to the theory of programming, and the application of
computerised methods of computation to mathematics and logic. These come together in the
field of formal methods where computerised mathematics is used to support the mathematical
modelling of computer systems.
In the application of formal methods proof is required for many tasks. For instance proof may be
required to justify steps in program transformation or refinement, or proof may be undertaken
to show that a program satisfies requirements in respect to safety or other properties defined in
its specification. On a smaller scale, proofs such as those of the termination properties of loops,
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or of the timing properties of sections of code, may be undertaken to validate the algorithms
employed in software products.
Although such formal methods are not yet commonly used in software engineering, they are
the subject of much research, and their use is increasing as they become more widely known
and the methods and tools that support them become more mature. In the area of high-
integrity software engineering, standards and certification are becoming increasingly important.
Certification at the highest level usually requires that proof be undertaken, if only of the key
algorithms and critical properties of the implementation.
Using proof to support a program development, or validate some property of a specification
or implementation, is a device to increase our assurance in a software product. This aim is
only achieved if we have confidence in the correctness of the proof. In high-integrity software
development this confidence is achieved by requiring that proofs be audited as part of the
certification process. Where the proof is performed by human beings the auditing process can
take the form of traditional method of peer review. However, where the proof is performed by
a theorem prover, as is commonly the case, then hand checking may be difficult, and it may be
necessary to employ other strategies. Two such strategies are:
1. that the proof be repeated using a second independent theorem prover, or
2. that the original proofs be done using a theorem prover that is itself highly trusted, for
example, one that has been certified at the highest level. In this case we can be highly
confident that its proofs are indeed correct, and auditing will be restricted to checking
that the prover was used correctly.
The first strategy, that of confirming the proof using a second theorem prover, has inherent
difficulties due to the problems of translation of the logical infra-structure between one theorem
prover and another. Supporting theories may need to be translated, and logics may be subtly
different between provers. These complexities can be circumvented by the use of a proof checker.
In this context a proof checker is a program that checks a proof that has been recorded as a
sequence of very basic inference steps.
Checking a proof is a much simpler operation than finding that proof in the first place. Proof
checkers only process actual proofs, whereas much of the code of a theorem prover is concerned
2
3with searching the space of possible proofs to find the required one. They are also free from
all but the simplest user interface concerns, since their input is a proof produced by another
program, and their output may be as simple as a ‘yes/no’ reply to the question: Is this a valid
proof? 1 Since proof checkers are simple it is feasible to write checkers for individual theorem
provers, and the combination of theorem prover and proof checker gives an equivalent assurance
to the use of two independent theorem provers.
The second strategy, that of using a formally verified theorem prover, is also problematic since
most theorem provers are too complex to be verified formally using currently available tech-
niques. However we can combine both strategies for providing confidence in the results of a
theorem prover by developing a formally verified proof checker. Whereas the formal verifi-
cation of a full theorem prover is a major task, the verification of a simple proof checker is much
more feasible. Such a checker can be used to provide an independent check on proofs already
completed by the theorem prover, and in addition its results are also guaranteed to a high level
of assurance by virtue of the checker being formally verified.
The verified proof checker concept for software engineering has been explored and partially
implemented by von Wright, Wong and others in the project ‘A Fully Verified Proof Checker’
[GHH+95, vWWG+95]. However this project is specific to the HOL theorem prover, and many
other theorem provers are also used in formal methods support systems. If a proof checking
component were to be added to a number of such systems it would be advantageous to use a
common checker across the different systems — that is a checker that is generic with respect
to the theorem provers whose proofs it can check. Also, and more importantly, the formal
verification of a proof checker, even though it is much simpler than the typical theorem prover,
is still an expensive undertaking. A generic checker maximises the return on the effort expended
in verifying it by amortising the cost over its use with multiple theorem provers. For these
reasons we take the concept of a verified proof checker a step further by adding the requirement
1 Note that in this thesis we use the term ‘valid’ to indicate that a proof is correct. In the terminology of logic
validity is strictly a semantic notion, and theorem provers generally implement syntactic derivability. The latter,
of course, implies validity if the logical calculus used is sound. In practice the logics used in formal methods will
be well established ones whose soundness has been demonstrated, and in any case, since the checking system that
we will be describing is generic with respect to logical calculi, establishing properties of an individual calculus,
such as its soundness, is assumed to be a separate concern from the checking of proofs generated using that
calculus. In this thesis we therefore adopt an informal usage, and use the term ‘valid’ applied to a proof to mean
both its derivability and its logical validity.
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that the proof checker be generic.
The primary objectives of this thesis are:
• the specification of a generic proof checker,
• the validation of this specification by prototyping, and
• an evaluation of the feasibility of developing a proof checker from this specification by
formal verification.
To make the requirements of the checker as simple as possible, we are assuming that the checker
be primarily intended for use as an auditing tool in the software certification process. This type
of auditing is only mandated for software certified to the highest level, and the requirement is
simply for the checker to pass or fail proofs.
The thesis is divided into four parts. The first part gives the rationale for using a generic
proof checker in a formal software development system. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the
use of theorem provers in software engineering, focusing on formal methods and high-integrity
software engineering. Chapter 3 then develops the concept of a generic proof checker in detail.
It argues that a generic checker has many advantages, and states the requirements for a generic
verifiable proof checker. It also emphasises the importance of the choice of proof representation,
and proposes an architecture for systems that implement proof checking.
The integration of a proof checker into a formal development system involves two activities:
1. recording proofs as they are constructed — this is performed by the theorem prover (with
the possible help of a translator program), and
2. checking the recorded proof-objects — this is done by the proof checking program.
The second and third parts of the thesis are devoted to these two activities respectively.
Part two describes the recording of proofs. The design of the proof representation has important
implications for the simplicity of the proof checker. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 4, and
an EBNF description of the representation is given in Appendix A. Part two also describes two
4
5prototype implementations of proof recording: one for the Ergo 5 theorem prover (in Chapter
5) and a second for the Isabelle 98 prover (in Chapter 6).
The third part of the thesis is concerned with the proof checker itself. In Chapter 7 a formal
specification of the checker is described, and the full specification, in the Z notation, is given in
Appendix B. A prototype checker that implements the algorithm implied by the specification
is described in Chapter 8. This prototype is written in Qu-Prolog, and the code is given in
Appendix C. This prototype has not been formally verified.
The final part of the thesis evaluates the work done. The aim of the thesis is to establish the
feasibility of a verified generic proof checker for use in a working formal development system.
Therefore the evaluation in Chapter 9 concentrates on three aspects of the work:
1. genericity,
2. verifiability, and
3. scalability.
All three are evaluated from a theoretical perspective, and also empirically by running test
cases. The practical tests use the Ergo 5 and Isabelle 98 proof recorders to generate proof
records, and these are then checked by the prototype checker. The evaluation is positive, and
the final chapter discusses the implications for possible future work.
5
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Part I
The Generic Proof Checker Concept
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CHAPTER 2
Theorem Provers and Software
Engineering
This chapter reviews the use of theorem provers to support formal methods in software engi-
neering. First, in Section 2.1, we review the history and development of theorem provers, and
discuss different types of theorem provers and some of their properties. In Section 2.2 we dis-
cuss the general question of how we should view the proofs that theorem provers generate, and
review the impact that automated proof has had on mathematics. Finally, in Section 2.3, we
review formal methods in software engineering. We describe the notions of integrity level and
assurance, and discuss the requirements of standards for safety-critical software development as
they pertain to theorem proving.
2.1 The History of Theorem Provers
This section reviews the history of theorem proving programs. In this thesis we are primarily
concerned with the role that theorem provers play in supporting formal methods in software
engineering. In consequence, the following discussion is focused on this aspect of the history of
theorem provers, for instance in discussing recent work, it concentrates on interactive theorem
provers.
2.1.1 Early Work
Computers have been used to prove theorems in logic and mathematics since the 1950s. A
survey of this early work, which also covers some of the later developments discussed below,
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can be found in [Mac95]. Theorem proving is basically a search of a large space of possible
proofs, and the earliest provers were simply an encoding of the rules of the predicate calculus
and an exhaustive search of all possible sequences of applications of those rules for a suitable
proof. The exponential explosion inherent in such an approach makes it useless as a general
method. Nevertheless, in any particular case one may hope that a solution would be found
in a reasonable time, and useful results were obtained with judicious choice of problem. The
key to developing a more effective theorem prover was the search algorithm, and a major step
forward was the resolution algorithm described by Robinson in 1965 [Rob65]. This was a more
practical proof procedure, but still suffered from exponential explosion with certain types of
problems. By the mid 1970s research on resolution-style proving was exhausted and future
work went in two main directions.
One direction was the extension of automated theorem proving to include heuristics and other
mechanisms, to control the search. An advocate of this approach was Bledsoe, and his 1977
paper [Ble77] is an account of the state of research in this area at that time. Another account
of this strategy may be found in Bundy [Bun83]. This automated approach has been largely
devoted to proof in mathematics — a significant contribution was the work at the Argonne
National Laboratory that led to the development of Otter [McC94]. It has had much less
impact on software engineering, and for this reason fully automated theorem proving is not
discussed further in this thesis.
2.1.2 Interactive Theorem Provers
The other main direction taken in the mid 1970s was the development of interactive theorem
provers — where the search was guided more directly by the user, often interactively during the
process of searching for the proof.
An early pioneer was de Bruijn with his work on AUTOMATH [dB70, dB73, dB80] (see Section
2.1.3 below). However, other approaches were taken by Milner, Gordon and Wadsworth in
their work on LCF (the Logic of Computable Functions) and the associated meta-language ML
[GMW79], and by Boyer and Moore [BM79], who developed a computational logic based on Lisp
and implemented it in an experimental interactive theorem prover known as the Boyer-Moore
prover.
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In the 1980s the early Boyer-Moore theorem prover was developed into the prover Nqthm
[BM88]. However in our area of concern, the most important work during this period was
the further development of the Logic of Computable Functions by Gordon and Milner and
especially the Edinburgh LCF version [GMW79] in the late 1970s. Important aspects of this
work included the notion of a safe type for proofs (which could only be constructed by privileged
constructors), the development of a powerful notion of tactic for applying subproofs, and the
associated notion of fully expansive proofs, whereby tactics expanded to applications of the
primitive inference rules. In LCF the tactic language was ML, which was later developed into
a comprehensive functional language [MTH90]. Tactic driven provers are typically top-down,
with tactics breaking goals down into (simpler) subgoals. From these foundations a number of
important theorem provers were developed in the 1980s and early 1990s.
• HOL by Gordon and Melham [GM93],
• Coq by Coquand and Huet [CH85, BBC+97],
• Nuprl by Constable [CAB+86, Jac96] and
• Isabelle by Paulson and Nipkow [PN94, Pau97].
HOL was a development of LCF, extended to use a higher-order logic. It was used in early
attempts at hardware verification (for instance, the Viper processor [Coh89, Won93a]). The
original HOL was written in Lisp using ML as a meta-language, but later versions used ML as
the programming language throughout. HOL has been improved since that time and the latest
version is HOL 98.
The calculus of constructions (Coquand [Coq89]) was implemented in an experimental prover by
Huet using the CAML variant of ML [Hue89]. This prover gave rise to the Coq theorem prover
which is now in version 6, and is extensively used for theoretical investigations, particularly into
program extraction and the presentation of proofs.
An earlier theorem prover which was also based on a constructive logic was Nuprl. Nuprl
adopted much of the LCF philosophy. It has been largely used for mathematics, and also for
some hardware verification [BY92]. More recently, in the 1990s, Nuprl has been re-implemented
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in Prolog as the Oyster system [HS90] and is being used by Bundy’s group investigating high-
level proof planning [Bun91].
Another prover developed in the early 1990s was Isabelle. It is in the HOL tradition, but
whereas in HOL the logical rules are implemented as code, Isabelle is a generic prover that
supports different logics by implementing logical rules as data [PN94].
Theorem proving technology is constantly evolving. A 1988 review by Lindsay of reasoning
support systems for software engineering [Lin88] included the following major systems: LCF,
Nuprl, Veritas, Isabelle, Affirm, Boyer-Moore and Gypsy. It also mentioned B, HOL and Never
amongst a number of others that it reviewed briefly. An inspection of Web repositories, such
as the Database of Existing Mechanised Reasoning Systems [DEM99] (for theorem provers in
general) or the Oxford Formal Methods Archives [OXF01] (for those more specific to program
verification and formal methods), shows that over the last twelve years some of these systems
have disappeared, others have achieved maturity, and many new systems (such as Larch [WG90,
GG91], PVS [ORS92, OSR93b, OSR93a]) and Ergo/Cogito[BBNU96, BKKT95]) have appeared.
2.1.3 Proof Checkers
In reviewing the history of theorem provers we have concentrated on interactive provers of
the LCF type in which the user cooperates directly with the prover, since it is these that are
typically used in software verification. However, in Section 2.1.2 we also mentioned de Bruijn’s
AUTOMATH system. This is of the type of theorem prover that is usually called a ‘proof
checker’.1
Proof checkers avoid the limitations of purely automatic systems by the strategy of having the
user specify the proof in some detail before submitting it to the checker. The checker then has
only to perform a series of small steps as directed by the proof script. Each of these steps is
sufficiently simple to be amenable to automatic methods. If the checker fails to prove a step
then the proof script is passed back to the user for further elaboration.
Systems of the AUTOMATH type are typically used to verify formal proofs in mathematics. A
1 Unfortunately the term ‘proof checker’ is also sometimes used as a general synonym for ‘theorem prover’ —
an example (in the PVS literature) is [OSR93a]. However we avoid this broader usage here.
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modern example is Mizar [BT95, Try]. The Mizar literature describes the approach by stating
that the Mizar checker performs obvious inferences [Rud87]. The limiting case of a proof checker
is where the steps performed automatically are single inferences in the underlying logic. It is
such a program that is considered in this thesis. In the main body of the thesis (that is
from Chapter 3 onwards) we will, unless otherwise stated, use the term proof checker in the
restricted sense of a proof checking program whose input is a fully formal proof (usually machine
generated) in which each step can be checked by the direct application of a rule of the logic.
(Boulton refers to this type of proof record as a fully expansive proof [Bou92, Bou94].)
In such systems the user is primarily responsible for finding the proof while the proof checking
program is responsible for confirming that the proof is logically valid. Finding a proof is a
much more difficult task than checking the resultant proof, and this fact is of key importance
in this thesis. Barendregt [Bar96, Bar98] discusses the distinction between finding proofs and
checking proofs. This topic is also discussed by Harrison [Har96a] from a software engineering
perspective. Barendregt describes the situation using the diagram [Bar98] :
` X X provable (may be undecidable)
`p X p is a proof of X (very decidable)
In a similar context, Slaney [Sla94] notes that a proof checking program is inherently simpler
than a theorem prover, when he says [Sla94, page 11] :
the proof checker can be a much simpler and more obviously correct piece of software
than the prover
This issue is also very important for this thesis, as is the corollary that in consequence a proof
checking program can be more easily formally verified (although in the quotation above Slaney
seems to rely on inspection rather than formal verification for giving confidence in the correctness
of the checker).
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2.2 Proof in Computerised Mathematics
Computer generated proofs are not confined to those produced by general purpose theorem
provers. An early instance, much discussed, is the proof of the famous ‘four-colour’ conjecture.
This was first proved by Appel and Haken in 1976 who used a special purpose computer program
to do an exhaustive case analysis [HA77, HAK77]. A more modest contribution, which was
achieved by a general theorem prover, is McCune’s solution of the Robbin’s Conjecture in
Boolean algebra, which was first proved by a version of the Otter automatic theorem prover
[McC97].
Proofs generated by computer may be very long, as is the case with the ‘four-colour’ proof, and
may be in a format that is not easy for a human being to comprehend. Thus the normal process
of ‘peer review’, by which the validity of a proof is ensured by its publication for scrutiny by
other mathematicians, may break down for such proofs. The conventional view of the status
of mathematical proofs had already been questioned by those who suggested that standards of
mathematical proof are social constructs that may vary with time and occasion. For instance
Lakatos’ well known interpretation of a historical case study [Lak76] supports this view. If this
is the case, then machine generated proofs that cannot easily be checked at all by human beings
are especially problematical. Thus the advent of proofs generated by computers has been one
factor that has led some to call for a reassessment of the notion of proof in mathematics. The
popular discussion in [Hor93] is entitled The Death of Proof, while a more sober discussion may
be found in [Thu94].
This argument has also been used by some who question the overall feasibility of formal methods
in computer science [DLP79, Fet90, Mac91, Mac98], the argument being that if we accept the
notion that standards of mathematical proof are socially constructed (which is congenial to a
postmodernist outlook) then the whole strategy of using mathematics to achieve an otherwise
unachievable level of assurance in software development loses much of its force. Pollack [Pol97]
has published a detailed examination of similar issues from the perspective of proofs in program
verification in a paper entitled ‘How to Believe a Machine-Checked Proof’.
At the other end of the spectrum from those who query the status of computer generated proofs
is the proposal that all mathematics should be checked by machine, as typified by the QED
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manifesto [ano94] and the ongoing Mizar project [Rud92]. Another proposal is Barendregt’s
formulation of the technology of ‘Computer Mathematics’ [Bar96], which is a wide ranging
discussion of the possibility of creating a standard formalised logic for mathematics that can be
processed by machine. A similar proposal, from a computer scientist’s perspective, is Harrison’s
discussion of ‘Formalised Mathematics’ [Har96b]. A more philosophical discussion of a perceived
impact of the feasibility of computerised proof on the notion of mathematical proof can be found
in de Bruijn’s paper ‘Philosophical aspects of computerized verification of mathematics’ [dB98].
A related issue is the status of fully formal proofs — are informal proofs just shorthand versions
of the ‘real’ formal proofs, or is informal proof essential to mathematics? This issue has an
important bearing on the types of machine checked proofs that we may see as useful. It has been
discussed by Robinson [Rob91, Rob97a] (and, with respect to a related issue, by Sherry [She97]).
The problems associated with machine generated proof in mathematics are also discussed by
Slaney in [Sla94]. The solution that he proposes – a solution which he terms a ‘Modest Proposal’
– is a generic proof checker for mathematics.
2.3 Proof in Software Engineering
In the late 1960s a formal theoretical basis for computer programs was developed [Flo67, Hoa69],
and at the same time a more disciplined approach to the practice of writing computer software
was emerging with the concept of structured programming [DDH72, Wir71]. One outcome,
which had its roots in a convergence of these ideas, was the concept of ‘program proving’ or
formal program verification, which is part of what is today called ‘formal methods’. (See, for
example, [Pla88]).
With the increasing importance of software and the use of computer programs in safety-critical
applications, the discipline of ‘high-integrity software engineering’ has evolved. Formal methods
are often used in this discipline and their use typically involves stating and proving theorems. In
contrast to the situation in mathematics, where the inability to prove a theorem may simply be
unfortunate, the software engineer has an imperative to give a proof of every theorem required
to support a development. Thus interactive theorem provers, which can be guided by the users
to tackle complex proofs that are not easily amenable to automatic methods, are important
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tools in the practical application of formal methods. Consequently the designs of a number of
theorem provers have been influenced by the requirements of formal methods.
2.3.1 Formal Methods
Formal methods have been defined as [BH99, glossary]:
Techniques, notations and tools with a mathematical basis, used for specification
and reasoning in software or hardware development.
Thus ‘formal methods’ span both hardware and software engineering. The problems of software
and hardware verification have some similarities, and similar software technology is required to
support them. The two disciplines and technologies have evolved hand-in-hand, and some the-
orem provers have been used for both. Notable examples are HOL, ACL2 and PVS which have
been used for both hardware and software verification and also for CPU microcode verification
which spans the two disciplines [Coh89, SMLK, ORSS95]. Formal development for embedded
systems may be even wider in scope and cover the complete progression from requirements to
hardware implementation. An example is the ProCoS system [HHF+94].
Within software engineering the survey by Clarke and Wing [CW96] divides the application
of formal methods into the areas of specification and verification. They define specification as
‘the process of describing a system and its desired properties’ and formal verification as the
use of formal methods to ‘analyze a system for desired properties’. In respect to specification,
the evolution of formal specification languages such as Z [Spi92, BN92] has been crucial in
the development of formal methods, since the successful application of analytical techniques is
predicated on a suitable and convenient language for formalisation.
Clarke and Wing subdivide verification techniques into two: model checking and theorem prov-
ing. Model checking is a set of techniques for formally verifying finite-state systems, and is
commonly used in hardware verification. In this thesis we are concerned with the theorem
prover approach, however some systems, such as PVS, integrate both model checking and the-
orem proving in the same framework. Combining the two techniques to get ‘the best of both
worlds’ is becoming a common strategy, for example the TPHOLs’99 conference has papers
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on theorem proving systems used for hardware verification which have integrated links to a
model checker [AJS99], the automated MDG (Multiway Decision Graph) system [XCT99], and
a system supporting a general ‘plug-in’ mechanism for other proof components (PROSPER)
[Kro99, Hur99]. In some cases the response received from the external system is converted into
a subproof within the theorem prover (for example, [Hur99]), however in other cases the result
is simply assumed to be true (for example, [XCT99]). Systems of this type can be accommo-
dated in the framework described in this thesis but in the latter case the guarantees that are
produced will be conditional on the correctness of the results of the model checker or other
external system (see the discussion in Section 4.6.5).
We may decompose formal verification into two parts design verification and program verifica-
tion. Design verification is concerned with analysing the specification and checking that it is
consistent and has the desired properties. For instance, where the specification is fully formal,
we may prove theorems about the consistency of the specification, or about safety or other
properties of the system. Such proofs serve as a check that the formal specification meets the
requirements in these respects. On the other hand, program verification is concerned with
proving that a program does what it is specified to do. It may involve program transformation
or refinement, or explicit proofs that the final program exhibits safety or other properties that
have been specified.
General purpose theorem provers such as HOL and Isabelle have long been used for theorem
proving in software verification and HOL is also the basis for the commercial system ProofPower
marketed by ICL in the UK [Art96]. With the evolution of CASE systems in the 1990s theorem
provers were increasingly integrated into complete software engineering environments. A very
early system of this kind was Gypsy [AGB+77], while Mural [JJLM91, Lin89], a support system
for VDM [Jon90], was a more modern pioneer in this direction. Such systems include a formal
specification language and a process model for developing a system from a specification.
Practical software development systems, such as RAISE [NHWG89], B [Abr96], and KIV/VSE
[Rei92, HLS+96] require tool support. Such systems vary in the amount of formality that they
enforce, and here we are only concerned with those that include theorem provers as support
tools. The B system for instance, supports development with full proofs and its support system
includes a theorem prover [Abr, B-C96]. Other systems that integrate theorem prover support
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include EVES (the NEVER prover) [KPS+93], PVS [ORS92, OSR93a], VSE [HLS+96] and the
SVRC’s Cogito [BKKT95, NUT96, THK+97] which uses the Ergo theorem prover [BBNU96].
While integrated support for their application is steadily improving, formal methods remain
expensive and difficult to apply in practice, and their uptake in industry has been very slow.
Opinions are divided as to whether this is reasonable, considering the difficulty and immaturity
of the methods and tools, or a symptom of lethargy on the part of industry, with a resultant
failure to adopt new methods to solve important problems [Sai96, Hal90, BH95]. While the use
of formal methods in industrial applications is increasing [HB99], the take-up of fully formal
methods requiring mathematical proof is still small.
However, irrespective of the practical take-up of formal methods, formal proof is generally
regarded as a standard of guarantee, even if one that is often seen as too expensive to aspire to
in practice, and the judicious use of proof-based development is an integral part of the emerging
discipline of High-Integrity Software Engineering.
2.3.2 High-Integrity Software Engineering
Software applications where life, security or large sums of money are at risk in the event of
failure, are becoming common. The issue of confidence in such computer systems has therefore
become increasingly important.
Software builders have looked to the traditional Engineering disciplines for models and tech-
niques for building such systems. While this has been highly beneficial in many ways, software
systems are not physical systems (in any but the most obvious and irrelevant sense) and pro-
grams differ in crucial ways from the physical artefacts produced by traditional engineers. Some
early work in formal methods aspired to mathematical certainty in software, but again software
products are not just mathematical models either, and such aims were misguided. This is not
because of vague philosophical doubts as to the correctness of mathematical methods (such as
have been canvassed in Section 2.2) but rather because mathematics cannot model the whole
environment in which a software product is developed and used, and so the ultimate level of
confidence is always less than the certainty aspired to.
The discipline of High-Integrity Software Engineering has evolved a foundation and methodology
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for developing software systems in which we can have a high, and justifiable, level of confidence
or assurance. In comparing software engineering methods with more traditional engineering
methods McDermid [McD93, page 24] says:
we are using confidence, or assurance, in the face of inadequate knowledge and
uncertainty as a ‘substitute’ for statistical knowledge
In recent times national and international standards for the development of safety-critical soft-
ware development have been devised (see for example [BS92]). Typically these require a safety
analysis of the system and categorise system components by their safety level (or integrity,
level). (See Bell and Reinert [BR93] for a discussion of integrity levels — which is based on the
pioneering work done by the IEC [Com92].) The integrity level assigned to a component reflects
its contribution and importance to the critical functionality of the system. More assurance is
required for those components deemed to be in the higher integrity levels.
Where the highest levels of integrity are required it is often mandatory to use formal methods
for development, since these are seen as giving a greater degree of confidence in the resulting
product than with more traditional methods. For example the British defence standard MOD-
0055 [oD97] defines four integrity levels and specifies requirements for developing software at
each level. At the highest level it takes the view that the use of formal methods is the best way
of meeting these requirements.
While the military have long seen the need for high integrity software for both safety and security
reasons, the advent of ‘e-commerce’ has made software security a much more general concern.
There are a number of national and international standards in this area. The UK ITSEC [ano96]
standard is widely used in Europe, and an international standard (the ‘Common Criteria’ (CC)
[ano00a] and ‘Common Evaluation Methodology’ (CEM)[ano00b]) has been developed. ITSEC
has seven security levels — E0 to E6. The highest level, E6, requires formal proof:
19
20 Theorem Provers and Software Engineering
Evidence must be provided by means of formal proof that the formal description of
the security enforcing components in the architectural design satisfies the relevant
SEF properties in the formal security policy model. [ano96, 8.13].
This is an example of a requirement that a developer compile an assurance argument [MKM99]
— a formal argument that a critical design or implementation meets some criteria of safety or
correctness as part of the certification process. (For a published example of development to the
highest (E6) level see [SCW98, Ste98, Ste01].) How much confidence we can place in a system
depends on a number of factors, indeed the concept of assurance encompasses an assessment of
risk and an evaluation that covers all aspects of the product and its development [McD89]. For
example the ITSEC standard describes the scope of the standard thus:
The ITSEC addresses the assurance which may be placed in the security enforcing
functionality of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) from two different points of view.
It distinguishes assurance in the correctness in the implementation of the security
enforcing functions and mechanisms from assurance in their effectiveness. [ano96,
2.3].
In this case assurance covers not only that the software meets its specification, but also that
the specification is effective in the assumed environment — the security objectives, assumed
threats and so on.
Where formal methods are used to give increased assurance, our confidence in the result is
directly dependent on the correctness of the proofs used in their application. For instance,
where formal verification techniques are used to demonstrate that a software product meets its
specification, proofs will be conducted to show that the verification conditions are met. Where
such proofs are performed by a computerised theorem prover, our confidence in the software
products depends directly on this tool. The main objective of this thesis is to investigate one
approach to increasing our assurance in the proofs generated by computerised theorem provers
in this type of situation.
In this chapter we have reviewed the development of theorem provers from a software engineering
perspective. We have focused on their role in formal methods, particularly as used in high-
integrity software engineering. In this area conformance to national and international standards,
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and certification by standard bodies is becoming increasingly important. In the next chapter we
discuss possible approaches to increasing our confidence in the results of computerised theorem
provers, and describe the approach that is investigated in this thesis. This approach is one
that is suited to situations where certification of the kind that we have just described is a key
requirement.
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CHAPTER 3
A Verified Generic Proof Checker
In this chapter we give the rationale for a verified generic proof checker as a component of a
formal program development system, and investigate the requirements for such a checker in
detail. Our two main requirements are verifiability and genericity. A proof checker is used in a
software development environment in order to increase our confidence in the software produced,
and using a verified checker further increases this level of confidence. Requiring that the checker
be generic, in the sense that it can be used with a variety of theorem provers, means that the
checker can be used more widely, thus amortising the cost of verifying it. The genericity of the
proposed proof representation is a key feature that differentiates this approach from previous
work on proof checkers. A third important requirement is that a checker that is designed and
constructed to meet the first two requirements should be capable of checking large proofs, of
the size that will be encountered in industrial use. That is we require that the proof checker be
scalable.
In the first section of this chapter (Section 3.1), we discuss the different ways in which proofs may
be validated or checked. Next, in Section 3.2, we describe the approach that we are adopting in
this thesis, that of using a stand-alone proof checker that is both amenable to formal verification
and generic with respect to the theorem provers whose proofs it can check. In Section 3.3 we
describe the requirements for a proof checker of this type. If we are to use the checker with an
existing theorem prover we will almost certainly have to modify the prover in some way, since
most provers do not generate detailed records suitable for checking. In Section 3.4 we describe
how a translator program can be used to simplify such an implementation. Using a translator
also makes the approach more generic and we describe a general architecture for such a system.
Finally in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 we discuss the issues of the verification of the checker and the
requirement of scalability.
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3.1 Different Approaches to the Validation of Proofs
Where formal methods are used in a software development system to give increased assurance,
our confidence in the result is directly dependent on the correctness of the proofs that support the
application of the formal methods. Two strategies that may be used to increase our confidence
in the correctness of such proofs are
1. increasing our confidence in the system used to perform the proofs, and
2. performing the proofs twice using independent systems.
Where proofs are performed by hand, an example of the first strategy would be the requirement
that the persons performing proof activities be professionals with some relevant accreditation,
while an example of the second strategy would be peer review of the proofs.
Where proofs are performed by a computerised theorem prover, the strategies that may be used
include,
1. increasing our confidence in the proof system by using a trustworthy theorem prover,
perhaps one that has been formally verified, or
2. performing the proofs twice by either rerunning the proof using a different theorem prover,
or recording an audit trail of proof which can be checked in a separate operation.
In the latter case we can either have a human being examine and validate the proof record, or
use a tool to check the proof automatically.
In this thesis we investigate the feasibility of the last approach — that of recording proofs
and checking them with a stand-alone proof checker. However, before examining the particular
approach that we have adopted in detail, we first discuss all of the approaches in general terms.
This will not be a detailed comparison of the different approaches — our intention is rather to
highlight the characteristics of the approach that we have chosen. We do not claim that any of
these approaches is intrinsically better than the others; each approach has its advantages and
disadvantages, and the relative merits may depend on the circumstances. Indeed the degree
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of assurance needed may dictate that more than one approach is used in a particular software
development.
3.1.1 Trusting the theorem prover
The first approach mentioned is to ‘trust the theorem prover’. There are several ways of applying
this philosophy, one approach is the basis of LCF and its successors.[GMW79, Gor97]. LCF
is written in the strongly typed language ML and theorems are defined as objects of a single
type with a strictly limited set of constructors. These constructors are designed so that only
valid theorems can be generated, that is: the base objects are all theorems and the constructors
can only generate valid theorems from valid theorems. In this way we can be sure that all the
theorems generated by the system are valid, provided that the system is implemented correctly.
A slightly different approach is to design a theorem prover in a structured way such that a
few isolated components are responsible for the integrity of the proofs generated.1 These
components are often termed a ‘trusted core’. If we can demonstrate that this core is correctly
implemented then we can have a high degree of confidence in the system as a whole. The
limiting case of this approach would be to completely verify the theorem prover. It is a premise
of the current thesis that performing a full verification of a practical theorem prover is not
feasible at the present time. However, the ACL2 system [BM94, KM97] offers a bootstrapping
strategy for eventually achieving this end since the ACL2 theorem prover is itself written in
ACL2, and can be used to reason about its own code.
A similar project has been undertaken for the Coq theorem prover. In [BW97] the theory of the
Calculus of Constructions, which forms the basis of Coq, is formalised within Coq itself. This
formalisation is used to prove the decidability of the Coq type inference system, and, since Coq
is based on a ‘proofs as types’ paradigm, this proof is equivalent to a verification of the proof
checking algorithm for Coq. Thus the key component of the Coq core has been verified within
Coq itself. (This work is along similar lines to Pollack’s verification of the LEGO type system
[Pol94, Pol95].)
1This concept is inherent in the design of a number of theorem proving systems. It was apparently discussed
in [BD93] which is cited in, for example [Won95], but this was part of an informal workshop and is not in the
published proceedings of TYPES93.
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The main weakness in the ‘trust the theorem prover’ approach is that it fails to provide an
independent check on the proofs generated.2 As discussed in Section 2.3.2, standards for high-
integrity systems generally require an independent check, if only to avoid a single point of
failure.
3.1.2 Using a second theorem prover
The second strategy is to redo the proofs using another theorem prover. This strategy has an
immediate appeal since there are a number of mature theorem proving systems readily available.
The main drawback is that each system is different and migrating a set of proofs and associated
theories from one to another is often difficult. Differences of syntax, tactic repertoire, available
theories and supported logics all create difficulties for both the technical task of migration and
the interpretation of the results.
The benefits of being able to transfer theories and proofs between theorem provers are, however,
general and not restricted to software verification. There are a number of studies in which
two theorem provers are compared, either in general terms, or for a specific task (such as
implementing a ZF-style set theory) [AG95, Age95, How96, Zam97]. It may be possible to some
degree to ‘emulate’ one theorem prover within another — one experiment in this direction is
the Mizar mode for HOL [Har96c]. More loosely one theorem prover may have a similar ‘style’
to another. For instance the generic prover Isabelle has an implementation of a higher-order
logic in the HOL style which is similar to that of the HOL theorem prover itself (the system
is often called Isabelle/HOL [NPW01]). The migration of theories and proofs between such
related systems should be easier than for other cases.
There are few examples in the literature where the proofs from one theorem prover are imported
into another, however we may mention here some experimental work with the Eves system
[SCKP92] where libraries from other provers were imported into Eves and the proofs re-done.
Nevertheless this approach is difficult, since in general the base logic differs between theorem
2In this context the following quotation is relevant to the aims of this thesis: It should be noted that until
ACL2 constructs independently checked formal proof-objects . . . a proof by ACL2 about its own source code has to
be regarded with the same skepticism one is inclined toward when someone says ‘I would never lie to you’ [BM94,
page 27].
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provers and the theories may need to be reworked, and the results should be treated with
caution.
3.1.3 Using human beings to check the proof
In the context of high-integrity software engineering the third approach (using human checkers)
is the most straightforward way of meeting an obligation for independent checking imposed by
regulations or standards. A recent example of using humans to both produce and check proofs
in order to meet regulatory requirements is in the certification of the protocol for the Mondex
electronic-purse system [SCW98, Ste98, Ste01]. As mention in Section 2.3.2, this system is
certified to the highest level of security (ITSEC level E6). This requires formal specification
and also the production, and auditing, of formal proofs that show that the low level design
correctly implements the abstract security properties specified.
Human beings are able to interpret all varieties of theories, logics and proof styles. However they
are not very good at reading very long and detailed proofs, nor those presented in styles that
differ significantly from the normal conventions for presenting proofs to human beings. Therefore
in order for humans to check proofs efficiently the proofs should not be unreasonably large and
they should be presented in a user friendly fashion. However, much of the proof involved in
software verification is naturally detailed, low-level and repetitious, and often results in large
proofs — in short it is unsuitable for human checking.
This difficulty may be ameliorated by strategies such as reducing the size of proofs. Proof size
may be reduced either by breaking a proof into a series of lemmas that are proven separately,
or by summarising a proof using large steps whose detail is hidden by the theorem prover.
The latter strategy has the danger that important details (or flaws!) may be glossed over.
Much work has also been done on the presentation of proofs in ‘human-readable’ formats.
Current theorem provers that emphasise this type of presentation include PVS [OSR93a] and
Coq [BBC+97, HKPM97].
We may conclude, however, that the checking of machine-generated proofs is intrinsically more
suited to processing by other computer programs than to checking by human beings.
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3.1.4 Checking proofs using an automated proof checker
In some ways using an automated proof checker is like using another theorem prover, since
the result is that the proof has been confirmed by two independent programs. However it has
the great advantage that proof checking is much simpler than theorem proving. It is therefore
easier to construct a proof checker than a theorem prover. In addition, from the point of view
of establishing confidence in the results, it is also easier to ascertain the correctness of a checker.
This argument is, for instance, advanced in the recommendations of MOD-0055, where Section
32.5.1.3 of the standard states:
Theorem prover tools are generally large and complicated and it is therefore difficult
to ensure that they are free of errors. In contrast, theorem checkers can be much
simpler. By using a different, and simpler, tool to check the proof the chance of an
error being introduced by one tool and overlooked by the checking tool can be made
very small. [oD97, 32.5.1.3]
Some practical examples of proof checkers in software engineering are given in Section 3.2,
but another example, this time from mathematics, is provided by McCune’s solution of the
Robbin’s conjecture [McC97] (see Section 2.2). This was proved by the Otter theorem prover,
but to check the result McCune wrote a special program in Nuprl that independently checked
the Otter proof record.
It is also important to note that proof derivation is only decidable for simple logics. One of
the differences between computer science and mathematics is that mathematics has a strong
tradition of axiomatization supported by a single well defined logical basis. In contrast, as was
mentioned in Section 2.1.3, computer science tends to use a variety of formalisms and different
logics. For some of these proof derivation may not be decidable. In contrast, proof checking is
decidable for logics of practical importance. Thus proof checking can be done automatically even
when human intervention was originally required to create the proof. This difference between
proving a theorem and the subsequent checking of a proof is discussed in [Har96a, Pol97].
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3.2 A Combined Approach
In Section 3.1 we have reviewed various strategies for increasing our confidence in the proofs
generated by a theorem prover. The two main approaches were to increase our confidence in the
tool that performed the proofs, and to perform each proof twice. In Section 3.1.4 we discussed
the implementation of the second of these approaches by using a separate proof checker. In this
thesis we combine these two strategies by investigating the feasibility of the formal verification
of an independent tool for checking proofs. In this scenario proofs are proven twice (initially
by the theorem prover and then by the checker) — thus implementing strategy 2, and the
correctness of the checker is guaranteed by its being developed formally — thus implementing
strategy 1.
Verified proof checkers for use with a specific theorem prover have been produced before. One
example is the checker for HOL which is discussed further in Section 3.2.1. Another example
is described in [BW97]. As discussed in Section 3.1.1 this work produced a proof of the Coq
type-inference algorithm. But Coq is a constructive theorem prover and has the facility to
extract the computational content of its proofs. Applying the extraction mechanism to the
type-inference proof generates a functional program that is a verified checker for Coq proofs.
In this thesis, however, we are requiring that the checker be capable of checking proofs generated
by a variety of theorem provers — that it is generic. The motivation being that verification is
assumed to be expensive, and a generic verified checker gives maximum benefit for this effort
by being usable in a number of different environments. Genericity is the most novel aspect of
the work in this thesis. In particular, it is a principal aim to determine whether such a generic
checker is in fact simple enough to make verification worth the cost.
3.2.1 Previous Work — the HOL Verified Proof Checker
Before proceeding to discuss the requirements of a generic proof checker in more detail, we first
describe some previous work on a specific proof checker for HOL which covers much of the same
ground, but stops short of attempting genericity. In a series of papers [Won93b, Won95, Won96],
Wai Wong describes a method for recording HOL proofs. In Wong’s system, an extension to
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HOL allows the user to re-run a proof while at the same time logging a record of the proof
steps to an external file. All proof operations in HOL are combinations of a fixed number of
basic rules, so a proof can be recorded as a canonical sequence of applications of these primitive
rules. Wong has also written a proof checker: a program that checks the correctness of proofs
recorded in this way. Although this checker program was based on the work of Joakim Von
Wright that is described below, it was not developed formally and has not been verified.
Von Wright [vW94b, vW94a, vW94c], has developed a formal theory of HOL proofs within HOL
itself. In particular von Wright formalised two related concepts: provable and is a proof (which
he showed to be equivalent). This theory can be used to reason about HOL proofs. Previously
von Wright had developed a mechanism for refining program specifications in HOL to functional
procedures (the HOL ‘RefCalc’ contribution). He uses this mechanism to refine the is a proof
predicate in the HOL proof theory to a (non executable) program — which is effectively a proof
checker for HOL proofs. The refinement mechanism is calculational and generates verification
conditions that can be proved in HOL. Von Wright has proved the set of verification conditions
generated by the development of his proof checker, so the resulting program is fully verified.
The program produced is not executable, but it can be translated by hand to an ML program.
The work of Wong and von Wright has been combined in the project: ‘A Fully Verified Proof
Checker’ [GHH+95, vWWG+95]. However this work stops short of integrating the two systems
to the extent of having a verified checker that accepts automatically generated HOL proof
records as input. Currently the only proof-objects that HOL produces are those described by
Wong which are not in the format required by von Wright’s checker.
3.2.2 Implications of Genericity
We have advocated a generic checker on the grounds that it has a wide field of applicability, and
thus would repay the costs of fully verifying it much more readily than if it were restricted to
use with a single prover. However a generic proof checker does have some of the disadvantages
of using another theorem prover, for instance it still has to cope with different logics, syntaxes
and type systems. Fortunately most of the logics of interest in software verification can be
described in conventional logical style by specifying a set of rules in a standard form, so it
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should be possible to define a formal syntax for a representation of this kind which is applicable
to a variety of logics.
If proofs are checked by a human being, then the logic would need to be accessible to the auditor
in a human-readable form. Often this will be done in what we will call a ‘text-book’ style of
presentation, typically in a form of Natural Deduction. Since this style is independent of any
particular theorem prover and is capable of representing a wide range of logics we are proposing
to adapt it for our generic representation. This general style can be seen in Figure 4.1 (page
51 of Chapter 4, where we define in detail the representation of proofs and logics that we use
for the proof checker). The logics for most provers can be expressed in this way. One example
is the description of HOL given in Chapter 9 (Figures 9.1 and 9.2). This is taken from the
documentation of HOL. Similarly, figure 3.1 is a presentation of an Isabelle logic, taken from
[Pau93, page 2].
Although Figure 3.1 is one presentation of an Isabelle logic, other documentation (such as
[PNW93]) use a more technical style, which reflects the internal representation of rules within
Isabelle. Similarly, Ergo has different representations of its logical rules — a comment in the
Ergo code starts
% There are at least three representations of Ergo inference rules.
%
% 1. The pretty syntax defined by tactics/prettyrule.ql.
%
% Eg. rule fred(Arg) ===
% PNode1 ::: hyp+++[A] ---> C
% ------------------------------
% PNode0 ::: A => C
% provided
% blah(Arg,PNode1).
%
% Rationale: Concrete syntax that gives maximal readability for users.
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Figure 3.1: Logic Rules in the Introduction to Isabelle
and this first representation is the standard format for displaying Ergo rules to the user. This
style is essentially in the ‘text-book’ format, although it is slightly more complicated. (The other
two representations mentioned at the head of the comment are internal Ergo data structures.)
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This topic is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, but we are proposing that a representation
of this kind can be used for a variety of logics. In this framework different logics are just different
sets of rules, which are data to the checker, and the process of checking is the application of an
algorithm that applies rules of the required logic. This algorithm is the same for all logics. For
each theorem prover that is to be used in conjunction with the checker the issue is therefore, how
to represent the logics supported by that theorem prover in this ‘text-book’ style. This should
be simpler and more transparent than translating proofs from one prover logic to another, as is
required when reproving theorems in a second theorem prover.
In particular the issue of semantics — of whether the proof in the second prover means the same
as the original proof is not relevant in this case. This is because from a theoretical perspective
the only semantic property of the theorem that we are interested in when we check it, is its
truth. Also, from a practical perspective, the issue of semantics only becomes a problem when
we try to use theorems proved in the first prover within the second prover (since it may not
mean the same thing in the new environment) — however in the proof checking scenario this
is never done. (Of course the theorem may be used again in the original prover but all we have
then is a new proof checking problem, this has the truth of the first theorem as part of its
context, but does not rely on its semantic interpretation in a second prover.)
3.2.3 Proof Representation by Theorem Provers
We have discussed the representation of proofs from the perspective of the proof checker. How-
ever, proof records will be recorded by the theorem prover that generates the proof. Theorem
provers represent proofs in many different ways, and the way that a proof is represented is de-
termined by the purposes to which the representation is put. These purposes vary from prover
to prover, but we may suggest the following reasons for a theorem prover to construct and keep
explicit proofs.
• Proofs may be kept in order to repeat the proof later (usually as a prover-specific proof
script).
• Proofs may be intrinsically interesting to the user of the prover, for example to mathe-
maticians.
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• Proofs are kept to provide guidance to the user. For example, keeping an explicit proof
structure during proof construction in order to display the proof tree graphically.
• Proofs are kept to extract proof content. For example the extraction of tactics, derived
rules or proof plans.
• Proofs are kept to extract computational content — programs or algorithms.
• Proofs are used to model other objects, for example a proof in a theory of programs may
represent a program refinement.
• Proofs are kept as a complete record of the activity of the prover for auditing purposes.
• More specifically a prover may keep proofs to facilitate the checking of its results by a
human being or another computer program.
These different purposes determine differing requirements for the representation. However these
purposes are not mutually exclusive and the same representation may be used to facilitate
different uses for the proof. For example, the prover may extract a representation of a proof
in natural language which may be stored as an audit record, or used to communicate the
proof to others besides the proof creator, or to provide easily understood feedback during proof
construction. A user may thus use a single representation of the proof for several different
purposes.
Where proofs are kept we may enquire how they are represented by the prover, and it is an
interesting exercise to examine how different types of representation suit different purposes. But
here we are only concerned with the last reason given above for keeping proofs explicitly, that
is: so that the proof can be checked by a proof checking program. In this case we shall call the
representation of the proof a proof-object.3
An inspection of current theorem provers (such as that in [Wat98]) shows that few have the
ability to construct a proof-object. Indeed, some never construct complete proofs at all. This is
often the case with top-down provers, which adopt the strategy of breaking the initial problem
into smaller and smaller sub-problems and solving these piecemeal. If the purpose of the theorem
3 This is established terminology, see for example [CKT95, Bar96] and also the quotation in the footnote on
page 26.
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prover is simply to establish whether a theorem is valid, then it is sufficient for a top-down prover
to know at each stage just what is left to be proved. When this pool of remaining problems is
empty then the theorem is proven, leaving no record of the complete proof. (However a top-
down prover may generate a complete record of a proof by writing it incrementally to a file
without ever constructing the proof as a whole.)
Of course, for a variety of reasons, most provers do record proofs in some form. But in most
cases the form of representation is useless for proof checking. For example a proof record that
is simply a log of the commands used to create the proof is, in general, only useful as input to
the theorem prover itself. In order to check the proof we require an external record of the proof
that is complete and contains all the information necessary to check the proof.
3.3 Requirements for a Stand-Alone Proof Checker
The general requirements for a stand-alone proof checker may be divided into three parts
1. the general requirements on the software development system of which the checker is a
part,
2. the requirements on the theorem prover to enable its proofs to be checked, and
3. the requirements for the checker itself.
In respect to the system as a whole, the main requirement is that proofs are first-class objects
that are recognised and managed by the system. In order that the proof be repeatable, some
record of it must be kept, even if just a pen-and-paper record by the software engineer. However
it is obviously preferable if this is done automatically by the theorem prover. In fact most
theorem provers can save scripts of proof commands for this purpose. However in the proposed
scenario we have a more specific requirement: that all proofs are recorded in an electronic form
capable of being checked. This may be stated as a requirement to construct an audit trail of
the proof (or proof-object) specifically for the purpose of checking the proof automatically. Such
an audit trail should, of course, be subject to the same version management discipline as other
objects associated with the component being verified. A practical consideration is that proofs
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performed as part of software verification may be large, and so the support environment, and
the tools, used must be scalable to store and process very large proofs.
Our main requirement of the theorem prover is that it can generate a checkable external audit
trail. We have previously discussed different strategies that theorem provers might adopt to
facilitate the checking of their proofs. Using an external checker is not a common one (generating
‘human readable’ proofs is much more popular) and the theorem prover will often have to be
extended to generate a checkable proof record. For example, we have noted that Wai Wong had
to extend HOL for this purpose (although his extension was later incorporated into the core of
some versions of HOL).
The prime requirement for the proof checker itself is that it differentiates between valid and
invalid proofs. This may be divided into the requirement that it never accept an erroneous proof,
and the requirement it never reject a valid proof. The former is the fundamental assurance
property required of the checker when used in the auditing process; while the latter, although
not directly impacting assurance, is vital for maintaining confidence in the checker as a useful
tool. Besides this basic requirement we also want the proof checker to be sufficiently simple to
be amenable to formal verification. We also require that the checker be scalable to large proofs,
as mentioned when discussing the system requirements.
3.4 The Prover/Translator/Checker Architecture
The fundamental requirement of the envisaged approach is the incorporation of a proof checker
into the software engineering environment and the linkage of the theorem prover and checker
via an audit trail which is generated by the one and checked by the other. This relationship is
pictured in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Theorem Prover and Proof Checker
36
3.4 The Prover/Translator/Checker Architecture 37
In practice, the problem of modifying the code of an existing prover to generate an audit trail
acceptable by the checker may be simplified by using an architecture that incorporates an
intermediate translation program. This allows minimal change to be made to an existing prover
to export a proof record in a format appropriate to its ‘native’ proof representation, while the
translation program can then reformat this into the ‘generic’ representation required by the
checker. For example, Isabelle already has a feature that enables a low-level representation of
a proof to be written to a file. A separate translator program might be able to convert this
Isabelle-specific representation to the generic form. This modification to the architecture is
shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Adding a Translator
We do not limit the functions that may be performed by a translator. It may just perform
low-level functions, such as basic syntax conversions which operate on individual terms. Al-
ternatively, it may perform large-scale operations which operate on the whole proof, such as
the global instantiation of meta-variables. In Chapter 6 we describe a proof translator for Is-
abelle. This translator performs the latter operation (the instantiation of meta-variables). It
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also performs a more intricate conversion function that sets up the correct instantiations for
applications of rewrite rules (see Section 6.5.2).
Not all theorem provers have facilities to export a detailed record of their proofs, and those that
have use a variety of formats. If this architecture is used in a system in which proof records can
be generated by several different source theorem provers, then a translator for each theorem
prover is required. The output of each translator will be in the generic format that is accepted
by the proof checker. Figure 3.4 shows the architecture of a system with two different provers.
(Note that the arrows and white boxes show the flow of types of information, they do not imply
the merging of individual proofs from separate sources.) One advantage of this strategy is that
it separates the basic task of recording the proof from the task of detailed conformance to the
generic representation.
Although the translator architecture achieves genericity, it may be argued that this is at the
price of having to verify the translator or translators as well as the checker. However on reflection
it can be seen that this is not really the case. First we note that in most cases an error in the
translation of the actual proof body will result in a corruption that will cause the checking of
the proof to fail. This preserves assurance at the possible cost of degrading efficiency. Second
we note that in the context of software verification we are interested in the validity of theorems,
not in the details of the proofs used. Thus if the translation were to transform a proof into
another that is also valid, for example by rearranging or optimising the proof steps, this would
be irrelevant to the purpose at hand, provided that this is still a proof of the same theorem.
This observation even applies to the unlikely case where an error in the translator converts an
erroneous proof (that was deemed valid through a fault in the prover) into a valid one that is
then passed by the checker. Although this seems paradoxical, we recall that in the context of
auditing formal developments it is sufficient that the theorems be valid, the auditing process
does not pass judgement on the proofs themselves. (In some other situations, such as a checker
for mathematical proofs, we may be more concerned that the proof that we are checking is
the same proof as the original, but this is not a significant consideration here.) Of course this
situation, where the original prover performs incorrectly but this is not detected by the checker,
is to be deprecated; but this will be a rare occurrence, dependent on compensating unrelated
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Figure 3.4: System with Two Theorem Provers
errors. The important point is that such an occurrence does not invalidate the outcome of the
checking process.
Nevertheless, there is a cost to adding a translator, since we do need to be sure that some of
the translation is correct before we can certify that a proof is correct, namely that it accurately
reports the statements of the theorems that it checks, and the logics that it uses to check them.
This is so that the auditor is correctly informed of the theorem being proven and the logic that
is being used (which is a proviso of the proof). It is therefore a requirement of the proof checker
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that these are reported in their representation as passed to the checker. The logic is normally
common to a whole group of proofs and in the software certification scenario we envisage that
checking the translations of this, and the statements of the theorems, can be done ‘by hand’4.
Thus what the stand-alone proof checker does provide is a list of valid theorems, expressed
in the generic syntax, plus a list of the contexts in which these theorems have been checked.
We can describe this situation in terms of a guarantee of relative assurance — that is: on the
assumption that the checker has been correctly verified the theorems are valid if the context
can be verified. A key feature of this strategy is that the task of checking the context is
significantly less than that of checking the theorems themselves. Where a number of theorems
are proved in the same theory this may be done in a sequence where later theorems use earlier
ones. In such a case the context of the later theorems will include the validity of earlier ones,
but this part of the context will have been assured by the checking of those theorems. Where
dependencies between theorems is involved, certification may require a guarantee that there are
no cycles of dependency, but this can be achieved by a protocol requiring a linear sequence of
proofs. However, in this thesis we are only considering the checking of individual proofs. A
general discussion of extending the framework to handle more sophisticated cases can be found
in Chapter 10.
3.5 The Verification of the Proof Checker
One of our requirements is that the proof checker be amenable to formal verification. In a
system such as we have described the generic proof representation must be sufficiently flexible
and powerful to enable it to represent proofs from a variety of provers. But the verification re-
quirement means that this representation must also be as simple as possible, since the simplicity
of the checker depends on the representation that it processes and the simpler the checker the
simpler the task of formally specifying and verifying it. One of the objectives of this thesis is
therefore to examine the feasibility of developing a verified generic proof checker based on a sim-
ple representation. The aims of simplicity and genericity conflict to a certain extent. However,
4These considerations are similar to some of the motivation for the implementation of the Eves proof checker
[KPS95].
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by limiting the scope of the genericity to be just sufficient to support the typical logics used in
software verification we hope to show that a reasonably simple representation is achievable.
3.6 The Scalability of the Proof Checker
In this chapter we have discussed the concept of a verified stand-alone proof checker, and have
given the requirements for such a checker. This was done in the context of using such a tool
in a formal software development environment, where the correctness of the proofs created is
very important, and where the checking of such proofs may be mandated by the certification
processes required for the software products being produced.
Such a scenario is what is commonly termed an ‘industrial strength’ application of formal
methods. In such cases proofs tend to be large. Applications, such as the verification of CPU
microcode with many instructions, typically involve large numbers of proofs or proofs with many
cases. For instance, Wong’s description of the Viper processor verification [Won93a] reports a
series of proofs and lemmas that contained nearly half-a-million proof steps (in HOL) and which
took nearly an hour to run on a Sun 10. Also, formal methods often generate proofs with large
and complex terms. For instance, formalisations of the Z notation (such as in Cogito [THK+97])
will often generate large and complex terms when unfolding complicated schemas. In such cases,
therefore, proofs are often large and complex and it is vital that the tools used can handle this
type of problem efficiently, that is, that they are scalable to large proofs.
The description of the generic verified proof checker project which follows in Parts II and
III, is primarily concerned with requirements and prototyping. Although we keep the issue
of scalability in mind during this discussion, scalability is primarily a property of the final
implementation, and we do not take the project that far in this thesis. The issue is, however,
taken up in detail in Part IV when we evaluate the prototyping work done in the thesis and
discuss the prospects for a full implementation as future work.
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter we have described the concept of a ‘generic verified proof checker’. We have
described the general problem of confidence in the proofs generated by computerised theorem
provers, and have discussed various approaches to this problem. We are specifically concerned
with the question of the assurance of the results of the development of high-integrity software
using formal methods. We have argued that, in this situation, a generic verified proof checker
is a powerful solution to providing confidence in proofs, and that it is particularly suited for use
as a tool in the certification and auditing of formal developments.
In the remainder of this thesis we develop a particular version of a proof checker and demonstrate
its feasibility by prototyping. The proof checking scenario consists of two parts: the recording
of proofs, and the checking of proofs. In Part II we investigate proof recording in detail.
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CHAPTER 4
Proofs and their Representation
In this chapter we describe how we represent proofs in the proof-objects that are communicated
to the proof checker. In Section 4.1 we discuss the characteristics of proof-objects, and in Section
4.2 describe the general requirements we have of the representation. Then, in Section 4.3, we
give an overview of how we have chosen to represent proofs to meet these requirements. The
next sections describe the parts of the proof representation in more detail and explain some of
the reasons for the design choices that we have made. The representation of terms is described
in Section 4.4, of the logical context in Section 4.5 and of the structure of proofs in Section
4.6. In Section 4.7, we discuss the implications of the representation described here for the
representation of proofs for more general purposes. Finally Section 4.8 has some concluding
remarks. A definition of the representation in EBNF form can be found in Appendix A.
4.1 The Nature of Proof-Objects
In Chapter 3 we described the concept of a generic proof checker. The input to the checker
is a representation of a proof constructed by a theorem prover and written to an external file.
As discussed in Section 3.4 this representation may require translation before it can be input
to the proof checker. We call the final version, whether produced directly by the prover or via
a translator, the proof-object. In this section we describe some properties of proofs that are
relevant to how we represent these proof-objects.
4.1.1 Forwards and Backwards Proof
Proofs can be constructed either forwards or backwards. In forwards proof one works from the
axioms of the logic and the assumptions of the theorem and finishes with an assertion of the
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theorem itself. In contrast, in backwards proof one takes the theorem to be proved as a goal and
applies a rule of the logic to break it into subgoals, the subgoals are then progressively tackled
in the same way until no unproven subgoals remain. In practice different parts of a proof may
be constructed in different directions.
Although we have described the forwards and backwards styles in terms of proof construction,
more generally they represent two different ways of viewing proofs. To the checker the direction
of construction is irrelevant, since any part of a completed proof can be viewed or checked
in either ‘direction’. In fact the direction of checking that we shall use is strictly backwards.
The main reason for checking proofs in the backwards direction is that this strategy is easily
applied to the tree representation which we shall be using for proofs. This is discussed further
in Section 4.6. The direction used for proof construction may, however, have some indirect
implications for the checker since it often influences the form of the rules and/or axioms used
to describe the logic. This is usually called the ‘presentation’ of the logic. The same logic (in
the sense of describing the same set of true sentences) may be presented in different ways, with
some formulations of the rules being more convenient for forwards proof construction and some
for backwards. Interactive theorem provers, as used in software verification, commonly use a
backwards style and have logics suited to this. This is another reason why we are adopting a
backwards style for checking our proofs.
4.1.2 Meta-Variables
A feature of goal-directed interactive theorem provers is that they commonly implement meta-
variables in some form. Meta-variables are variables local to the proof that can be introduced
during the application of a rule and then instantiated later. (Note that the theorem itself may
be a schematic theorem containing variables — these are not meta-variables in the sense being
discussed here.) Meta-variables are a typical feature of backwards proof where the details are
gradually filled in as the proof of the theorem is decomposed into smaller problems. The rules
applied in a proof are generally schematic and meta-variables can be introduced by replacing a
schematic variable in a rule by a meta-variable rather than fully instantiating the rule at that
point. Values are determined for these meta-variables at some later stage of the proof.
The stance taken here is that meta-variables are an artefact of proof construction. A proof-
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object represents a completed proof so it contains complete information for each rule instance
used in the proof. This is so even where, during proof construction, the details were not
determined when the rule was applied but were determined later in the proof. The information
to instantiate meta-variables is to be found somewhere in the proof, so we require the resolution
of all local meta-variables. These should be eliminated from the proof record before it is written
to the proof-object.
In some theorem provers this is the case anyway. For instance, where a prover is implemented
in Prolog instantiation of variables is automatically propagated, and so any variable that is
instantiated is eliminated in favour of its instantiation throughout the proof. In other cases a
translator is required to accumulate the instantiations of meta-variables and ensure that they
are applied throughout the proof-object generated by the translator. But, however it is done,
we assume that the proof representation passed to the checker is independent of the proof
construction process and in particular that all meta-variables have been eliminated in favour of
their eventual instantiations.
4.1.3 The Representation of Rules and Constraints
Proofs are assertions about objects in a particular logic; they are not assertions in that logic
itself. Thus proofs are conducted in what is often called a ‘meta-logic’ of the particular logic, in
contrast we may call the logic itself the ‘object-logic’. Although a proof represents objects from
the object-logic, for instance the true formulae which are the theorems being proven, these are
manipulated at the meta-level. Generic theorem provers may use a single meta-logic to reason
about a variety of different object-logics.
Working at the meta-level does not assume any specific object-level semantics. For instance, a
proof assumes no semantics for the connectives of the object-logic. Of course these semantic
properties are reflected in the rules in which the connectives occur, for instance in De Morgan’s
Laws, but a proof deals with syntactic derivation, and does not assume semantic properties.
This also means that the traditional distinction between formulae and terms is not relevant, so
the one category of terms is sufficient.
In Section 3.2.2 we have outlined the ‘text-book’ style of representing proof rules, which we
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claim is generic. A typical rule, represented in this style, is
∃ x • P P ` Q
Q
∃ elim
with the condition that x is not free in Q or any assumption except P .
This contains the following components.
• Schematic variables such as P and Q.
• Quantifiers, such as ∃, and possibly operators of the object-logic.
• Binding variables in quantifiers, such as x. We shall refer to these as ‘object-variables’.
• Rule constraints, such as not-free-in constraints.
At the meta-level, object-level items such as logical connectives are represented as constants,
which are uninterpreted. However the structure of quantified terms is important at the meta-
level. Thus an object-level quantifier is represented by a meta-level quantifier, but no semantic
interpretation of that particular quantifier is imposed at the meta-level.
As in the example above, some quantifier rules are conditional and require not-free-in constraints
to define their applicability. When a rule is applied any such constraints on the applicability
of the rule must be satisfied for that particular instance of the rule to be a valid application.
This requires that we evaluate a condition of the form ‘x not-free-in T ’, where T is some
term. This must be done both in the theorem prover, when creating the proof, and also in the
checker, when checking it. A not-free-in constraint can be evaluated by examining the structure
of the term to which it applies, and in particular the free or bound status of object-variables.
However, when the evaluation of such a constraint is pushed through the structure of a term it is
ultimately dependent on the not-free-in status of the constraining object-variable with respect
to individual variables, which may include any schematic variables that appeared in the original
theorem. Thus the representation of the original theorem must include information about the
not-free-in status of object-variables with respect to any schematic variables that it contains,
in order that not-free-in evaluation be completed.
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There are two ways of representing such information in the theorem. The simplest way is to use
explicit not-free-in constraints. Using this approach, if the rule shown above were to be proven
as a theorem (that is as a derived rule) its representation would include the assertion ‘x not-
free-in Q ’, which is, of course, a constraint on the applicability of the theorem. An alternative
style is to represent dependent variables explicitly, leaving not-free-in conditions implicit — to
be evaluated from the dependency information. Using this style, any possible dependency on
the variable x would be stated explicitly. So in the rule above, P would be written as P(x),
while the constraint on Q can be expressed simply by omitting any dependency on x. Thus the
constraint is expressed implicitly, and no clause corresponding to ‘x not-free-in Q ’ is required.
An associated convention is that of the status of meta-level object-variables, are they variables
or constants? That is, in the statement of a theorem, can x and y be identical (as opposed to
perhaps just having the same value)? This convention is linked to the preceding one, since if
not-free-in’s are represented explicitly then object-variables will be variables. Thus, with the
explicit not-free-in convention, a quantified term will be represented in a form like ∀ x • P , and
the similar term ∀ y • P will, in general, represent a different object-level term. Here x and y
are variables at the meta-level, and may represent different object-level variables. They will be
identical variables if they are constrained by x not-free-in y, although, of course, the object-level
variables that they represent could have identical values in other cases. On the other hand, with
the explicit dependency convention, the corresponding quantified term will be represented in a
form like ∀ x • P(x ), where the name x is bound, and the term represents the same object-level
term whatever name is used.
Where dependent variables are represented explicitly, the convention will invariably be that
object-level variables are represented by constants, since to allow the possibility that x and y
be identical just complicates the interpretation to no purpose.
Thus the conventions described above occur in the following two pairs.
• Implicit not-free-in constraints (by means of explicit variable dependencies) and constant
naming of object-variables.
• Explicit representation of not-free-in constraints and the use of meta-level variables to
represent object-variables.
49
50 Proofs and their Representation
The proof checker should support both approaches, although this means that a slightly dif-
ferent algorithm has to be used, since the approach taken affects the evaluation of not-free-in
conditions.
4.1.4 Proof Calculi and Sequents
The representation of a proof by a theorem prover is dependent on the calculus that it uses. A
calculus is a representation of the axioms and rules of the logic and a mechanism for applying
those rules. Two of the most important types of calculi were described by Gentzen [Gen69] in
his work on proof theory: Natural Deduction and the Sequent Calculus. Gentzen formulated
Natural Deduction to formalise classical mathematical reasoning, which is a forwards style where
what is to be proven is deduced from what is known. Gentzen was pursuing investigations in
proof theory and, since Natural Deduction was difficult to handle theoretically, he devised the
Sequent Calculus which was more convenient for his purpose. Sequent Calculus is a notation in
which various logics can be expressed, and it introduced the important notation of the sequent.
A sequent is a pair of lists of formulae written thus:
A1 . . .An ⇒ S1 . . .Sm
the sequence of formulae S1 . . .Sm is called the succedent of the sequent (often there is just one
formula) and the sequence A1 . . .An is the antecedent. The members of the antecedent are often
called the hypotheses. Note that either m or n may be zero but not both. The succedent and
antecedent of a sequent are sequences of formulae and the Sequent Calculus includes a set of
structural rules to manipulate these sequences.
Natural Deduction and Sequent Calculus are families of calculi that can be used to present
different logics (in particular classical and intuitionistic propositional and predicate calculus).
In both there are typically two rules for each logical connective. In Natural Deduction there
are introduction and elimination rules for each connective. In the Sequent Calculus, as defined
by Gentzen, the elimination rules are replaced by rules for introducing a connective to the left
of the sequent (that is in the antecedent) — so in these calculi we have introduction rules to
the left and right of the sequent for each connective. Logics expressed in the style of Gentzen’s
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Sequent Calculus Rules [RC90, (adapted)]:
Γ⇒ ∆,A Γ⇒ ∆,B
Γ⇒ ∆,A ∧ B ∧ r
A,B ,Γ⇒ ∆
A ∧ B ,Γ⇒ ∆ ∧ l
A,Γ⇒ ∆,B
Γ⇒ ∆,A→ B → r
Γ⇒ ∆,A B ,Γ⇒ ∆′
A→ B ,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′ → l
Natural Deduction Rules [RC90]:
A B
A ∧ B ∧ intro
A ∧ B
A
∧ elim1
A ∧ B
B
∧ elim2
[A]....
B
A→ B → intro
A→ B A
B → elim
Sequent Encoding of Natural Deduction Rules [SB96]:
Γ⇒ A Γ⇒ B
Γ⇒ A ∧ B ∧ intro
Γ⇒ A ∧ B
Γ⇒ A ∧ elim1
Γ⇒ A ∧ B
Γ⇒ B ∧ elim2
Γ,A⇒ B
Γ⇒ A→ B → intro
Γ⇒ A→ B Γ⇒ A
Γ⇒ B → elim
Figure 4.1: A Comparison of Different Proof Calculi — Rules
original Sequent Calculus require multiple formulae in the succedent. Figure 4.1 shows the
rules for the conjunction and implication connectives for propositional logic in both Gentzen’s
Sequent Calculus and Natural Deduction.
Sequent notation is a general one and its use is not confined to Sequent Calculus systems. It has
proved a convenient data structure for computerised proof, especially the concise representation
of rules. Standard presentations of Natural Deduction, such as that in [Pra65]1 do not use
sequents, however it can be presented in a calculus that does do so, as is also illustrated in
Figure 4.1. In such cases Natural Deduction only requires single formula succedents, and a
1 Except in the appendix.
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variety of common logics can be presented in this way.
The interpretation of the sequent connective ⇒ may be different in the various usages. In the
standard interpretation, the sequent:
A1 . . .An ⇒ S1 . . .Sm
is taken to mean:
A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧ An → S1 ∨ S2 ∨ . . . ∨ Sm
However, in the case of Natural Deduction (with a single formula in the succedent) we can
interpret the sequent as:
A1 . . .An ` S1
where ` represents derivability. There is also some terminological confusion in this area, since
the term ‘sequent calculus’ is often used for any calculus expressed in terms of sequents, although
some reserve it just for those calculi which have rules with connectives on each side of the
sequent.
A third calculus is the Hilbert-style calculus [HA50]. In this calculus the logic is presented
primarily in the set of axioms, the rules of deduction being restricted to a few basic rules
of inference. The Hilbert-style calculus is rarely used for practical theorem provers. Its main
application is in proof theory and in the axiomatic presentation of logics. However, the inference
rules of the Hilbert-style calculus can be also expressed using sequents, so a sequent-based
representation can be used for all three calculi. Examples of propositional logic proofs in three
different calculi are given in figure 4.2.
In this thesis we adopt a sequent-based representation of logics in our proof-objects, and we
limit these to the single formula succedent form.
52
4.1 The Nature of Proof-Objects 53
A Comparison of Proofs of (Q → R)→ ((P → Q)→ (P → R))
Sequent Calculus proof:
P ⇒ P assump Q ,P ⇒ Q assump
P ,P → Q ⇒ Q → l R,P ,P → Q ⇒ R assump
P ,P → Q ,Q → R ⇒ R → l
P → Q ,Q → R ⇒ P → R → r
Q → R ⇒ (P → Q)→ (P → R) → r
⇒ (Q → R)→ ((P → Q)→ (P → R)) → r
Natural Deduction proof:
[P ] [P → Q ]
Q → elim [Q → R]
R → elim
P → R → intro[P ]
(P → Q)→ (P → R) → intro[P → Q ]
(Q → R)→ ((P → Q)→ (P → R)) → intro[Q → R]
Natural Deduction proof using sequent rules:
P,P → Q,Q → R ⇒ P assump P,P → Q,Q → R ⇒ P → Q assump
P,P → Q,Q → R ⇒ Q → elim P,P → Q,Q → R ⇒ Q → R assump
P,P → Q,Q → R ⇒ R → elim
P → Q,Q → R ⇒ P → R → intro
Q → R ⇒ (P → Q)→ (P → R) → intro
⇒ (Q → R)→ ((P → Q)→ (P → R)) → intro
Hilbert-style proof:
(Q → R)→ (∼ P ∨ Q)→ (∼ P ∨ R) Substitution instance of the Axiom:
(Q → R)→ (S ∨ Q)→ (S ∨ R)
(Q → R)→ (P → Q)→ (P → R) Definition of →
Figure 4.2: A Comparison of Different Proof Calculi — Proofs
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4.2 Requirements
We require that our proof checker be generic in the sense that, where we wish to add a proof
checker as a proof-auditing component to a software verification system, we should be able to use
the standard checker, without modification. Thus the checker must be sufficiently flexible that
it can handle input from a number of different provers. (Although we note that the auditing
system of which the checker is a part can be modified for different provers, in particular we
may utilise a specific translator program in each case.) The checker must also be verifiable,
and verifiability has, in part, determined the type of genericity required of the checker. A
checker that could be used with different theorem provers by instantiating generic code for each
particular case does not suffice — for this requires re-verification for each prover.
In this strategy the representation used for the proofs is very important. The task of adapting
a theorem prover to export its proofs in a format that conforms to the checker’s representation
is dependent on the expressiveness of the proof representation, and this task should be feasible
for a wide range of provers — otherwise the goal of genericity will not be attained. On the
other hand, the representation must be fairly simple, otherwise the algorithm for processing it
will be unduly complex — making the task of verifying the checker a large one.
The algorithm for checking that the proof is valid is described in Chapter 7. The result of the
algorithm is a judgement as to whether the proof is valid or not, but in addition the checker
generates a list of ‘provisos’ upon which the judgement depends. Provisos supply information
that enables a human auditor to understand the limitations of the imprimatur of the checker.
An auditor can then proceed to make further checks to confirm the unconditional validity of
the proof. The informational requirements of provisos are described in Chapter 7 as part of
the discussion of the checking algorithm. The logic in which the proof is done is one of these
provisos, however we require the checker to be more specific by listing those parts of the logic
that are directly relevant to the validity of the proof, for example which rules are actually used in
the proof. In addition the proof may depend on assertions that are not justified within the logic,
examples are appeals to a decision procedure for arithmetic calculation or an external program
for algebraic simplification. We use the term oracles for such external sources of assertions
which are deemed to be true. The checker must recognise appeals to oracles and list them in
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the provisos so that they can be checked by some other means. Note also that with the current
checker the type correctness of the proof record is also one of the provisos for each proof.
In order to keep the system as simple as possible, we are, in this thesis, assuming the case where
a proof-object contains a single proof. However, in a realistic situation the system in which the
proof checker is embedded will be handling theories (which are sets of related theorems) and
there may be efficiencies to be found in supporting the checking of such theories using more
complex proof-objects that contain a number of related proofs. The issues associated with
such an extension are discussed further in Section 10. In particular, if the recording/checking
mechanism were to be extended to allow the checking of multiple proofs in a single proof-object,
care would need to be taken that premises used as local rules, as described in Section 4.6.2, are
indeed local to just the proof in which they are declared, and not inherited by later proofs.
One important feature of theories that we are not addressing in this thesis is the possibility of
circular reasoning by means of mutually dependent theorems — the case where two theorems
rely on each other, either directly or indirectly, for their validity. This is seen as a separate
concern from checking the validity of the proofs individually. However the proof checker can
assist in managing this problem — the list of provisos provided by the checker includes all the
theorems used, and this can be used as data to procedures that check for such circularities.
In pursuing the aim of simplicity we have adopted a representation that places some restrictions
on genericity. Among these is a focus on backwards provers, which are the commonest model for
practical interactive provers. We have also placed restrictions on the format of sequents, which
has implications for the presentations of logics that can be supported. The restriction to a single
succedent restricts the way that logics may be presented, thus classical predicate logic must be
presented in a natural deduction form rather than the more appealing sequential calculus form
(LK). This is not seen as a major drawback because a single succedent presentation is needed in
order to use the calculus for backwards proof, and as we have stated most interactive theorem
provers support a backwards proof style. This restriction also eliminates the need for structural
rules that refer to the list of succedents, and there are other restrictions that limit the structural
rules that apply to hypotheses. To anticipate Section 4.5.4 we shall be representing hypothesis
lists implicitly by just recording the addition or deletion of hypotheses between the conclusion
and premises of a rule. We shall also be assuming that the order of these hypotheses is not
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significant. This means that the exchange rule is assumed by our representation. A theorem
prover may exchange or rotate hypotheses, but it is not necessary to represent such actions
explicitly by proof steps with the representation that we have chosen. On the other hand the
weakening rule (that is, delete hypothesis) will require a proof step, and if weakening is done
implicitly by the prover then the proof recorder must insert an extra proof step (and also add
‘delete hypothesis’ as an explicit rule). The implicit assumption of some structural rules for
hypotheses does restrict the logics that can be represented, in particular substructural logics
cannot be represented. However, such logics are not commonly used in formal methods. Where a
choice has to be made between a simple representation and a restriction on our ability to support
unusual logics or atypical theorem provers, we have opted for simplicity of representation.
4.3 The Proof-Object Representation
Each proof-object consists of three parts:
• a header containing some basic information that identifies the system that generated the
proof-object and the proof that it contains,
• the context, which describes the logic used for the proof, and
• the proof itself.
4.3.1 The Header
The information in the header is strictly irrelevant for checking purposes, and is ignored by
the checking algorithm. The first three fields contain standard identification information. The
first identifies the originating theorem prover, for example ‘Isabelle 98, v 1.3’. The second
field contains the version of the proof exporting system, for example ‘1.7’. This identifies the
software that actually wrote the proof-object. This may comprise an extra module added to the
theorem prover for proof reporting, and perhaps a translator as well. The third field is some
text that identifies the theorem. This might just be the name of a theorem, for example ‘And
Split’, the name of a file containing a proof-object, such as ‘jprop/and split.prf ’, or perhaps an
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identification tag generated by a version management tool. A fourth field is provided for any
other annotation. This can be used for any purpose, from adding comments by the author of
the proof, to recording a check-sum or other security information.
Although the basic checking algorithm ignores these fields, the prototype checker records the
first three in the log file in which it also records the progress of the checking process. Thus the
log file might be headed:
-- Proof Generated by Isabelle 98, v 1.3 recorder: version 1.7 --
-- Proof ID : /home/gwat/phd/provers/isabelle/scripts/imp_reflex.scr --
4.3.2 The Context
The context describes the logic used for the proof. It consists of an environment describing
some characteristics of the theorem prover, and a list of rules. There is also a place-holder for
a type signature, but this is not currently used. Thus each proof-object is self-contained. The
context is more fully described in Section 4.5.
4.3.3 The Proof
The proof is represented as an organised collection of rule applications. Each member of the
collection has a representation of the instance of some logical rule that was applied at that
point in the proof. The organisation of the collection represents the structure of the proof. It
associates the subgoals generated by applying a rule instance with those parts of the collection
which justify the subgoals. (In fact we shall be using a tree structure to organise our proofs —
see Section 4.6.1.)
In the following sections we examine the components of the proof-object in more detail. The
proof syntax is at two levels: the representation of basic terms of the logic and the representation
of more complex structures which contain terms as elements. The latter include sequents, rules,
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and proof steps. In the next section we describe the syntax of basic terms, and then proceed to
examine how the representation of the context and the proof itself is built up from this basis.
4.4 Terms
Terms are represented internally in theorem provers by many means, but in order for them to
be communicated externally to the checker we require that they be represented in ASCII. It
is assumed that they are in some subset of conventional mathematical/logical notation. That
is: identifiers, numerics, function symbols, operators, lambda expressions and quantified terms.
A Z specification of the checker can be found in Appendix B. This defines a type for terms
in our representation which has six constructors: Constant, Variable, Function Application,
Abstraction, Quantified Term and Substitution.
Note that we have included both λ-terms and quantifiers in our basic syntax. This is because
some meta-logics make explicit use of λ-terms. In theory it is possible either to take the notion
of quantifier as primitive and define λ as a quantifier, or to take λ-terms as primitive and define
logical quantifiers in terms of them. However, it is also possible to support both as independent
constructs, and we support any of these approaches in the proof checker.2
The precise details of the syntax for terms are not especially important, since we can utilise a
translator to convert the syntax used by a theorem prover to the syntax that we have chosen
for the checker representation. We represent all operators, including logical connectives, in
functional form and we rely on the translation process to convert terms to this form. For
example, we represent the formula: ¬ A ∨ P(x , y) which is written in Isabelle as ~ A | P(x,y)
by: |(~(A),P(x,y)). We do not have to identify the individual logical connectives as such or
use the same representation for them for every theorem prover, since it is their behaviour under
the logical rules which characterise the different connectives. Instead we just need to be able to
apply the appropriate rules to terms that contain them (this is done by matching the occurrence
of the same connective in the rule and the term). We can therefore retain the prover’s own
lexical representation of the logical syntax. For example we can use not for negation in Ergo 5
2Of course the λ-calculus may also be defined in theories at the object-logic level, but this is transparent to
the proof checker.
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proofs and ~ in Isabelle proofs.
We do, however, need to know some specific information to connect the logical syntax with
the semantics of our proofs. The checker needs to be able to parse terms so that it can apply
substitutions to terms, instantiate variables in terms, and perform pattern matching on terms.
In particular the checker needs to be able to identify schematic variables, to identify and re-
name bound variables and also convert λ-terms. To achieve this some syntactic items must be
converted to a standard form when recording the proof.
Exactly what these syntactic conventions should be is left open in the EBNF of the representa-
tion in Appendix A, but for the description in this thesis, and in the prototype system, we adopt
the Ergo convention of distinguishing quantifiers by the prefix ‘!!’ and variables in the logic
by ‘!’. (This was simply for convenience since the initial prototyping was done in Qu-Prolog,
the implementation language of Ergo.) In the prototype we also adopt the convention that
constants are represented by quoted strings, which places minimal constraints on the form of
constants from the object-logic. However, to avoid clutter, the quotes have not been used in
the text. We have used the reserved name lambda for the λ operator. We also need to recognise
and manage explicit substitutions, and adopt the representation: [X/Y]Z for the substitution
that replaces Y by X in Z. The identification and translation of these entities is either done by
the theorem prover itself or by the translator.
Details of the representation of terms can be found in Appendix A. As an example, the term:
∀ x • (¬ P(a) ∨ P(x )) ∧ (¬ P(a) ∨ ¬ P(b))
(where P is a schematic variable in the proof in which the term appears) is represented in Isabelle
as:
ALL x . (~ P(a) | P(x)) & (~ P(a) | ~ P(b))
which is represented in our proof-objects as:
!!ALL(!x ,&(|(~(P(!a)), P(!x)), |(~(P(!a)), ~(P(!b)))))
The same term is represented in Ergo 5 as:
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all x ( (not P(a) or P(x)) and (not P(a) or not P(b)))
which we represent as:
!!all(!x ,and(or(not(P(!a)), P(!x)), or(not(P(!a)), not(P(!b)))))
For brevity we have omitted the theory qualifiers on Ergo 5 connectives, thus not may actu-
ally be jprop.not and so on. We shall also omit these qualifiers throughout the rest of this
discussion.
4.5 The Context
The context precedes the proof in the proof-object and describes the logic used in the proof. It
is in three parts: the logical environment, the signature which gives the typing information for
the logic, and the rules of the logic.
4.5.1 The Logical Environment
The logical environment describes fundamental characteristics of the theorem prover which affect
the interpretation of the basic syntax. As described in Section 4.1.3, there are two methods of
handling not-free-in constraints and the relationship between object variables and variables in
the logic. The logical environment therefore consists of a single boolean which defines which of
these alternatives is used by the theorem prover. It is set to true if not-free-in constraints are
represented explicitly, and to false otherwise. The use of this boolean is discussed further in
Chapter 7 and Appendix B.
4.5.2 Signature and Types
Many logics are typed and the validity of a proof in such a logic is contingent on the type
correctness of the terms in the proof. However type checking cannot be done in a generic way,
for instance some type systems are undecidable. The position adopted in this thesis is that type
correctness is part of the set of provisos that the checker simply accepts.
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However this is not a completely satisfactory solution, since the type correctness of the initial
theorem is essential for the proof checking process to function correctly. It is envisaged that
with a more mature proof checker the theorem prover would generate a record of the type
checking process, perhaps as an auxiliary theorem, and include this in the proof-object. The
checker would then check this in a separate operation, and in this case it would need access to
the type signature. To support such an extension the context includes a place-holder for the
type signature, although this is not used in the current version of the checker.
4.5.3 Rules
The third section of the context contains the rules of the logic. The ‘rules’ in this section are
often conceptually divided into rules, axioms, theorems and definitions. However, theorems may
be regarded as, and represented by, derived rules, and similarly we may represent axioms as
rules with no premises. Thus we can use the same framework for rules, axioms and theorems.
With respect to definitions, there are a number of different ways that these may be handled by
theorem provers, and these are discussed further in Section 4.5.5. But we note here that we will
be adopting an approach that can also be accommodated in the framework of rule application.
We are using a sequent-based representation of rules. In this framework, rules have the general
form :
Sequent1[nfi1] Sequent2[nfi2] . . . Sequentn [nfin ]
Sequent0
provided that Constraints
We call Sequent0 the conclusion of the rule and Sequent1 . . . Sequentn its premises. We use this
terminology even though rules can be used in both directions and in backwards proofs rules are
used to derive the premises from the conclusion. A rule may have no premises but must always
have a conclusion.
Not all rules are universally applicable, and there may be applicability conditions that must be
satisfied before we can assert that a rule is properly applied. Here we call such conditions rule
constraints. In the rule schema given above Constraints is an optional list which specifies con-
ditions on the applicability of the rule. Specifically it may prescribe some not-free-in conditions
on variables explicitly mentioned in the rule, a condition describing a rewrite performed by the
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rule, or constraints on the form of the hypotheses. In addition, each of the individual premises,
Sequent1 . . . Sequentn , may have an associated list of not-free-in constraints (nfii).
The following are examples of how the different types of rules can be represented in this way.
We may represent the modus ponens inference rule by:
Γ⇒ A Γ⇒ A→ B
Γ⇒ B
the universal quantification introduction rule by:
Γ⇒ F (y) y nfi Γ
Γ⇒ ∀ x • F (x )
the axiom A→ A by:
⇒ A→ A
a theorem as:
⇒ A ∨ B → B ∨ A
a derived rule as:
Γ,A,B ⇒ C
Γ,A ∧ B ⇒ C
When a generic checker, such as that described in this thesis, checks a proof, it requires that the
rules and axioms of the logic be given to it explicitly as data. This is the situation in generic
theorem provers such as Ergo, Isabelle and Jape, in which logics are defined in theory files which
are supplied to the theorem prover at run-time. In this case we can simply re-format the rule
data given to the prover to generate the list of rules to pass to the checker. However theorem
provers that use a single fixed logic often have their rules encoded in their program code —
HOL is an example of such a system. In such cases the rules of the logic are not readily available
as data in the theorem prover. Instead some other method must be used to generate the list
of rules for inclusion in the proof-object. In the case of a fixed logic, a header file containing
the rules might be created and copied by the translator into the context of every proof. This
requirement is not seen as a disadvantage, since it makes the logic explicit and any external
checking process, even by human beings, would have to work with some description of the logic
rather than its implementation in the code of the prover.
The distinction between generic and fixed-logic theorem provers is not as clear-cut as suggested
above. For example Isabelle has a built in meta-logic which is used to manipulate the rules that
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are defined for individual logics. Here some of the more general rules defined for logics may
involve meta-logical connectives. (An example is the axioms generated for definitions which are
discussed further in Section 4.5.5 and Chapter 7.) In order to handle such rules in a way that
conforms to the generic mechanism used by the checker, the list of rules for the particular logic
is supplemented in the proof context by a set of extra rules for manipulating the meta-logical
connectives. In addition, since the manipulation of meta-logical connectives is handled in the
proof by implicit mechanisms, the proof recorder must identify points where such mechanisms
are used and expand the proof tree at such points by inserting subtrees that perform the same
actions by means of patterns of applications of the supplementary meta-logical rules (see Section
6.5.2 for an example of this process). Thus the list of rules extracted from a theorem prover
may have to be extended by the addition of supplementary rules. Typically such extra rules
are used in parts of the proof where extra steps have to be added to the original proof to adapt
the particular proof style of the prover to our generic mechanism.
The simplest example of a supplementary rule is the assumption rule. Some theorem provers
may have this as an explicit rule of their logics, in others it may be an implicit rule of closure
and implemented by code. We require assumption to be a rule, and thus for the latter type of
theorem prover we add assumption as an extra rule to the context and also insert a node invoking
this rule wherever assumption is used in the proof. Although we are ostensibly modifying the
logic in such situations this is not really the case, since the extra rules are only making explicit
mechanisms that are left implicit in the theorem prover itself. Such rules are highlighted by
qualifying their names with a special tag (see Section 4.5.4). It is obviously incumbent on the
human auditor to check the validity of such extra rules, and satisfy themselves that including
them does not affect properties of the logic such as its soundness. However this task need only
be done once for any particular logic in a given theorem prover.
4.5.4 The Representation of Rules
The representation of a rule is as follows.
• Rule Name — a unique name for the rule. This name is used throughout the proof
to identify this rule. Typically it is the name used by the theorem prover and is often
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qualified by a theory name, e.g., IFOL.allI. The special theory name PCInternal is used
to identify supplementary rules that have been added to the context for compatibility
with the proof checker.
• Conclusion — a sequent containing schematic variables. These variables, and those in
the premises, must be instantiated when the rule is used to generate a rule instance.
• Premises — a list of sequents containing schematic variables. Each premise may have
an associated list of not-free-in constraints on its hypotheses.
• Constraints — a list of constraints, of which there are three types.
1. ishyp(X) — which requires that the given term X matches one of the current hy-
potheses.
2. nfi(x,T) — which requires that the object variable x is not-free-in the term T.
3. rewrite(U,V,X,Y) — which requires that the term Y can be obtained from the term
X by replacing zero or more occurrences of the subterm U by the term V.
ishyp constraints are used in rules that manipulate hypotheses. For example, a rule that
deletes a hypothesis in one of its premises will typically have an ishyp constraint that
ensures that the hypothesis to be deleted is indeed among the current list of hypotheses.
nfi constraints are used in rules that manipulate quantifiers, while rewrite constraints
are used to define rules that implement rewriting.
• Variable List — a list of the schematic variables in the rule. This is used when generating
an instance of a rule for a proof step. The list of variables is matched with the list
of corresponding values that are recorded for the step and the instance generated by
substitution.
• Kind — the type of the rule, for example ‘axiom’ or ‘theorem’. This is used to categorise
rules in the reporting of the provisos of a proof. The values of kind are usually those
used by the theorem prover itself. However, where the translator adds rules for special
purposes (such as the local rules as described in Section 4.6.2) special names are used
which may indicate to the checker that these rules need to be treated in a special way.
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Sequent rules are often written in forms such as:
Γ⇒ P ∨ Q Γ,P ⇒ R Γ,Q ⇒ R
Γ⇒ R ∨ elim
where Γ represents that part of the hypothesis list that is irrelevant to the application of the
rule.
When representing rules we ignore these irrelevant parts of the hypothesis lists and simply
represent the changes in lists between the premises and conclusions. In our ASCII syntax we
represent the removal of a hypothesis P by delete(P) and the addition of P by either post(P)
or pre(P) according to whether the theorem prover appends or prepends added hypotheses.
The latter is an implementation feature of the theorem prover. Although we are representing
hypotheses implicitly in the proof-object, they will be represented by sequences in the specifica-
tion of the proof checker. The explicit representation of post(P) or pre(P) allows the checking
algorithm to follow the order of the originating theorem prover when generating this list. While
this information may allow an implementation to be more efficient in operations such as match-
ing hypothesis lists, the correctness of the checking algorithm does not depend on this feature.
Thus explicit rotation of hypotheses in the theorem prover may cause misalignment with the
order of hypotheses presumed in the checker, but this will not affect the outcome of the checking
process.
Note that while this representation is adequate for rules designed for a backwards proof style a
forward proof style might use a rule in the form:
Γ1 . . .⇒ Y Γ2 . . .⇒ Z
Γ0 . . .⇒ X
where Γ0 is Γ1 ∪ Γ2. Our current representation does not support this since we are focusing on
theorem provers that use a backwards style. This issue is discussed further in Section 4.6.4.
As an example to illustrate the representation of rules, the Isabelle rule for conjunction elimi-
nation is:
Γ⇒ A ∧ B Γ,A,B ⇒ C
Γ⇒ C conjE
This is represented in our proof-objects as a structure that contains the following components.
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‘IFOL.conjE’ % Rule name = rule conjE in theory IFOL
=>C % Conclusion = a sequent
[=>&(A,B), (post(A),post(B)=>C)] % Premises = list of sequents
[] % Constraints (an empty list)
[A,B,C] % List of schematic variables in the rule
‘axiom’ % Kind of rule. In this case an axiom
Note that:
1. The conclusion has no hypothesis list, notionally the actual list in an instance of a rule is
carried forward to all the premises from the conclusion.
2. The hypothesis lists in the premises are represented by sets of modifiers to the hypotheses
of the conclusion. In this case we use the post(..) construct, since Isabelle adds new
hypotheses to the end of its list.
3. The schematic variables in the rule are A, B, C, each of which must be instantiated to give
an instance.
The rule for the deletion of a hypothesis is
Γ⇒ Y
Γ,X ⇒ Y hyp delete
This rule is represented in our proof-objects is a form that contains
‘hyp_delete’ % Rule name
=> Y % Conclusion
[(delete(X)=>Y)] % Premise (with hypothesis X removed)
[ishyp(X)] % Constraint that ensures X was an
% initial hypothesis
[X,Y] % List of schematic variables in the rule
‘axiom’ % Kind of rule
The rule for universal quantifier introduction, was given as an example in Section 4.5.3:
Γ⇒ F (y) y nfi Γ
Γ⇒ ∀ x • F (x ) allI
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The Isabelle version of this rule is represented in our proof-objects by a structure that contains
‘IFOL.allI’ % Rule name
=>!!ALL(!x0, F(!x0)) % Conclusion
[(=>F(!x1),[nfi(!x1)])] % Premises (with not-free-in constraints)
[] % Constraints
[F,!x1]] % List of schematic variables in the rule
‘axiom’ % Kind of rule
Note that:
1. There is a not-free-in constraint list associated with the single premise. This applies to
the hypothesis list of that premise.
2. The list of schematic variables in the rule does not include the bound variable !x0.
We support two forms of not-free-in constraint.
1. Constraints on premises. These apply to the hypotheses of the premises and are
represented as lists of object-variable constraints, as in the example [nfi(!x1)] above.
2. Explicit not-free-in constraints. These specify explicitly a term to which the con-
straint applies. These occur as a single list per rule. For example a rule may be subject to
the constraint: [nfi(!x0,P)], where P is a schematic variable in the rule. This constraint
is only evaluated after P has been instantiated.
Although such constraints are normally shown explicitly in the documentation of logics, they
may be implicit in the internal representation of rules and proof steps in the theorem prover.
Some provers, such as Ergo 5 (see Chapter 5), do represent the not-free-in constraints of a rule
explicitly. Others, such as Isabelle (see Chapter 6), do not. In the case of Isabelle constraints are
defined by meta-level quantification, instantiation of the rule involves moving the hypotheses
inside the scope of these quantifiers, and procedures that prevent variable capture implicitly
enforce the associated not-free-in constraints. Where constraints are implicit in the prover they
have to be made explicit for recording the rule, either by modifying the prover code or by means
of a translator.
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4.5.5 Definitions
Many logical systems make extensive use of explicit definitions. Definition allows new notation
to be introduced which may be more succinct or convenient in other ways. For instance,
equivalence is commonly defined by:
A ≡ B =Df (A→ B) ∧ (B → A)
(where =Df means ‘is defined as’). This mechanism allows the core of the logic, on which for
instance its consistency depends, to be kept small, while permitting the convenience of a rich
notation. Definition thus implements the use of ‘syntactic sugar’.
Definitions are schematic, and they can be used to transform terms into equivalent ones by
rewriting. This may involve either the introduction of an instance of the defined notation or
the elimination of an instance of its use. This form of rewriting is a basic operation in theorem
proving, but it may be handled in different ways by different theorem provers. In keeping
with our general approach we have implemented definitions in the framework of rules and rule
application. Thus the definitions themselves are represented as rules, albeit of a special form,
and rewrite steps are implemented using specific rules that utilise the rewrite constraint for
rewriting.
The rewrite constraint expresses the relationship between the initial and the rewritten term,
given the subterm that is rewritten and the term that replaces it. As stated above, the constraint
is rewrite(U,V,X,Y) — which holds when the term Y can be obtained from the term X by
replacing zero or more occurrences of the subterm U by the term V. Typically rewriting steps
are implemented by a pair of rules such as
A == B Y
X rewrite(A,B ,X ,Y )
A == B Y
X rewrite(B ,A,X ,Y )
although the exact form depends on the theorem prover. The rewrite constraint can also be
used to define rules which apply rewriting directly to hypotheses.
Implementing this generic approach may require adding extra rules to the context and possibly
extending the proof with rewrite steps or reformulating those parts of the theorem prover’s
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original proof that perform rewrites. This is in keeping with the general approach to imple-
menting genericity outlined in Section 4.5.3. The specific mechanisms required for the Ergo 5
and Isabelle provers are described in detail in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.6 Proof Structure
A proof is a collection of applications of logical rules which we call proof ‘steps’. Each step
is an instance of a rule consisting of a conclusion and zero or more premises. A proof has a
structure which is induced by the relationship between steps, determined by a premise of one
step forming the conclusion of the other. A proof can be represented as a directed graph whose
vertices are proof steps and whose adjacency matrix is determined by this relationship. In fact
proofs are directed graphs of a particular form. One requirement is that they are acyclic, since
a cycle would indicate circular, and hence fallacious, reasoning. Also if the edges are labelled
from conclusion to premises of the rule applications, then a proof graph has a single source —
the theorem that is proven.
The occurrence of a sequent as the conclusion of a step in a proof is an assertion that it is
valid, and the list of sequents that are the premises of a step is the justification of that step.
The proof structure sketched here is effectively an assertion that the justification of every step
in the proof is valid. The validity of a proof, which is discussed further in the next chapter,
requires both that at each step the specified rule is applied correctly, and also that the proof is
complete, that is that for every leaf node the associated rule has no premises (often this is the
‘assumption’ rule).
4.6.1 Trees or DAGs?
We have noted that the structure of a completed proof is in general a particular form of connected
directed acyclic graph (DAG), and that for suitable direction of labelling a proof graph has
a single source — the theorem that is proven. Also each sink is something that has, and
presumably requires, no justification. That is, it is something that is assumed to be true in the
context of the proof — for example an instance of an axiom or previously proven theorem of
the current theory, a premise of the theorem being proven, or a response from an oracle.
69
70 Proofs and their Representation
Proofs generated backwards, by applying rules each of which may generate a new list of subgoals,
are naturally constructed as trees. Such trees are a special form of DAG, and we shall represent
proofs by trees in our proof-objects. This places some restrictions on the proofs that we can
represent, however we contend that this is not a significant restriction in practice and the
rest of this section discusses and justifies this decision. In this discussion, to avoid constant
qualification, the term DAG is used to mean a directed acyclic graph that is not a tree.
Most interactive theorem provers provide a backward mode of proof construction. In this mode
of construction a DAG is only created if the theorem prover allows the user to reuse an existing
subproof at another point in the proof and records this reuse as a link to the original subproof.
However this situation is rare in practice for a number of reasons. As noted in Section 3.2.3
interactive theorem provers often do not keep any structure representing completed subproofs,
so previous subproofs are simply not available for reference. In such provers reuse is only
possible by recording the commands used during subproof construction, and re-running them
at a different point in the proof — thus duplicating the subtree rather than creating a link. This
facility may be available directly in the prover, or where it is not it may be available by other
means. For instance theorem provers with command-line interfaces are commonly executed as
a subprocess of Emacs, and in such a system commands can be recorded in a separate buffer
and subproofs can then be duplicated by cut and paste. Proof General [AGKS01, Asp00] is
a generic system of this type that supports a variety of theorem provers. Similarly the Jape
[Bor96] prover has a sophisticated GUI which supports the cutting and pasting of components
direct from the display. But again the result in the underlying proof is a duplication of the
subtree — not the generation a linkage to the initial subproof.
This discussion has focused on the representation of proofs at the user interface level rather
than the underlying representation in the prover since it is assumed that reuse of subproofs
of significant size will only result from user intervention. Automatic reuse of results is more
feasible in forwards proof, but in the sphere of application that we are concerned with, forwards
proof construction is generally limited to small-scale subproofs, often generated by tactics.
Even where mechanisms for sharing subproofs do exist, detecting common subproofs and invok-
ing this mechanism still requires work on the part of the user, and where this is possible it is
often less onerous to promote the subproof in question to a lemma and use this where required.
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A theoretical consideration is that backwards proofs often accumulate superfluous hypotheses
during proof creation and this lessens the likelihood that two subproofs will be identical, for
even where the essentials of two subproofs are the same, they may differ in inessential detail
such as unused hypotheses.
From a practical point of view we are therefore taking the view that all proofs will be represented
as trees. Where the theorem prover may have taken advantage of a more concise representation
and produced a proof-object that is structured as a DAG, then a translator can expand this to
an equivalent, although less parsimonious, proof by duplicating the shared subproofs. This is
a mechanical and relatively straightforward process. It is also our contention that this is not
a serious practical issue since the occurrence of shared subtrees (rather than explicit lemmas)
is small, and in many cases precluded by the design of the theorem prover itself. This is a
practical trade-off which has some implications for scalability.
A key advantage of a tree representation is that the nodes of a proof tree can be stored in
an external file in a left-to-right depth-first sequence for communication between prover and
checker, and then checked in a top-down manner by a single left to right pass over the file. The
algorithm described in Chapter 7 is of this form. If a proof is a DAG with reused subtrees then
any subtree is a possible candidate for reuse so we need information about the links between
reused subtrees when we check the proof. This information could be obtained by a preliminary
pass through the file accumulating information about sharing, but would at least require identity
tags to be stored to be able to locate the targets of links to shared subproofs as well as an extra
pass through the proof file.3 This method of processing a proof stores information as we pass
down the tree, which is progressively released as we pass back up the tree.
4.6.2 Proof Representation
We represent a proof by a pair of objects,
• the theorem proven by the proof, and
3 Just such a strategy is used by the Wong’s HOL checker [Won96], although here the problem is that the proof
is stored forwards, so that for any particular node we do not know whether it will be used as the justification for
a later step until we have read the whole proof.
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• the proof tree itself.
To cater for the possibility of proving rules we represent the ‘theorem’ to be proven (the initial
goal of proof) as a rule. For simple theorems this rule has no premises, in which case it
degenerates to a sequent (the conclusion of the initial goal). Note that in the most general case
there may also be constraints on the rule that is proven.
Each node in a tree may contain some data. For a proof tree this data contains an instance
of a rule of the logic (and possibly other data). The tree structure is generated from a single
root node by iteration of the ‘child-of’ relation. In the case of a proof the root is the theorem
proven and the relationship between a node and its children is defined by the rules of the logic
— the children represent the premises of the instance of the rule recorded at the parent node.
The proofs constructed by theorem provers are always finite trees.
A node is a leaf node of a tree if it has no children. In the case of proofs, leaf nodes are of
two types: they are open if no rule instance is associated with the node, that is they have no
justification, and closed if there is a rule instance associated with the node but this generates
no children. A proof tree is complete if all its nodes are closed. It is a crucial requirement of
the checking algorithm that it be able to check that a proof is complete. In our representation
we ensure that completed proofs are always represented by complete proof trees (see Section
4.6.2). Checking the latter condition is straightforward.
A tree structure can be represented in various ways. For instance, we can define a recursive
structure whereby each node includes its children as a substructure. Another method is to use
pointers, whereby each node has an identifier, unique within the tree, and each node contains a
list of the identifiers of its children. In our case we are processing the proof tree by a top-down
left-to-right traversal of the nodes, so a parsimonious and efficient representation is simply to
record the nodes in this sequence and leave the lists of children implicit. Each node references a
rule and every rule specifies a determinate number of premises, which constitute the children of
that node (this is a condition on our representation of rules).4 Thus the rule recorded at a node
implicitly defines the number of its children, and this, together with the top-down left-to-right
enumeration, uniquely induces the required tree structure on a linear list of nodes.
4In the case of oracles the children are represented explicitly in the node.
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Open Nodes and Local Rules
When a proof is of a schematic rule rather than just a theorem, some theorem provers leave
open those nodes of the tree that represent the premises of the rule being proven. However in
our representation we ensure that even in this case we have a closed tree by adding an extra
step which associates the ‘dummy’ rule OPEN-NODE with such a node and closes the branch. In
this way the completion condition for a proof always reduces to the completion of the graph of
its proof tree.
As an illustrative example, the Natural Deduction proof given above in Figure 4.2 can be
modified to a proof of the rule:
⇒ Q → R
⇒ (P → Q)→ (P → R)
This proof is shown in Figure 4.3.
P ,P → Q ⇒ P assump P ,P → Q ⇒ P → Q assump
P ,P → Q ⇒ Q → elim
⇒ Q → R
P ,P → Q ⇒ Q → R Del hyps
P ,P → Q ⇒ R → elim
P → Q ⇒ P → R → intro
⇒ (P → Q)→ (P → R) → intro
Figure 4.3: A Proof of a Rule
Note that in this case the branch containing the term Q → R at the top right is left open,
representing a premise of the rule. We also have an extra step, Del hyps, in the backwards
proof to handle the elimination of irrelevant hypotheses.
In our representation the open node ⇒ Q → R is closed by adding the step:
⇒ Q → R OPEN-NODE
Other theorem provers allow the user to use a premise of the initial theorem in a similar way
to a rule during a proof. It is natural, for instance, in theorem provers in which the sequent
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connective ⇒ interpreted as derivation, to allow premises to be assumed throughout the proof.
One feature of this approach is that it allows such a premise to be used more than once, and
this can in some circumstances allow simpler proofs than are possible in the other case.
The solution that has been adopted to handle this situation is to require that the theorem prover
or translator add the premises to the context of the proof as rules. These rules are distinguished
in the syntax by being given the kind premise. They are conveniently referred to as local rules
as they are rules local to the theorem, rather than being derived from the current theory. These
rules can then be used in the proof and processed by the checker in a similar fashion to the rules
of the logic, but with one caveat – such local rules must not be instantiated, since the premises
of the theorem have to be used in their original form. Premises used as rules in this way may
appear to contain schematic variables, but these are schematic variables in the theorem to be
proven. These variables are thus global to the proof and must not be treated like the schematic
variables in normal rules which are local to the rule and can, indeed must, be instantiated. For
this reason the checker never instantiates rules with the kind premise
The difference between the two approaches to handling rules with premises is highlighted when
the premises have hypotheses. As an illustration, consider a proof of the derived rule:
A,B ⇒ C
A ∧ B ⇒ C
If, in the course of such a proof, we obtain the sequent A,B ⇒ C at a leaf node, then we can,
in the first approach, just leave this node open and this completes the branch. However in the
second approach, we use the premise A,B ⇒ C as the local rule: A BC . Applying this rule,
and closing the resulting branches with assumption, gives the proof fragment:
A,B ⇒ A assumption A,B ⇒ B assumption
A,B ⇒ C premise used as rule to derive C
Note than our representation (and the algorithm that checks it) supports both methods of
handling theorem premises. However it will almost certainly be the case that any particular
theorem prover will only use one of these, and therefore the two will never be found together
in the same proof, although the checking algorithm does not require this and does not enforce
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this restriction.
4.6.3 Proof Nodes
A node represents the application of an instance of a rule of the logic, and is represented by:
• A rule — identified by its label.
• A list of instantiations — these are used to generate the instance of the rule.
Rule Application
At each node in the tree we represent the rule by its label. This is used by the checker as a
handle to retrieve the rule from the set of rules stored when the context was read. A rule is a
schema and when it is applied its schematic variables must be instantiated to give an instance
of the rule. These instantiations are recorded explicitly at the node. In the case of a proof that
was constructed in a backwards style, the instantiations would have been inferred by matching
the conclusion of the instance of the rule with the sequent to which the rule is being applied.
This inference may have required unification, and it may also have been under-determined in
that meta-variables were introduced at the time that the rule was applied, to be resolved later.
However, as was discussed in Section 4.1.2, these will all have been resolved by the time the
proof was complete, and the instantiations in the proof-object will be explicit terms.
During the process of checking the proof the correct instance can be generated by simple sub-
stitution. Note that this instantiation must also be consistent with any constraints on the rule.
As an example, the rule for universal quantifier introduction was given in Section 4.5.3 above:
Γ⇒ F (y) y not free in Γ
Γ⇒ ∀ x • F (x ) allI
If this rule is applied in Isabelle backwards to the sequent:
⇒ ∀ x • (¬ P(a) ∨ P(x )) ∧ (¬ P(a) ∨ ¬ P(b))
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which is used as an illustration in Section 4.4, and which is represented as:
=> !!ALL(!x ,&(|(~(P(!a)), P(!x)), |(~(P(!a)), ~(P(!b)))))
then we may get the proof step:
‘IFOL.allI’,
[lambda [!x] &(|(~(P(!a)), P(!x)), |(~(P(!a)), ~(P(!b)))),!k],
Where:
‘IFOL.allI’ is the label of the rule used at this node.
lambda [!x] .... is the instantiation of F in the rule that gives the required instance (and !x
is instantiated to !k).
In this case the instance of the rule is:
=> &(|(~(P(!a)), P(!k)), |(~(P(!a)), ~(P(!b))))
-------------------------------------------------------------
=> !!ALL(!x ,&(|(~(P(!a)), P(!x)), |(~(P(!a)), ~(P(!b)))))
where the variable !k trivially satisfies the not-free-in hyp constraint, since the hypothesis
list is empty.
4.6.4 The Representation of Hypotheses
During backwards proof the hypothesis list often accumulates irrelevant hypotheses. As we
noted in Section 4.5.4, a presentation of a logic for forwards proof may contain the rule:
Γ1 . . .⇒ Y Γ2 . . .⇒ Z
Γ0 . . .⇒ X
which would be:
Γ . . .⇒ Y Γ . . .⇒ Z
Γ . . .⇒ X
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for backwards proof. Thus in the backwards proof both branches inherit all the hypotheses,
which is not the case for a forwards proof. Both rules are of course valid, for the presence
of unnecessary hypotheses (as in the backwards proof) does not affect the validity of a proof.
However, if the rule contains not-free-in hypotheses constraints, and if we insist on applying
these constraints to all hypotheses recorded at the node, then we may invalidate valid proofs.
An illustration of this problem is given in Appendix D. In contrast, in forwards proof hypotheses
are generated at the leaves and are carried forwards. Thus at any node all hypotheses in the
hypothesis lists are relevant to the subproof at that point, since they were generated by that
subproof (rather than being passed down from a node nearer the root).
There are two obvious solutions to this problem: one is to prune the proof written to the
proof-object of unnecessary hypotheses — in effect always creating a forwards-style proof. The
other is to delay the application of such not-free-in constraints until hypotheses are used. The
first solution has much to recommend it. It conforms to one of the underlying principles of
this project, that of keeping the checker simple by, where possible, performing tasks in the
recorder rather than in the checker. However it has a number of disadvantages which include
the following.
• It requires bottom-up processing of the proof tree by the recorder, in contrast to a general
top-down strategy.
• It effectively generates a forward style proof-object, which conflicts with our aim of check-
ing proofs generated backwards.
• Most of the sequents in the pruned tree would be different from the corresponding ones
in the original proof. This might cause problems where the human auditor was seeking
confidence in the validity of the original proof. (However, since the pruned proof had
extraneous material removed it might be argued that this should increase the transparency
of the proof and thus our confidence in it.)
• A proof modified in this way would,
– either require lots of extra nodes, where the pruned hypotheses were re-injected to
allow the original rules to be applied successfully,
– or else all rules would have to be replaced by equivalent rules in the forward style.
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It is not clear how the latter could be implemented automatically and would require more
work on the part of the auditor to verify that the same logic was effectively being used.
(An alternative would be for the proof checker to support (and possibly report on) the
implicit deletion of hypotheses when applying a rule.)
On balance we decided that it was better to use the second strategy. Accordingly the checking
algorithm implements delayed checking of this type of constraint, as described in Section 7.4.4.
4.6.5 Oracles
Another feature of some theorem provers that needs special treatment is the use of oracles. We
use the term ‘oracle’ to refer to some process external to the logic which is accepted by the
prover as capable of validating the truth of some sequent. This may be a recourse to some
external program such as a model checker or algebraic simplifier, and some examples of such
systems have been cited in Section 2.3.1. It may also be the case that the prover itself contains
code to perform proof steps programatically rather than by using rules of the logic. This may
be done, for example, for reasons of efficiency. In either case the prover/translator must ensure
that the reason that the step was accepted as valid is recorded in the proof representation,
perhaps adding an explanation or even inserting a step if none is present in the original proof.
In the representation of such steps the prover records the input to the oracle and uses the
special rule name ORACLE. This is treated by the checker as equivalent to the use of a rule
of the form: P . . .A where the exact form of this ‘pseudo-rule’ depends on the particular
circumstances of the use of the oracle. Often the oracle just returns True, thus closing its
branch of the proof. (If it had returned False we would not have a proof to check!) This is the
simplest case, where the premise list of the ‘pseudo-rule’ is empty.
However this is not necessarily the case. An example is where the oracle is a call to an algebraic
simplifier, where the rule is construed as: BA in which B is the simplified expression corre-
sponding to A. In more complex cases there may be more than one premise returned from the
oracle. The invocation of an oracle is represented by a special form of node. This contains the
following data.
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• The rule label ORACLE — which identifies the node as recording a call to an oracle.
• An explanation field — which is any text that will allow an auditor to check on the
functionality of the oracle. It is not used by the checker, and is just passed to the proviso
list.
• A representation of the input to the oracle (as a sequent).
• A representation of the results of the oracles (as a list of sequents).
The checker uses the last two fields in a similar way to the conclusion and premises of a rule
instance. However, in the case of the results it assumes these as premises, rather than generating
them as with other rules. This process is described further in Section 7.4.4. The premises are
then used to generate new subgoals in the standard way, irrespective of whether they were
derived from the application of a proof rule or an appeal to an oracle.
4.7 The Representation of Proofs for Other Purposes
In this chapter we have described a proof representation tailored to the particular purpose of
proof checking. The details of the representation was driven in part by the need for simplicity.
As we noted in Section 3.2.3, proofs are represented by theorem provers for many reasons. Some
representations are internal and others external. The representation that we have given here is
one possible external representation.
It is interesting to speculate on the possibility of a common format for proof representations
— one that could be used for a variety of purposes and by a variety of provers. One use for
such a format would be the interchange of proofs between systems, although how useful a proof
from another system would be to a theorem prover is problematic [SCKP92]. Nevertheless,
in a different and more limited context, the exchange of proofs is an important feature of
distributed verified code (see for example [NL98]). Here fragments of distributed code carry
with them proofs of their own verification — proofs which can be checked by potential users of
the code to guarantee correctness before a fragment is used. Another use for a general proof
format is in the development of generic tools for manipulating proofs. Indeed, the generic proof
checker described in this thesis is one such tool.
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In itself the proof representation that we have proposed is not a suitable candidate for a common
proof format. This is because it is limited in its requirements – it does not, for example, include
typing information. However it can be seen as providing the requirements for one ‘view’ of this
representation, the view which provides the necessary information for proof checking. Other
‘views’ that need to be accommodated in a general representation include type checking and
proof browsing.
An illustration of the implications of different ‘views’ on the adequacy of a proof representation
is provided by the limitations of the representation given here for the browsing of proofs. An
early version of the proof representation for the checker included explicit information on the tree
structure of the proof. It included, for instance, node identifiers and an explicit representation
of the list of children for each node. It also included an explicit representation of the sequent at
each node. The final version of our representation omits these details, the tree structure being
inferred from the structure of the rules used at each node. The omission of this detail simplifies
the representation, and does not impact on checking since the tree structure is automatically
recreated as the rules are applied during the checking process. However, if we wish to browse the
proof recorded in a proof-object, then the two representations have very different properties.
The earlier proof representation that was discarded has sufficient explicit information for a
browser to regenerate the proof tree by a simple pass through the file, without reference to the
details of the rules. On the other hand, the final simpler proof representation requires that the
list of rules be consulted (and each rule unpacked in so far as the number of premises of the
rule needs to be calculated) so that the tree structure can be reconstructed.
If, in addition to the tree structure, we wish to display the sequent at each node during browsing,
then this can be done directly with the earlier proof representation, and furthermore this can
be done for any portion of the proof in isolation. In contrast, with the simpler representation,
sequents must be generated by application of the rules. That is we can only browse the proof
by checking it, and to browse a subproof requires that we check the whole proof from the root
to that point. We may also note that the earlier and more ‘browser-friendly’ representation is
an extension of the final simpler one, and the latter can be generated from the former simply
by deleting some of the information recorded for each node.
Nevertheless, despite its limitations when used for other purposes, the representation described
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in this thesis is well suited to the task of proof checking. It is therefore anticipated that the
requirements derived here would be useful input to the design of a general proof format. They
provide a validated design that fulfils one major requirement, that of checkability. They could
thus form one component of a larger design, for a proof representation that satisfies more
general requirements that include browsing, type checking, and proof exchange, as well as proof
checking.
4.8 Conclusions
This chapter has described the ASCII representation of proofs that we use for our proof-objects.
A definition of this representation in EBNF form can be found in Appendix A. The represen-
tation of rules is based on a commonly used human-readable format, such as is often used in
‘text-book’ descriptions of logics. The proof itself is tree structured. It is made as simple as
possible by reducing the amount of data at each node and using an implicit representation of
the structure of the tree based on the order of access of the nodes.
In the proof checking systems described by this thesis, proof-objects utilising this representation
are first generated by a theorem prover and then input to a verified proof checker. The repre-
sentation used in these proof-objects is of a simple and explicit form designed to make it easy
to adapt a typical theorem prover to construct such proof-objects for its proofs. To validate
this objective two case studies were undertaken to adapt existing theorem provers to produce
proof-objects of this form. The theorem provers chosen were Ergo 5 and Isabelle 98 and the
case studies are described in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
A Proof Recorder for the Ergo 5
Theorem Prover
This chapter describes a prototype proof recording system for the Ergo 5 theorem prover. The
system comprises a modified version of Ergo 5, which can record its proofs in the ASCII format
described in Chapter 4. In Section 5.1 we describe the general characteristics of Ergo 5, and,
in Section 5.2, we detail how Ergo 5 represents its proofs. Then in Section 5.3 we describe the
implementation of the proof-recording module that has been added to Ergo 5.
5.1 The Ergo 5 Theorem Prover
Ergo 5 [Utt97] is an interactive theorem prover that is under development at the University
of Queensland. Ergo 5 is a complete re-engineering of the previous prover – Ergo 4, a mature
theorem prover that has been in regular use for a number of years. Ergo 5 was chosen for our
case study because it has a number of features that simplify the generation of the required
proof-objects. (In contrast the Isabelle case study described in the next chapter, was chosen to
test the genericity of our approach by using a theorem prover that required much more work to
generate a proof-object.)
One of the design goals of Ergo 5 is to ‘Construct an explicit record of each proof’ ([Utt97,
page 1]). The rationale for this is that it allows the transformation of a proof for a variety of
purposes such as proof browsing, and tactic generation. This property also allows us to map
the internal representation of an Ergo 5 proof to the representation required of a proof-object
as described in Chapter 4. Ergo 5 records its proofs in a data structure that is essentially a
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tree. It is a simple exercise to add a command to Ergo 5 to walk the internal proof tree and
write out a proof-object in the format required.
Another feature of Ergo 5 is that its meta-logic is based on the sequent calculus. Thus the
translation of its rules to the format required by the checker is also relatively straightforward,
since both have a sequent-based structure.
Ergo 5 is written in Qu-Prolog [RH99, Rob97b]. This is a version of Prolog designed for writing
theorem provers and similar software — it has, for instance, object variables and quantifiers
among its basic types. In addition, Prolog has the characteristic that the instantiation of
variables is global, so no special steps have to be taken to ensure that meta-variables are fully
instantiated when recording Ergo 5 proofs. (See Section 4.1.2).
On the other hand, Ergo 5 has some features that are very general. For instance, its sequents
have a generalised form of antecedent, and there is a mechanism for user-defined constraints
which allows arbitrary constraints to be placed on rules. It is not clear how the framework de-
scribed in this thesis could be extended to accommodate such general features in a uniform way.
However, specific uses of such features can be considered on a case-by-case basis. For instance,
generalised antecedents have been used to partition hypotheses when implementing a modal
logic for program refinement, and user-defined constraints are used to implement oracles in
theories of integer arithmetic. In both these cases, proof steps that have recourse to generalised
forms of antecedents can be converted to forms that can be accommodated within the generic
representation we have described. Thus in the case of integer arithmetic, the information in the
constraint can be used to construct an equivalent step that records the call to the oracle in our
generic syntax. (This theory is part of a version of Ergo 5 that is more recent than the system
tested here. Oracles are not implemented in the prototype proof checker.)
5.2 Ergo 5 Proofs
As noted in the previous section, Ergo 5 stores its proofs as trees and the logic is expressed
using sequents. An Ergo 5 proof of a theorem T starts with a single node containing T. Since
this node is open, and open nodes are interpreted as premises to the proof, this single node
may be interpreted in Ergo 5 as the trivial rule TT with identical premise and conclusion,
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although only the latter is represented explicitly. The proof proceeds backwards by applying
rules to the open nodes of the proof — initially to the theorem itself. Note that when we are
proving a rule in Ergo 5 the initial theorem is just the conclusion of the rule, the premises of
the rule are only represented explicitly in the proof when they appear as open nodes in the
completed proof. The premises are however recorded when the rule is initially stated, so that
Ergo 5 can check that the final proof matches the original rule.
5.2.1 Sequents
The classical sequent consists of a pair of lists of formulae, generally termed the antecedent and
the succedent. Ergo 5 restricts sequents to the single-succedent form, that is, the succedent is a
single formula. However it supports a generalised form of antecedent. The designers of Ergo 5
viewed the antecedent of a sequent as providing a context in which the truth or otherwise of the
succedent could be judged — in the classical case this is just a list of formulae that could be
assumed. They generalised this to allow the antecedent to be a list of such contexts, of which
the traditional list of hypotheses is just one.
In Ergo 5 a sequent is represented by a triple: seq(Id,Contexts,Concl), where:
• Id is a label for the sequent.
• Concl is a term representing the single succedent.
• Contexts is a list of contexts, each of which is represented by a (ContextName,CSpec)
pair, where ContextName is a label for the context and CSpec is the context information.
There may, in general, be several contexts for a sequent, however most standard logics (including
classical propositional calculus) use conventional sequents, that is they have a single context
(hypotheses) which is a list of formulae. Ergo 5 is a research tool, and can be used in many ways.
Its ability to define multiple contexts can be used to handle special logics, or to use standard
logics for special purposes. However, in the context of this thesis we are only considering the use
of Ergo 5 as a generic prover to support formal software development, and in this situation the
only type of sequent context that we consider is that of hypotheses (which have the ContextName
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of hyp). (Or, more broadly, uses where whatever contexts are defined can be converted to the
conventional list of hypotheses, by merging and/or discarding other types of context.) Under
these restrictions a sequent is a triple (identifier, hypotheses, succedent).
In a proof tree the hypotheses of sequents on the same branch are related to each other by
virtue of the rules that have been applied to get from one point on the branch to the other. For
instance when the rule:
Γ,A,B ` C
Γ,A ∧ B ` C
is applied, the hypotheses in the conclusion and premise differ by the addition of A and B and
the removal of A ∧ B . Within Ergo 5 context lists are managed by a complex data-type. The
management of this data-type includes facilities to view its contents in various ways. Thus
individual contexts, such as hyp, may be viewed as tree structures. Functions are available
to extract individual hypothesis lists from this structure, and the hypotheses in a sequent are
represented by such a function rather than an explicit list. This mechanism generates the
hypothesis list lazily, on demand, and it is efficient in storage space since individual hypothesis
terms are shared between lists wherever possible. When extracting a sequent, for instance to
contribute to a user-interface display, Ergo 5 reconstructs the hypothesis list by evaluating the
appropriate function. New hypothesis lists are generated by creating new functions which apply
changes to existing hypothesis lists — that is, they modify one generating function to produce
another.
The constructs for representing hypotheses lists in this way are as follows.
1. Use the existing list. This is done by using a reference to the original list.
Typically this is used to copy the hypotheses of the conclusion (which has the reference
‘hyp’) as the base list for the premises. For example, this construct would be used in the
rule given above to implement the copying of the Γ from conclusion to premise.
2. Add (+++) a list of terms to an existing hypothesis list.
3. Delete (---) a list of terms from an existing hypothesis list.
4. Specify a new list of terms (possibly the empty list) as the hypothesis list.
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5. Filter a list of hypotheses by a not-free-in constraint. This is written ??? (nfi) x0,
where x0 is the object-variable that the restriction applies to. The ??? means filter by
the following operation but only the (nfi) operation is currently defined in Ergo 5.
The first three mechanisms are illustrated in the rule mentioned above which may be represented
by:
hyp---[A and B]+++[A,B] ---> C
-------------------------------
Node ::: C
Here, hyp establishes the hypothesis list from the conclusion as the base list for the premise, and
this is then modified by the --- and +++ transformations. Not-free-in filters are a particular
type of rule constraint and are discussed with other such constraints in Section 5.2.3. We do
not implement the specification of a completely new hypothesis list (construct 4 above). It is
described as intended for cases where ‘a premiss of an inference rule must be proved in a context
completely different to that of the conclusion of the rule’ [Utt97, page 10] and it is not thought
that it is needed in the logics of interest here.
5.2.2 Rules
Ergo 5 rules contain the following components:
• Name, which must be unique within the current theory.
• Conclusion, which is a schematic term representing the succedent of the conclusion of
the rule. The antecedent of the conclusion is not represented explicitly.
• SeqList, which is a list of sequents that represent the premises of the rule. The an-
tecedents of these premises are represented relative to that of the conclusion.
• Constraints, which is a list of conditions, all of which must succeed for an application of
the rule to succeed.
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Such a rule is applied by unifying the schematic Conclusion with an actual sequent in the
proof tree, then, provided Constraints are satisfied, the tree is extended by adding new nodes
corresponding to the instances of the elements of SeqList, which become new subgoals of the
proof. The meaning of the rule is that such an instance of Conclusion can be proved by proving
these subgoals.
5.2.3 Rule Constraints
As noted in Chapter 4 a rule may have constraints that must be satisfied before that rule can
be properly applied. The constraints that can be specified in an Ergo 5 rule are:
1. Hypothesis — a term is specified which must match one of the hypotheses of the current
sequent.
2. Defined — two terms are supplied which must be definitionally equal in the current
theory context.
3. Not-free-in — a variable and term are supplied, and the variable must not be free in the
term.
4. User-defined — these can define arbitrary constraints. Defining such a constraint in-
volves supplying code or tactics to the theorem prover to implement them. Where proofs
that use such a constraint are to be recorded, then new code will also have to be added
to the proof recorder to handle the constraint, although how this might be done can only
be investigated on a case-by-case basis.
Constraints may refer to variables appearing in the rule and they are checked after instantiating
any such variables to give the specific instance of the rule applied at the node.
A hypothesis constraint requires that a given term match one of the hypotheses in the conclu-
sion. Typically this term is then removed from the hypothesis list of one of the premises of the
rule (by use of the --- hypothesis list constructor), possibly being replaced by another. The
full form of this type of constraint in Ergo 5 is context search(Context, , , Term). This
allows the constraint to be applied to any of the contexts defined for the logic, but as explained
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above we are confining ourselves to hypotheses, where Context is set to hyp. The following
Ergo 5 rule1 shows a hypothesis constraint:
postulate hyp_and_split(N_0) ===
A_0::: hyp === hyp---[N_0::: B and A]+++[N_2::: A, N_1::: B] ---> C
------------------------------
C_0::: C
provided context_search(hyp, C_0, N_0, B and A).
(The A 0,C 0 etc. are labels that allow reference to individual parts of the rule.)
A defined constraint specifies two terms that are asserted to be definitionally equal in the
context in which the theorem is proved. It is used in the rules for folding and unfolding
definitions. For instance the unfold rule is:
[P/x]A
------------
[Q/x]A
provided defined(Q,P)
Definition constraints are eliminated from rules as part of the general mechanism to handle
Ergo 5 definitions in the proof-object, which is described in Section 5.3.4.
not free in constraints typically occur in rules containing quantifiers. They are used to con-
strain the application of such rules to prevent variable capture that would otherwise invalidate
the rule. An example is the rule:
theorem imp_imp_ex ===
C_0::: (all [x0] (B => A)) => ((ex [x0] B) => A)
provided x0 not_free_in A.
This type of constraint is converted to the generic form: nfi(obj-var,Term) in the proof-
object. Explicit not free in constraints on the conclusion are required by Ergo 5 because of
the way it handles the occurrence of object variables in schematic variables. Ergo 5 does not
have an explicit mechanism for asserting that an object variable is free in a schematic variable.
This can be seen by contrasting the above with an Isabelle theorem such as:
theorem FOL.imp_all = ((ALL [!x] P(!x)) -> Q) <-> EX [!x] (P(!x)-> Q)
1 Ergo 5 has an idiosyncratic terminology for various sorts of rules. Note that here, and in the following
examples, postulate, rule and theorem are all Ergo 5 names for what we are calling just rules.
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Here the schematic variable Q is bound on one side of the equivalence but not on the other.
Isabelle uses an explicit representation of variables being free (as in P(!x)) and hence an explicit
representation of the converse, that !x is not free in Q is unnecessary.
The not free in constraint mechanism only implements such constraints on the succedent of
the rule conclusion. Similar restrictions on the hypotheses are handled in Ergo 5 by the nfi
filter mechanism. For instance the Ergo 5 rule:
rule all_intro(x0) ===
A_0::: hyp ??? (nfi)(x0) ---> A
------------------------------
C_0::: all [x0] A.
copies the hypotheses using hyp, and then uses the filter ??? (nfi)(x0) to ensure that the
bound variable in the conclusion that is freed in the premise does not occur in any of the
hypotheses. This type of constraint is converted to the generic form: nfi(!x) in the proof-
object.
A nfi filter is not a static test applied when the rule is used, but it is invoked whenever
a hypothesis to which it applies is used. The reason for this is that Ergo 5 is designed for
backwards proof construction. As we have discussed in Section 4.6.4, during backwards proof
hypotheses are passed to all premises, and this results in hypothesis lists that may contain
hypotheses that are not relevant to that branch of the proof. Applying a ‘not-free-in hypotheses’
constraint immediately to all the hypotheses in the list would usually over-specialise the proof
by recording unwanted constraints, and the attempt to prove the initial goal may fail. The
Ergo 5 nfi filter is a way of handling this problem. The filter ‘hides’ any hypotheses that do
not conform to the constraint. It does not fail the proof if any hypotheses do not conform,
but since any such hypotheses are not accessible subsequently on that branch of the proof they
cannot be used later. Any step that attempts to use a hypothesis which does not satisfy the
constraint will therefore fail. Isabelle uses a different strategy to achieve the same end, as is
described in Section 6.2.2. The specification of the proof checker uses a third approach, which
is discussed in Chapter 7.
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5.3 Recording Ergo 5 Proofs
We have noted that Ergo 5 keeps a complete record of a proof during its construction; it can
also save a proof to an external file. However saving a proof is implemented by recording the
commands used to create the proof, not a record of the proof itself. We therefore added new
functionality to Ergo 5 to record proof-objects for the proof checker. This is implemented by a
function that traverses the data structure that represents a complete proof and writes a proof-
object of the form required for checking. Thus we have extended the functionality of Ergo 5 to
include explicit proof recording. Proof recording can be activated in two ways. First a switch
can be set which adds the recording of a proof-object to the actions which take place on the
completion of a proof. In this mode a proof-object is written for every completed proof.
Secondly a new command has been added to Ergo 5, which generates a proof-object for a
previously completed proof. This new command is called record proof, and is an extended
version of the standard Ergo 5 function rerun postulate proof. rerun postulate proof reads the
tactic file that is written whenever a proof is completed, and executes the tactic that it con-
tains, thus re-running the proof. The new function record proof performs the same process as
rerun postulate proof, but it then records the proof as a proof-object.
The record proof function has the advantage that it allows proof-objects to be generated as and
when required, rather than creating one every time a proof is completed. In the scenario we
have envisaged, proof checking is seen as part of the auditing process, and so would normally
only be done once (when a system is thought to be complete). At this point record proof could
be run for each of the components proofs to generate the auditing documents. This mechanism
is regarded as a reasonable one which does not incur excessive costs, since in terms of processing
the overhead of having to re-run the proof is insignificant in comparison to the creation of the
proof in the first place.
5.3.1 Syntax
Ergo 5’s syntax for terms can be used in proof-objects with little change. In particular:
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• Operators — At the lowest level Ergo 5 operators are function applications as required
by the proof-object syntax. At the user-interface level operators can be displayed in other
ways, but low-level Qu-Prolog writes can be used to export Ergo 5 expressions with
operators represented in functional form.
• Quantifiers and object variables — These are distinguished in the proof-object syntax
by the prefixes !! and !. Since this convention was adopted from Ergo 5, the Ergo 5
syntax requires no change for use in the proof-object.
• Explicit Substitution — Again the proof-object syntax ([A/B]X — which is a commonly
used convention for substitutions) is also that used by Ergo 5.
• Lambda expressions — Ergo 5 does not support λ expressions in its core syntax, so they
do not appear in the basic proof terms of Ergo 5 proofs (although object-logics defined in
Ergo 5 could implement the λ-calculus).
Thus terms can be written directly from Ergo 5 to the ASCII proof-object by using standard
Qu-Prolog writes.
In respect to the larger-scale syntax, our proof-object syntax for lists matches that of Prolog,
that is [ ... , ... ], and so we can also write lists directly from Prolog to the proof-object
using writes that take complete lists as parameters.
5.3.2 Handling Meta-Variables
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Prolog has the virtue that when a variable is instantiated this takes
effect globally. Thus, when the Ergo 5 proof recorder generates the internal representation of
the complete proof by re-running the proof tactic, all meta-variables are instantiated to their
final state and eliminated from the proof data-structure. This means that no meta-variables
appear in the proof-object since it is generated by a pass over the internal representation of the
proof after the proof is complete.
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5.3.3 Qu-Prolog Instantiations and Not-Free-In Constraints
Qu-Prolog is an extension of Prolog that supports a richer set of basic types. This means that
its unification algorithm is more complex than for standard Prolog and this, in conjunction with
its extensive use of meta-variables, means that it often has to delay unification problems until
instantiation occurs [CRS90]. The way that this is implemented causes some problems for the
proof recording mechanism.
The internal Qu-Prolog representation of a term maintains a record of all the substitutions
that have been applied to that term during the unifications and instantiations involved in the
current query. A full record of this information is required in case of backtracking, and also
to allow possible modification when new constraints are applied. Even though all delayed
unifications relevant to the proof are performed when the proof is completed, much information
of this kind is still present in the low-level representation of terms in the proof when proof
recording is performed. This problem is alleviated by simplifying terms as much as possible
before writing them to the proof-object. This is done by combining the use of an explicit
Qu-Prolog simplification operation followed by a structural copying process which eliminates
unnecessary substitution.
5.3.4 Definitions
We have noted that in Ergo 5 definitions are implemented using a combination of the fold
and unfold rules, which involve explicit substitution, and defined constraints. However, as
described in Section 4.5.5, in our proof-objects we are implementing definitions by rules not
constraints. This is a case where we have to modify the proof record of the theorem prover to
conform to the generic format required for our proof-objects.
First we have to extend the list of rules in the proof context by adding a rule for each of the
definitions in the definition database of the current Ergo 5 theory. In fact definitions are stored
in the theory database using a mechanism similar to that used for theorems and postulates, and
they can be retrieved using similar code. A definition is stored in the form LHS = RHS where
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LHS, RHS are schematic. From this we generate the rule:
LHS ==RHS
This is written to the proof-object context in the standard format for a rule, including, for
example, a list of all the variables in both LHS and RHS that require instantiation.
In addition we have to modify the fold and unfold rules. For example the fold rule (which is
called expansion intro) is:
[A/!x ]C
[B/!x ]C
defined(A,B)
This rule is modified by adding the extra child A == B and removing the constraint before
writing the rule to the proof-object context as:
A == B [A/!x ]C
[B/!x ]C
In fact this transformation is applied to every rule that has a defined constraint of the form
A == B. Thus the generic rules are generated directly from the standard Ergo 5 expansion intro
and expansion elim rules, and any other rule that might use defined constraints is handled in
a similar fashion using the same mechanism.
Having modified these rules we also have to modify the proof tree at every point where they
are used. These rules can be recognised by their having a constraint of type ‘defined’. When
processing the proof tree to write the proof-object we check the rule constraints at each node.
Wherever we find a rule with a defined constraint we know that we have added an extra left-
most child to this rule, so we also add an extra node to the proof tree at this point. This node
contains the instance of the definition corresponding to the defined constraint determined by
the instantiations at the current node.
For example, if we have the application of the Ergo 5 unfold rule expansion elim
not(false)
---------------- expansion_elim
true
provided defined(true, not(false))
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Then this is converted in the proof-object to:
-------------------- true-def
true == not(false) not(false)
--------------------------------------------------------- expansion_elim
true
This matches the amended form of the expansion elim rule (with the extra child, and no
defined constraint), and the extra branch is closed by the invocation of the not-def rule. The
latter will have been added to the list of rules from the definition of not when the definitions
database was converted to a list of rules.
5.3.5 Open Nodes
As noted in Section 4.5.5, Ergo 5 can leave nodes of its tree open (that is, with no rule application
recorded at the node) when these represent premises of the rule being proven. Our checking
algorithm requires that all nodes be closed. We therefore add a node with the ‘pseudo-rule’ of
OPEN-NODE to satisfy this condition. Thus an open node with the sequent: X,Y => Z, becomes:
------------------- OPEN-NODE
X,Y => Z
Note that the checker recognises such nodes as representing premises of the rule being proven
and checks that this is in fact so.
5.3.6 Writing the Proof Object
Writing the Context
Ergo 5 uses an explicit not-free-in convention in its internal proof representation, and hence the
logical environment is set to the boolean value true.
In Ergo 5 the default is for logics to be untyped, although typing can be added at the theory
level. The signature part of an Ergo 5 proof-object is therefore always empty.
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The list of rules written to the proof context for an Ergo 5 proof consists of two parts.
1. The rules extracted from the primary rules database for the theory in which the proof is
constructed.
2. Rules for the definitions in this theory. (Internally Ergo 5 does not explicitly represent
these as rules.)
Most rules are transcribed directly, but those which contain defined constraints are modified
as described in Section 5.3.4. We also described how the rules for definitions are generated.
Note that when a rule is being proven, Ergo 5 does not support the use of any premises of rules
as ‘local’ rules in the proof, thus the mechanism described in Section 4.6.2 for adding such rules
to the context is not required for Ergo 5.
When writing the context we take advantage of the fact that we have the complete proof
available in a convenient tree-like data structure to do a preliminary tree-walk to collect a list
of all the rules that are actually used in the proof. The export of rules to the proof context is
then filtered by this list, so that only the required rules are written to the proof-object. This
reduces the size of proof-objects.
Writing the Proof
The proof itself is written by a recursive function which writes the data at a node and then
calls itself to process the list of children for that node. This effects a depth-first tree walk of
Ergo 5’s representation of the proof, and writes the nodes in the required sequence.
We have noted that Prolog’s property of automatically promulgating instantiations of variables
is convenient for ensuring that the proof record is complete. However this has the disadvantage
that the details of instantiations are no longer visible in the completed proof. Since we need to
record the particular instantiations of variables that took place at each proof step in the proof-
object, we have to recreate those instantiations as we walk the tree and write the proof-object.
At each node in the proof we generate a fresh copy of the rule used and extract its schematic
variables into a list. We then unify the conclusion and premises of the rule with the terms
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stored at that node and its direct children. This instantiates the variables of the copy of the
rule in exactly the same way that the rule was instantiated in the original proof. The list of
variables previously extracted is thus converted to the list of instantiations required. Note that
it is vital that the same process is used to extract the variables from a copy of a rule at a proof
step as is used to extract the list of variables from that rule when processing the context. This
is because the first list gives the instantiations for the variables in the second list and these two
lists are matched by position in the checker.
As described earlier in this chapter there are a number of circumstances in which the Ergo 5
proof tree is augmented by extra nodes when the proof-object is written. This is done to fit
features of Ergo 5’s theorem proving mechanism into the generic framework defined for the
checker. To re-cap, we add or modify nodes in the tree in the following circumstances:
1. Where a rule that contains a defined constraint is used (specifically rules for folding
and unfolding definitions) an extra child node is added that checks this constraint by the
application of the rule for the corresponding definition.
2. Where a node is left open and represents a premise of the rule to be proved, the node is
modified by recording the rule OPEN-NODE.
5.3.7 Naming Free Object-Variables
The procedure described above for generating and writing proof-objects from Ergo 5 has one
difficulty. This is in the naming of free object-variables.
In many cases object variables occur bound in rules, the names of these are local to the term
in which they occur and are not included in the list of variables in the rule. However where
object variables are free they do occur in the list of variables and must be given the correct
instantiation to match their use elsewhere in the proof. In particular, the rules containing
free object variables often include hypothesis not-free-in constraints, and the checking of these
constraints may fail if the object variable in question is instantiated with the wrong name.
The unification process used to generate the instantiations for rule variables does not always
instantiate free object variables uniquely. Instead it sometimes imposes substitutions and extra
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global constraints in which the required instantiation is only implicit. (In fact it is usually just
one of the possible instantiations consistent with the result of the unification.)
For instance, the rule ex elim:
∃!x • B B ` A !x not free in A
A
when applied to term P which contains a free !x1, does not generate an instance with the
premise exI !x1.Q (with whatever the appropriate value is for Q). Instead the premise exI
!x2.Q is generated, together with some constraints, which effectively ensure that exI !x2.Q
= exI !x1.[!x1/!x2]Q. This is the most general solution, but it also results in the not free in
constraint !x2 not free in A, rather than !x1 not free in A. This is a consequence of Ergo
using object-variables rather than simply a syntactic representation of free and bound variables.
For our representation we need to identify !x1 and !x2 and replace the latter by the former. In
Ergo however, it is sufficient for the variables !x1 and !x2 to refer to the same object (which is
ensured by the constraints).
In Ergo, the name for such a variable required by the checker is not immediately available when
the rule is applied. One solution to this difficulty would be to use the constraints to resolve
it, but this proved difficult in practice. However the required instantiation can be determined
later in the tree, when the hypothesis constraint is enforced. Thus, in the example above, the
premise exI !x2.Q will have to be discharged, and at this point we will have the unification of
a term containing exI !x2.Q with some term, derived from the original theorem, which have
the corresponding subterm in the form exI !x1.Q. At this point we can determine that Ergo
is identifying !x1 and !x2.
We thus found that the simplest solution is to use an initial pre-processing pass through the
proof tree to resolve for the names of object variables in these cases. This identifies cases where
fresh binding variables are actually used to bind existing free variables, and, where Ergo uses a
new name. The new name is then replaced by the original name in the appropriate parts of the
proof (particularly in constraints). Thus, in the example above, since we know that the proof
identifies exI !x2.Q and exI !x1.Q, we can replace !x2 by !x1, from the point at which the
ex elim is applied. This determination has to be made by pre-processing, for the proof-object
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is written by a single pass over the proof tree, and the correct name must be known at the point
the instance of the original rule is applied, which is earlier in the tree than the node at which
the name is determined.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter we have described a mechanism for generating a proof-object for Ergo 5 proofs.
Ergo 5 stores a complete internal record of its proofs, and a proof-object can be generated
by a pass over this structure. The low-level Ergo 5 representation of terms is similar to the
ASCII syntax used in the proof-object, and terms can be written directly in the required for-
mat. Recording the proof is simplified by the fact that Ergo 5 is written in Qu-Prolog, which
automatically instantiates meta-variables during proof construction. However, the resolution of
some naming problems caused technical difficulties and requires a preliminary pre-processing
pass over the proof structure prior to the main pass which writes the proof-object.
The results of this case study have been validated by the testing of the proof recorder in
conjunction with the prototype proof checker. This work is described in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 6
An Isabelle Proof Recorder
In this chapter we describe a prototype proof recorder for the Isabelle theorem prover. Unlike
the Ergo 5 proof recorder the Isabelle recorder does not write a proof-object directly – instead
it passes an intermediate file to a proof translator which generates the final proof-object. This
proof-object, which is in the format described in Chapter 4, can then be checked by the generic
proof checker.
First, in Section 6.1, we describe the relevant features of the Isabelle theorem prover, and then,
in Section 6.2, focus on the structure and representation of Isabelle proofs. Next, in Section 6.3,
we describe the standard Isabelle method of recording its proofs, and in Section 6.4 we describe
the changes that we have made to generate a record suitable for proof checking. In Section 6.5
we describe how the translator converts this record into a proof-object that conforms to our
generic requirements. Finally in Sections 6.6 and 6.7 we discuss the limitations of the proof
recording system for Isabelle and summarise the chapter.
6.1 The Isabelle Theorem Prover
Isabelle [Pau97, Pau93, PN94] is a generic theorem prover, supporting proof in a variety of
logics. Its historical development and relationship to other theorem provers have been described
in Section 2.1.2. Isabelle is freely available via the Internet. The Isabelle 98 version is used in
this thesis, although a later version (Isabelle99) has since been released. These recent versions
of Isabelle support the construction and export of proof derivations, a feature that was not
available in early versions of Isabelle.
Isabelle is written in the ML language, and proof sessions can be run from the ML prompt.
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Proofs are normally recorded by saving the commands used to construct them, and can be re-
run by executing a file of such commands with the use command. There are a number of more
sophisticated user-interfaces for Isabelle. For instance there is an Emacs interface, which has
one frame in which the proof script can be constructed and edited while the state of the current
proof (the theorem to be proven and the current open goals) is shown in a second frame. This
type of interaction can be managed in a more sophisticated way by the Proof General interface
[AGKS01, Asp00], which customises Emacs for theorem proving, and which supports a number
of common provers including Isabelle.
Isabelle is chosen as our second case study for a number of reasons. It is a widely used theorem
prover which is often used for program verification, and so is a convincing example of an ‘in-
dustrial strength’ theorem prover whose proofs may require auditing. Isabelle’s ability to save
and export proof trees is also an important factor in its selection. Although the Isabelle proof
format is not directly usable as a checkable proof record, the existing code can be adapted to
produce a record containing all the necessary information, which can then be processed by a
translator to generate a proof-object.
The Isabelle case study illustrates the genericity of our approach by extending its application
to a second (and more widely used) theorem prover, and also demonstrates the feasibility of the
prover – translator – checker architecture.
6.2 Isabelle Proofs
Isabelle conducts a proof of a theorem T by transforming an initial state representing the
trivial theorem: T ` T into a state that contains the theorem with no assumptions: ` T
This process generates a succession of proof-states. Isabelle maintains a list of such states
which enables it to support multiple proofs, reversion to previous proof-states, and backtracking
to alternative results given by tactics. The standard Isabelle proof method is goal-directed
(backwards) proof, and intermediate stages of the proof can be represented by theorems of the
form: subgoal1 . . . subgoaln ` T . Isabelle proofs are conducted by resolution. A resolution
step unifies the conclusion of one meta-level theorem (which may be either a rule of inference
or a previously proven theorem, both of which are of the type thm) with a premise of another.
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Although proof can be conducted by applying a sequence of basic resolution steps, theorem
proving in Isabelle is generally performed by using tactics. There is a set of tactics for basic
backwards proof and in addition there is a tactical language for combining the basic tactics into
more sophisticated and useful ones. The application of a tactical can be reduced to a sequence
of invocations of basic tactics.
6.2.1 Meta-Logic and Rules
Isabelle’s logic and inference rules are specified declaratively using three meta-level connectives:
implication (or entailment) ⇒ 1, universal quantification ∧ and equality == (which is used to
implement definitions and rewriting). One of the strengths of Isabelle is its mature collection
of theories and logics, where these logics are all expressed using this fundamental meta-logic.
The Isabelle meta-logic is a form of higher-order logic (called ‘fragment M’ in [Pau89]). The
rules of the logic are expressed in a form of Natural Deduction, but mechanisms exist for the
simulating the sequent calculus within object-logics. Theorems are expressed in terms of meta-
implication, and nested implications can be interpreted as sequents with hypotheses and a single
succedent. Thus the implication:
φ1 ⇒ (. . . (φn ⇒ ψ) . . .)
which in Isabelle is conventionally written as:
[[ φ1; . . . ; φn ]]⇒ ψ
represents the sequent:
φ1, . . . φn ` ψ
Isabelle theorems can be used as derived rules, and both theorems and rules are expressed in
Natural Deduction form. Thus the Isabelle rule IFOL.conjE is:
1 Note that in this chapter we are departing from our usual convention and representing a sequent by
antecedent ` succedent . This is because Isabelle conventionally uses the symbols ⇒ to represent meta-level
implication (while → is used for implication at the theory level).
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|- P & Q P,Q |- R
------------------------------ conjE
R
6.2.2 Rule Constraints
Isabelle does not have an explicit mechanism for representing constraints on rules. Not-free-in
constraints on the hypotheses of premises are implicit where meta-level universal quantification
(
∧
) is used in a rule. Instantiating a rule in Isabelle is a two-step process. First the rule is
unified with the succedent of the current sequent. Then the required instance of the rule is
completed by inserting the antecedent (specifically, its hypotheses) from the sequent into the
unified rule. The latter process is called ‘lifting’ in Isabelle. If a premise of a rule is quantified
by
∧
, then, when it is instantiated by lifting, the hypotheses lifted into this premise become
bound by the quantifier. The mechanism for handling bound variables enforces the not-free-in
constraint by failing if variable capture would otherwise occur.
The other form of not-free-in constraint supported by our representation is used to specify a
constraint on the conclusion of a rule. This type of constraint is not required for Isabelle rules
since this situation is made explicit by the convention of listing free variables as arguments to
a predicate. Thus, in Isabelle, writing A rather than A(x) obviates the need to explicitly state
that x is not free in A.
6.2.3 The Theorem Data Structure
An Isabelle theorem is represented by the datatype thm. This has the constituents:
• sign ref — the signature.
• der — the proof derivation, if it is recorded.
• maxidx — an index used internally when generating fresh variables.
• shyps — the list of sort hypotheses.
• hyps — the list of meta hypotheses.
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• prop — the statement of the theorem as a certified term. (A certified term is one which is
guaranteed to be type-correct with respect to a signature, and it is tagged with a reference
to that signature.)
The prop field of the thm data-structure contains the theorem as a certified term of the form:
premise1 ⇒ . . . premisen ⇒ goal
The goal and premises will themselves each be of the form: 2
assumption1 ⇒ . . . assumptionm ⇒ conclusion
Thus a theorem is comprised of embedded lists of premises and assumptions linked by associative
⇒s. As an example, the theorem:
A ∧ B
[A,B ]
C
C
is represented by the term:
(A&B) ==> ( (A ==> (B ==> C)) ==> C)
The der field of a theorem contains a representation of its derivation. It is from this that we
generate the proof record for checking.
6.3 Isabelle Proof Derivations
Isabelle has the facility to record proof derivations, and their construction is controlled by the
keep derivs switch. There are various levels for this switch, and the default is to record only
the high-level tactics used, rather than the full proof derivation. A full proof record (which is
at the level of detail required by a proof checker) is kept by selecting the highest level with the
2This corresponds to our use of a sequent, but when discussing Isabelle we shall conform to Isabelle terminology
which uses assumption where we use hypothesis, and conclusion where we use consequent.
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command: keep derivs := FullDeriv. This switch must be set before the proof is started.
When a proof derivation is constructed, it is stored as an ML object that is referenced by the
der field in the internal representation of the associated theorem.
6.3.1 The Structure of Derivations
Proof derivations are stored as polymorphic branching trees, defined recursively using the Join
constructor:
mtree(X) = Join of X * listof mtree(X)
Derivations have X instantiated to the type: rule, that is they are of type mtree(rule). rule
is a datatype describing Isabelle meta-level rules. It has 34 constructors. At any point in a
proof the derivation contains a representation of the construction of the proof so far. This
includes rewriting steps and all references to oracles. Proofs of lemmas are included in the main
derivation through the Theorem constructor.
Nodes are added to the derivation tree by tactics. The application of an Isabelle tactic is a
transformation between proof states generated by a series of basic proof steps each of which
adds a node to the derivation record. An Isabelle proof step does not correspond directly to the
notion of proof step described for the proof checker. The latter is a single application of a rule
of the logic and, in most cases, Isabelle proofs steps are at a lower level than this. For instance,
the straightforward application of a rule is represented by at least three steps in the Isabelle
derivation. However, in some cases Isabelle tactics apply transformations between proof states
that are at a higher level than the application of a single rule. The major instance of this is
the elimination resolution tactic that applies a rule, performs an assumption step, and removes
a hypothesis from the new subgoals that it generates, all in one step. This issue is discussed
further in Section 6.4.3.
The structure of an Isabelle proof record differs in two important respects from that of a proof-
object of the form described in Chapter 4. First, because the Join constructor prefixes new
nodes, it has the root at the end rather than at the beginning — that is, it is inverted with
respect to the corresponding proof-object.
Secondly it is essentially a linear representation, rather than being a tree structured proof. As
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an example, the proof of A ↔ A is shown in Figure 6.1.3
No subgoals!
val it = () : unit
> uresult();
val it = ‘A <-> A’ : thm
> #der (rep_thm it);
val it =
Join ( Assumption (1,‘A ==> A’,Some (Envir {..})),
[Join ( Bicompose (false,false,1,1, (..), Envir {..}),
[Join ( Lift_rule (..),
[Join (Axiom ‘IFOL.impI’,[])]),
Join ( Assumption (1,‘A ==> A’,Some (Envir {..})),
[Join ( Bicompose (false,false,1,1, (..), Envir {..}),
[ Join ( Lift_rule (‘A --> A’,1,..),
[Join (Axiom ‘IFOL.impI’,[])]),
Join ( Bicompose (false,false,1,2, (..), Envir {..}),
[Join ( Lift_rule (‘A --> A’,1,..),
[Join (Axiom ‘IFOL.conjI’,[])]),
Join ( Equal_elim,
[Join ( Combination,
[Join ( Combination,
[Join ( Reflexive ‘op ==>’, []),
Join ( Rewrite_cterm (..),
[Join ( RewriteC (..),
[Join (Axiom ‘IFOL.iff_def’,[])])
])
]),
Join ( Reflexive ‘A <-> A’, [])
]),
Join (Trivial ‘A <-> A’,[])
])])])])])]):deriv
Figure 6.1: The Isabelle derivation for the proof of A <-> A
This simple proof unfolds A ↔ A using the definition iff def, splits the resulting conjunction
using conjI and completes each of the two remaining subgoals, which are identical, using impI
followed by an assumption. The derivation shown here is simplified by having some information
elided (represented by ..). (Note that the root of the proof is represented by the Trivial node
at the end of the derivation.) Each node in the derivation is represented as:
3 This figure shows the completion of the proof at the line No subgoals!. The theorem just proven is then
retrieved by the function uresult(). The derivation is the der field of the full representation, which is generated
by applying the selection function #der to the result of the function rep thm.
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Join <node-data> [ <child-1>, <child-2>, ... ]
where child-1 etc. are also nodes. Even from this small example it can be seen that at each
node of the tree there is either just a single child, or else two children, one of which is a small
subtree. In the case of a Bicompose, for example, the subtree represents the axiom used and
the lifting of hypotheses into it. Thus, viewed as a tree, the derivation is very narrow, with
the main proof represented by a single branch, with a series of small side-branches containing
extra information. The derivation record is, therefore, an essentially linear representation of
the proof.
Isabelle provides a conversion function Deriv.tree that both inverts the derivation and formats
it into a fully structured proof tree. Nodes of the original derivation contain the number of the
subgoal to which the rule was applied. The Deriv.tree function reads the derivation record
forwards and is able to use these subgoal numbers, which are context dependent on the proof
up to that point, to reformat the proof so far. The final step in this process is to raise the last
node to be the root of the created tree. The main function used to reformat the tree is splice.
splice inserts an element into a list, subordinating a sequence of elements from the original list
to it. Thus if the list:
A B C D E F G H
is converted by a splice operation at position four, which adds the element X and subordinates
three elements to it, the resultant structure is:
A B C X G H
/|\
D E F
In the example derivation shown in Figure 6.1, the fourth parameter of Bicompose represents
the number of elements subordinated. Thus it can be seen that the Bicompose associated with
the axiom conjI subordinates two nodes. In the tree representation, each of these is expanded
to a full subproof of one of the subgoals generated by the application of conjI.
The result of Deriv.tree is an object of type mtree(orule), where orule is a datatype that
represents object-level rules.
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6.4 Recording Isabelle Proofs
The basic mechanism of our Isabelle proof recorder is to use a modified form of Deriv.tree
to convert a linear proof derivation to a proof tree whose nodes correspond to the rules used
in our proof-objects rather than Isabelle object-level rules. A second function then performs
a pass over this tree and writes an ASCII file in a form that can be converted to a checkable
proof-object by a translator program. This second function is similar to that used to write
Ergo 5 proof-objects.
The modified tree conversion function is called Deriv.pctree and it generates an object of type
mtree(pcrule). pcrule is a datatype that is an extended version of orule (the object-level rule
datatype used in the standard Isabelle proof tree). orule has a number of constructors, each of
which generates a different node type in the derivation. pcrule extends the set of constructors
of orule (and the node types that they generate) in three ways.
1. For some node types, extra data is recorded (notably information about instantiations).
2. Some node types have been split into several distinct types to allow a more detailed
description of the proof.
3. Some extra node types have been added, for instance a node to record the deletion of a
hypothesis.
The relationship between the original orule constructors and the new pcrule constructors is
shown in Figure 6.2. In this list, PCDelhyp (delete hypothesis), and PCOpen (open node), are
extra constructors for new node types. Most of the original orule constructors are split into
two or more constructors in pcrule. This enables the structure of pcrule tree to represent
more information about the proof. Thus Asm becomes either PCAsm or PCResAsm, the former
representing an explicit assumption and the latter an implicit one performed by an Isabelle
elimination resolution step. Also such ‘split’ constructors may require different data to be
stored for the separate cases. Thus Subgoal becomes either PCSubgoal or, at the root node,
PCGoal, with the latter having as extra data a list of the premises of the theorem.
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orule constructor pcrule constructor
Subgoal PCGoal
’’ PCSubgoal
Asm PCAsm
’’ PCResAsm
Res PCRes
Thm PCThm
’’ PCAxiom
’’ PCTheorem
’’ PCAnonTheorem
Equal PCEqual
’’ PCEqual2
Other PCOther
- PCDelhyp
- PCOpen
Figure 6.2: The Constructors for pcrule
Both orule and pcrule also include some constructors inherited from the rule datatype that
was used to construct the base derivation from which the tree version is derived. Nodes generated
by these constructors are retained in the tree representation to record information at a lower
level of detail — these are not shown in Figure 6.2. Examples are the Rewrite cterm and
RewriteC constructors that generate the nodes that represent rewriting.
Several constructors have extra information added. This sometimes requires that the original
rule constructor also be extended to record extra information, since the items of type pcrule
are derived directly from items of type rule. In other cases the extra information is assembled
from data that is present in the original linear proof record, but which was not previously passed
on during conversion to a tree. Where a constructor is split this also sometimes requires a corre-
sponding modification to the underlying datatype. For example, the Assumption constructor of
rule is split into two, corresponding to Asm and ResAsm constructors in pcrule. These changes
necessitate changes to the thm.ML source file, both by modifying the thm datatype and also by
changing the code at those places where modified derivation records are generated. All other
changes to Isabelle to implement proof recording are confined to the single source file deriv.ML
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which implements the processing of derivations.
Recording an Isabelle proof requires a number of steps. Proofs are normally recorded in script
files or in the ML source files which define a theory. A proof derivation is generated by executing
such a file with the derivation flag set to FullDeriv. After a proof has been re-run to generate
a full derivation, a proof-object is written by executing a command of the form:
Deriv.pcexport(theory,theorem,filename,description);
Deriv.pcexport is the new function that records a proof, and its arguments are as follows.
1. The theory in which the proof is constructed. This is used to generate the proof context.
2. The theorem itself, of which the der field contains the derivation.
3. A string containing the file-name to be used for the exported proof-object.
4. A string to be written to the identification field of the proof-object.
Within pcexport the derivation is first extracted from the theorem and converted to a tree by
pctree thus:
let
val tree = pctree(#der (rep_thm(theorem)));
in
The body of the pcexport function then operates on this tree representation.
6.4.1 Converting Terms
Isabelle has functions to convert terms in the internal ML representation to ASCII format for
display purposes. However these functions apply pretty-printing, which in Isabelle is quite
sophisticated, and it may apply logic-specific display rules. When converting terms to ASCII
for inclusion in a proof-object, we need full control over the output format so that the converted
form conforms to the generic representation. For this reason the Isabelle proof recorder uses its
own conversion function.
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This conversion function traverses the low-level structure of an Isabelle term and generates
an ASCII representation in the concrete syntax required by the checker. Thus, for example,
function applications are output in the form: f(a,b,c,..). For bound variables Isabelle uses
an anonymous internal representation (similar to de Bruijn indices), so the conversion function
has to assign them names for output. It also converts some internal names to more familiar
ones used by the standard Isabelle display functions, so that the correspondence between the
output from the proof recorder and the representation of the original proof by Isabelle is more
easily recognised. Thus the quantifiers All, Ex and Ex1 are converted to ALL, EX and EX!. We
also convert quantifiers and object-variables to their proof-object forms by prefixing with !!
and ! respectively.
As described in Section 8.1, the format generated by the Isabelle recorder is currently a restricted
form of the representation described in Chapter 4. Extra conventions are applied to the syntax
so that the proof-object is more easily handled by the Qu-Prolog code in which the prototype
proof checker is written. For example, constants and other object-logic names are quoted (as
in ’ALL’) and variable names are converted to start with a capital letter. This is done purely
for convenience in interfacing to the prototype checker, and proof-objects that conform to these
conventions still conform to the less restrictive representation which is described in Appendix
A, since the EBNF does not define the concrete representation of terminal symbols.
6.4.2 Writing the Context
The Isabelle representation of proof terms uses an explicit representation of dependent variables,
with not-free-in constraints being left implicit. The logical environment therefore contains the
boolean value false. The signature is not used. The pcexport function is passed the theory
in which the proof has been constructed. The Isabelle function thms of can then be used to
extract all the rules (that is, theorems and axioms) accessible in this theory. These are converted
into the proof-object format.
As outlined in Section 6.2.2, one complication is that we have to convert meta-quantification
of premises into the corresponding not-free-in constraints on the rules. These are identified by
examining the structure of the premise terms, and the corresponding not-free-in constraints are
generated where necessary.
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This basic strategy of generating the proof context is complicated by the need to add rules of
various kinds.
• We add a rule for assumption and a rule for the deletion of a hypothesis. Occurrences of
these actions are recorded in the derivation, but not as rule applications. During proof-
object generation, we convert these to explicit proof steps that use the new rules.
• We add four extra rules for rewriting. Rewriting is described in detail in Section 6.5.2.
• If the theorem has any premises we add these as ‘local’ rules for this proof.
Note that in Isabelle each theory has an axiom for each definition in that theory. However these
are not strictly axioms of the logic, since they refer to the meta-equality operator == which is
part of Isabelle’s meta-logic. Thus in Isabelle the iff connective is introduced by the definition
axiom:G ↔ H == (G → H ) ∧ (H → G). During Isabelle proof such rules are used as part of
the rewrite mechanism which is described in Section 6.5.2.
Premises as Local Rules
The strategy of making premises available for use as ‘local’ rules throughout the proof has been
described in Section 4.6.2. Isabelle treats theorem premises in this way, so when the context
is being written they are added to the list of rules. Local rules are given the special type
premise which ensures that the checker does not attempt to instantiate their variables, since
the schematic variables of a theorem are effectively constants within its proof.
6.4.3 Writing the Proof File
The ASCII proof file is written by the function pcexport which performs a pass over the
derivation tree. The derivation tree itself represents the Isabelle proof structure in more detail
than is required by the proof-object. For instance a rule application is represented by three
nodes.
1. A node identifying the rule by name.
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2. A node representing the lifting of the hypotheses into the rule.
3. A bicompose node which represents the resolution of the schematic rule with the sequent
to which it is applied. The data at this node records the instantiations used to effect the
resolution.
pcexport simplifies this tree structure and aggregates data when generating the exported file.
Conversely, in some cases it has to expand the tree to conform to the representation required
by the proof-object. Situations in which this is done include rewriting, the use of ‘swapped’
rules and elimination resolution. Rewrites involve complex interaction with the translator and
are discussed in Section 6.5.2.
Swapped Rules
Isabelle has a set of high-level optimised tactics for classical reasoning. These simulate a sequent
calculus for classical logic, within Isabelle’s natural deduction style — sequent calculus being a
more natural system for classical logics. (The Isabelle Classical Reasoner is described in [Pau97,
Chapter 11].) These tactics require that the available rules be classified into sets of rules of
different types and it uses the rules in each set differently. In particular it attempts to apply
introduction rules in two forms, either straightforwardly, as defined in the theory, or, if this fails,
in what we shall term the ‘swapped’ form. These forms of the rules are generated by the ML
function swapify as described below.
The swap rule is: P ==> ( Q ==> P) ==> Q which represents:
¬ P ¬ Q → P
Q . Isabelle
has a swapify function that composes this rule with an introduction rule to produce a new rule.
Thus an introduction rule of the form:
X Y Z
-----------
R
is ‘swapified’ to:
~R ~V |- X ~V |- Y ~V |- Z
-------------------------------
V
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There are two possible strategies for handling the ‘swapped rule’ mechanism. One is to augment
the list of rules by the ‘swapped’ version of every introduction rule. These can then be applied
in the body of the proof in the normal way. However this greatly increases the number of rules
in the theory. The other strategy is to retain the original list of rules in the theory, and convert
an application of a ‘swapped’ rule to an application of the rule swap followed by an application
of the original rule. This is the strategy that is adopted in the proof recorder. Note that this
whole mechanism is only invoked if the rule swap is found among the rules of the theory.
A ‘swapped’ rule can be identified in the Isabelle proof derivation by the fact that it is anony-
mous; it has no rule name recorded for it. When a node with an anonymous rule is found the
following procedure is taken.
1. The original ‘unswapped’ rule is determined. As part of the implementation of this strat-
egy, the code which writes the rules of the logic to the context also generates a table of
‘swapped’ rules. Each introduction rule found in the theory is ‘swapified’ and an entry
written to the table associating the body of the ‘swapped’ form of the rule with the name
of the originating rule. Although ‘swapped’ rules are anonymous in the proof, the associ-
ated Lift Rule node contains the body of the rule itself. This can be used to retrieve the
name of the original rule by table lookup.
2. The node at which the ‘swapped’ rule is applied is converted to an application of the swap
rule itself. That is, a node such as:
~R ~V |- X ~V |- Y ~V |- Z
------------------------------- ‘anon’ rule
V
is converted to:
~R ~V |- R
------------- swap rule
V
3. An application of the original rule is then inserted into the proof, so that the initial single
node is replaced by two nodes having the same effect. In the example introduced above
the original rule was:
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X Y Z
----------- unswapped rule
R
and the whole replacement subtree is:
~V |- X ~V |- Y ~V |- Z
--------------------------- unswapped rule
~R ~V |- R
----------------------- swap rule
V
Elimination Resolution
In Isabelle the application of elimination rules is typically done using the elimination resolution
tactic (or etac). This tactic resolves an elimination rule with a sequent and then automatically
performs two actions. First it discharges the first new subgoal by assumption, which unifies a
schematic term introduced by the application of the elim rule with one of the original hypotheses.
Secondly it removes this hypothesis from all of the other subgoals generated by the elimination
rule. For example the Isabelle rule IFOL.conjE:
|- P&Q P,Q |- R
---------------------------- conjE
R
applied to the sequent A&B,C |- D gives the subtree:
A&B,C |- P&Q A&B,C,P,Q |- D
----------------------------- conjE
A&B,C |- D
However if the rule is applied using etac as described in Section 6.2.2 we get, in one step, the
subtree:
C,A,B |- D
----------- etac(conjE)
A&B,C |- D
where the previous A&B and P&Q have been unified by assumption to set P to A and Q to B, and
also A&B has been removed from the hypothesis list.
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This mechanism for handling elimination rules obviates the need for rule constraints of the form
X occurs in the hypotheses (ishyp(X)) that are required by Ergo 5. The Isabelle IFOL.conjE
rule given above corresponds to the Ergo rule hyp and split:
hyp +++ P +++ Q --- P&Q |- R
------------------------------- hyp_and_split
R ishyp(P&Q)
The Isabelle formulation does not have the explicit hypothesis constraint present in Ergo 5.
The two steps of etac have the same effect as the Ergo rule, that is of requiring that the term
P&Q be one of the initial hypotheses.
To represent the action of etac by an appropriate sequence of rule applications, the proof
exporting procedure has to add a node to the tree to perform the assumption and also add a
delete hypothesis node for each of the other subgoals. This is performed by pctree when it
reconstructs the tree from the linear derivation.
6.5 Translating Isabelle Proofs
In previous sections we have outlined how we can generate an ASCII representation of an
Isabelle proof which has a tree format, and in which the terms are of the required form for
our proof-object. However, the proof record written by the Isabelle recorder is still not directly
usable by the checker and is therefore passed to a translator for further processing. The current
translator consists of two stages. The first uses an awk script to fix up minor deficiencies in
term conversion and resolve some discrepancies in representation between variable names as
recorded in different parts of the proof. These are minor house-keeping activities and are not
discussed further. The second stage executes a C program which effects the global instantiation
of meta-variables and processes the intermediate records of rewrites generated by the proof
recorder. The operation of this program is described in the rest of this section.
6.5.1 Instantiating Meta-Variables
Unlike Ergo 5, where the occurrence of meta-variables in the final proof is eliminated by Prolog’s
global instantiation, the Isabelle proof derivation contains references to meta-variables from the
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point that they were introduced to the point where they are instantiated. At the latter point
the derivation records the associated instantiations as explicit (variable,term) pairs. Such nodes
are often an application of the assumption rule where an expression containing a meta-variable
is unified with a hypothesis.
pcexport writes details of instantiations as auxiliary records in its ASCII output file. The
format of these records is:
Meta-Variable-Name
Instantiating-Term
For example:
Q_1
’isa.|’(!!’ALL’ [!x] (P(!x)),Q)
The translator performs two passes through the file containing the intermediate proof represen-
tation. During the first pass it accumulates in a table all the instantiations that occurred during
the construction of the proof. Following the first pass, this table is rationalised by iteratively
instantiating occurrences of meta-variables in the instantiations of other meta-variables. This
resolves all dependencies between meta-variables. When this processing is complete the table
associates each meta-variable name with a fully explicit term as its instantiation (the sequential
nature of proof construction ensures that mutual dependency is not possible). A second pass
then reads the proof file again, and writes the final proof-object. During this pass the auxiliary
instantiation records in the input file are removed and all occurrences of meta-variables in the
other records are replaced by their complete instantiations from the table generated during the
first phase.
6.5.2 Rewriting
Isabelle effects rewriting by functions which can apply multiple rewrite rules to either or both
sides of a sequent (that is to both hypotheses and conclusion). This is achieved by an opera-
tion applied to the sequent as a single term in the Isabelle meta-logic, and which performs a
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sequence of separate rewrites on individual subterms of the sequent. This poses two problems
for generating the proof-object.
1. Rewriting is achieved by code, not by the application of explicit rules.
2. The individual rewrites are performed during iterations of a loop, and only partial infor-
mation about each is recorded in the proof derivation.
The first of these problems is solved by the strategy of adding extra rules to the Isabelle
logic. These rules use the rewrite constraint, which is described in Section 4.5.5, and which
is intended specifically to implement rewrites. The second problem is more difficult. Isabelle
rewrites are performed by a single pass over the whole sequent, and although the details of
the rewriting of individual subterms can be extracted, the effects of these on the particular
hypothesis or conclusion are difficult to extract directly during the course of the rewriting
operation. Rewriting is performed by optimised code in the Isabelle core, and, if an attempt
were made to change the code to extract this information during the iteration, it would be
difficult to verify that the Isabelle functionality was unaffected. The strategy that we have
adopted is to record the individual term rewrites as they occur, and to use the translator
to reconstruct the transformations at a higher level by re-applying the rewrites during the
translation process. The success of this strategy depends on the observation that the Isabelle
rewrite code performs rewrites individually, and from left to right in the sequent which is being
rewritten.
The Rewrite Rules
We add four extra rules to the Isabelle logic which handle rewriting using the rewrite constraint.
The rules are in pairs. In each pair one rule handles the folding of a definition and the other
the unfolding. There is one pair of rules for rewriting the conclusion of a sequent, and another
pair for rewriting a hypothesis, although Isabelle itself handles both cases seamlessly in one
operation. All four rules have, as a premise, a definitional equality, using the Isabelle meta-level
connective ==. This premise can be discharged using one of the Isabelle definition rules.
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The rules for rewriting a conclusion are the following.
PCInternal.rewrite
U == V Y
-------------------------
X Constraint :[rewrite(U,V,X,Y)]
and the corresponding rule, PCInternal.rewrite2, with V == U. While the rules for rewriting
a hypothesis are:
PCInternal.rewrite_hyp
U == V [delete(Y),post(Z)] |- X
-------------------------------------------
X Constraint :[rewrite(U,V,Y,Z),ishyp(Y)]
and the corresponding rule, PCInternal.rewrite hyp2, with V == U.
Rewrite Derivations
Rewrites are recorded at a low-level in the derivation associated with a proof, as mentioned
briefly in Section 6.4 above. When the proof derivation is converted to a tree, a rewrite appears
in a form such as:
[Join (PCEqual
(Join (Rewrite_cterm (Seq1, Seq2),
[Join (RewriteC (Term1_a, Sig_a, Inst_list_a, Term2_a, Hypidx_a),
[Join (Axiom Adef,[])]),
Join (RewriteC (Term1_b, Sig_b, Inst_list_b, Term2_b, Hypidx_b),
[Join (Axiom Adef,[])]),
.... ]
In this structure PCEqual and Rewrite cterm represent the invocation of a rewrite, and each
RewriteC node represents a single rewrite of an individual term using the definition axiom
Adef, which is justified by the associated Axiom side-branch. The Rewrite cterm node records
both the initial sequent Seq1 and the final rewritten sequent Seq2. In general multiple indi-
vidual rewrite steps are required to derive Seq2 from Seq1, and these steps are recorded in
the list of RewriteC’s. The RewriteC nodes of the original linear derivation are thus retained
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in the derivation tree passed to the proof recorder. However, these nodes do have some extra
information recorded in them specifically for use by the proof recording module.
An occurrence of RewriteC in the proof derivation generates an application of one of the new
rewrite rules in the proof-object. Although these rules allow multiples rewrites, in this case only
one occurrence is rewritten in any one step. Note that, although in some cases this procedure
could be optimised by using these rules to rewrite several terms in one step, this is not in
general possible, since the rules apply simultaneous rewrites and the derivation applies them
sequentially. The latter allows rewrites to be applied to the results of previous rewrites. Thus
when generating the proof-object we replace each occurrence of RewriteC by an instance of one
of the four rewriting rules, but it is difficult to determine the actual instance of the rewrite rule
to use in each case. This is done by the translator.
Recording the Rewrite Structure
The recording of term rewriting in the final proof-object is implemented in a manner illustrated
by the following example. Suppose we have the sequent: X,Y |- Z, where X,Z have instances of
the terms U1, U2 which are to be rewritten to V1, V2 respectively, using the definition Adef.
Then we may consider the Isabelle rewrite to be conceptually
X(V1),Y |- Z(V2)
--------------------- U1 == V1 and U2 == V2 by Adef
X(U1),Y |- Z(U2)
and we can implement it by the following two steps which utilise the rules we have described
above.
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--------- Adef
U2 == V2 X(V1),Y |- Z(V2)
------------------------------------- PCInternal.rewrite
X(V1),Y |- Z(U2) Constraints: [rewrite(U2,V2,Z(U2),Z(V2))]
.
.
--------- Adef .
U1 == V1 X(V1),Y |- Z(U2) (via [delete(X(U1)), add(X(V1))])
--------------------------------- PCInternal.rewrite_hyp
X(U1),Y |- Z(U2) Constraints: [ishyp(X(U1)),
rewrite(U1,V1,X(U1),X(V1))]
The example is simplified in that a single rewrite takes place on each sequent, whereas in
the general case multiple rewrites can occur. Multiple rewrites are performed one at a time
sequentially from the left.
In order to generate such a structure in the proof-object we need three pieces of information
for each individual rewrite step.
1. The pair of definitionally equivalent terms which the rewrite operation uses to apply the
rewrite at that step. One will be replaced by the other, in either a hypothesis or the
conclusion of the current sequent. (These are the first two parameters to the rewrite
constraint.)
2. The initial and final values of the hypothesis or the conclusion that is being modified by
the rewrite. (The second two parameters to the rewrite constraint.)
3. An indication whether it is a hypothesis or the conclusion which is being rewritten. This
is required to determine which form of rule to use.
As noted above, the first of these items is recorded in the standard RewriteC derivation record,
but the other two pieces of information are not. Indeed the second item, as we have also
indicated, is not directly available during the rewrite process, because the rewrites are applied
sequentially to the sequent during a descent of its structure, and the final rewritten form is only
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generated at the completion of the whole operation. However, this operation proceeds from left
to right through the sequent structure, and it is possible to track the progression through the
list of hypotheses to the conclusion, As each rewrite occurs, this information is recorded in the
item labelled Hypidx a in the description of the RewriteC derivation record. It is an integer
containing either zero representing the conclusion, or the index of one of the current hypotheses.
Thus we have items 1 and 3 explicitly recorded in the derivation record. This information is
used by the translator to generate item 2.
Term Replacement in the Translator
To handle rewrites we extend the meta-variable recording mechanism in the translator with
a facility to perform term replacement. This extension allows the translator to re-apply the
rewrites performed by the prover, and so recover the ‘before’ and ‘after’ values of the hypothesis
or conclusion which is the target of a rewrite step.
This extension is expressed by the formalism: %Term1/Term2%Target. Where Term1 is a term
that will be substituted for the first occurrence of Term2 in Target. The effectiveness of this
process is dependent on the fact that the rewrites are done serially left to right, so we can always
replace the first occurrence of Term2 in Target.
The complete process involves representing the hypotheses and conclusion of the current sequent
by local meta-variables. These are generated by the proof recorder, not, as is usually the case,
by the theorem prover when performing the proof. Also they are local to the particular rewrite
being processed. These meta-variables are initialised to values corresponding to the initial
sequent at the start of the rewrite. The proof recorder tracks the progress of the rewriting, and
at each individual rewrite a translator expression is generated which will apply that rewrite to
the current value of the requisite hypothesis or conclusion. The result of the rewrite is set to
be another, fresh, meta-variable. The ‘current’ value of the hypothesis or conclusion that is
changed by the current rewrite step, is updated to be this new meta-variable, so that further
rewrites will be incremental. The key mechanism here is that the meta-variables representing
the ‘current’ values, can be used in expressions generated by the proof recorder, although their
actual values will only evaluated when the translator processes the replacement operations.
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(Note that the information is available to perform these operations within Isabelle, but since
the Isabelle representation of sequents is quite complex it was simpler to use C string search
and replace functions in the translator to implement this mechanism.)
6.5.3 The Translator Program
The translator is a relatively straightforward ‘C’ program of some 750 lines of code. It performs
the following tasks, all of which can be implemented using the basic string functions of search,
test for equality, and find and replace.
• Collecting the table of meta-variables and their values.
• Substituting iteratively for embedded occurrences of meta-variables within this table.
• Performing substitutions of the form: replace the first occurrence of term-1 in term-2.
• Performing general substitution by replacing meta-variables by the their instantiations
throughout the proof.
The translator performs two passes through the proof file. The initial proof file exported
from Isabelle has extra information pertaining to the instantiation of meta-variables, and this
information is read and stored on a first pass through the file. The final proof-object is written
on the second pass.
As described in Section 6.5.2, the translator processes the information about meta-variables
in a separate phase between the two passes. This calculates an explicit instantiation for each
meta-variable. The exception to this procedure is the handling of the substitutions used by
the rewriting mechanism. The meta-variables used in rewrites are local to the rewrite steps,
but their instantiations may refer to other local meta-variables and also other ordinary meta-
variables. The implementation is simplified by performing the calculation and application of
the substitutions by the rewriting mechanism during the second pass rather than during the
intermediate phase. This procedure partitions the expansion and instantiation of the two types
of meta-variable, since:
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• Local meta-variables are generated during proof recording and so cannot be referenced by
standard (non-local) meta-variables which were generated during the original proof.
• All the non-local meta-variables have been expanded prior to the start of the second pass.
6.6 Limitations of the Isabelle Proof Recording System
The system described in this chapter is a prototype. Isabelle is a large and mature system
and not all of its features are handled by the current proof recorder. The following are known
deficiencies in the current version (there are also a number of outstanding individual error cases
that have not yet been resolved).
• The user-defined logics are under-pinned by a ProtoPure logic with about a dozen rules.
These rules refer to meta-logical connectives. It was originally thought that these rules
were for internal use only, however in later testing some of these rules appeared in the proof
record. For instance, the structural rule ‘thin rl’ (thinning) and the cut rule ‘revcut rl’
can appear in the derivation. The current recorder is unable to convert the subtrees
associated with such rules correctly, and it is not clear whether they should in fact occur
in the derivation record at all.
• The code for performing Isabelle rewrites is just one part of a sophisticated simplification
mechanism. The current prototype recorder only handles rewrites. Other simplifications
that this mechanism may invoke include the following.
– Using the current assumptions as rewrite rules.
– Using congruence rules for rewriting.
– Proving subgoals during the course of the rewriting.
Since much of simplification is performed by tactics, it is not clear how many basic mech-
anisms, at the level of individual proof steps, are involved in simplification.
Isabelle is a sophisticated system, and limited time and resources restricted the prototype to
the handling of the basic features of rule application and term rewriting. Also more knowledge
of the internals of Isabelle would be required to investigate all its features in depth.
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It is important to note that a key assumption of the thesis is that the operations of the theorem
provers for which proof recorders are written can be interpreted in terms of the applications of
rules. Arbitrary manipulations of proof structures are not supported, or rather, where proof
structures are manipulated directly by code, such operations must be describable by sequences
of rule applications that produce the same result. (Possibly using limited extensions to the set
of rules, as with the Isabelle rewrite rules.) In the case of Isabelle, the fact that the prover
includes an option to generate a full derivation record implies that this assumption does hold
for Isabelle.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter we have described a mechanism for generating a form of proof-object suitable
for recording Isabelle proofs. The standard Isabelle facility for recording proof derivations has
been adapted to record most of the information required for generating the proof-object. This
derivation is converted to a tree format by a modified version of the standard Isabelle function for
converting derivations to a tree-structured form. An intermediate ASCII proof file is generated
by a pass over this tree. The formatting of terms into ASCII for this file is done directly from
the low-level ML representation of terms.
The final proof-object is generated by a program that translates the intermediate proof file.
The main task of the translator is to resolve and eliminate meta-variables from the proof. The
recorder module in Isabelle includes extra information about meta-variable instantiation in the
intermediate file, for use by the translator. The translator also completes the recording of any
instances of rewrite rules in the proof, by resolving occurrences of local meta-variables which are
generated by the proof recorder. The current prototype is limited to the direct application of
rules of the logic, and the standard rewrite mechanism. Some of the more sophisticated features
of Isabelle are not yet supported.
The results of this case study were validated by testing the Isabelle proof recorder and translator
in conjunction with the prototype proof checker. This work is described in Chapter 9.
126
Part III
Checking Proofs
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CHAPTER 7
A Specification of the Checker
This chapter describes an algorithm for checking that a proof contained in a proof-object is
valid. The representation of the proof-object is that described in Chapter 4. The algorithm
is presented formally using the Z notation [Spi92] in Appendix B. In Section 7.1 we describe
the requirements of the specification, and in Section 7.2 its overall structure. The next sections
describe the details of the specification: the checking of steps in Section 7.3, the handling of
rules in Section 7.4, and the processing of terms in Section 7.5. Finally we discuss the status of
the final specification (in Section 7.6).
7.1 Requirements
Although we are using the Z specification notation, it is important to note at the outset some
things that we are not doing. First we are not giving a specification of a general proof checking
system. We are taking the proof recording part of the system as given and are assuming that
proof-objects are recorded in the format described in Chapter 4. This is obviously only one
possible implementation of a proof checking system of the general type discussed in this thesis.
Secondly, and more importantly, in this chapter we are describing a specific algorithm to check
such proof-objects — we are not giving a high-level specification of what it means to check
a proof. The reason for working at this level is that we wish to draw plausible conclusions
about the feasibility of a formal verification of the checking algorithm. In order to deduce
characteristics of likely implementations, we need to work at a level that, while still formal, is
nevertheless sufficiently detailed to indicate how an implementation will proceed.
The requirements for the checking algorithm must be viewed in the context of the overall
requirements of the proof checker, since it must function as a component of that program. The
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requirements of the checker are as follows.
• The input is an ASCII file representing a proof-object in the format definedin Chapter 4.
• For each input file the proof checker must return a result of either valid or invalid. This
represents a judgement on the validity of the proof in the input proof-object.
• If the result is valid the checker must report, in a auditable form, the assumptions relative
to which the judgement is made. That is, it must return a list, called the proviso list, of
the rules used in the proof and information concerning any calls made to oracles.
• We require that if valid is returned, then the proof represented by the proof-object is valid
with respect to the fragment of the logic reported in the proviso list and subject to any
oracle calls reported in that list, and provided that the proof is type-correct.
• We require that if invalid is returned, then the checker emit an informational message to
indicate the position at which the checking process failed and, if possible, an indication
as to why the checker was unable to process that proof step.
The reporting requirements are important because the checker will be part of an auditing pro-
cess, and the auditor must be able to monitor the acceptance of a proof. If a response of invalid
is returned then no provisos are returned, however the checker will output an informational
message to help in diagnosing the cause of the rejection. This is a practical and informational
rather than a functional requirement, and is not part of the formal specification given here.
We now consider the requirements of the checking algorithm within the proof checker. The
reason that we are separating the algorithm from the rest of the checking process is that we
wish to reduce the task of verification as much as possible. By isolating other functions, such
as parsing the input, into separate modules, verification is only necessary for the main algo-
rithm (provided that it is isolated from the other components throughout the development and
implementation). The reason that we only need to verify the checker and not necessarily the
parser is similar to the reason that we do not need to verify the translator. If the parser were
to function incorrectly then the checker would receive a corrupt proof record and would fail the
proof. Thus the correctness of the parser affects the efficiency but not the correctness of the
proof checker as a whole.
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A proof-object consists of three parts: the identification, which is irrelevant for checking, the
context, which contains information that may be required throughout the rest of the checking
process, and the proof, which is processed sequentially node-by-node. We can therefore recast
the requirements as follows.
• An unverified parser module with the following characteristics:
– The input is an ASCII file representing a proof-object.
– It initially parses the context and constructs an internal representation of the rule
database for use by the checking module.
– It parses the proof record as a sequence of steps, and can pass each step to the checker
module on demand.
• A verified checking module which receives its input from the parser in its internal repre-
sentation. It determines whether the proof is valid, and if it is, outputs a list of provisos.
We require that if an affirmative response be returned, then the proof represented by the
proof-object be in fact valid with respect to the fragment of the logic reported in the
proviso list and subject to any oracle calls reported in that list.
• The checking and parsing modules must be uncoupled to the extent that they can be re-
fined and implemented separately (apart from the common data structures). The checking
module will be verified, possibly by formal development from the Z specification given in
Appendix B, but the parsing module need not be.
We have noted that the input parser need not be verified, and justified this by claiming that if
it is defective then proof checking will fail. However, this is not the case for the output from the
checker. For the system to be correct the final output must faithfully reflect the output from
the verified checking module. The specification defines the components of the output but does
not detail how they should be represented. For a valid proof, the output is defined as a list
of provisos, and a statement of the theorem proven. These are defined in the top-level schema
checker1 (see Appendix B.3.1, and Figure 7.1). For the checker program to function correctly we
require that the implementation generates a faithful external representation of both the theorem
proven and the proviso list. This process is not explicitly described in the specification, instead
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it is represented by coercions to the types OUTPUTOBJ and OUTPUTTHM. This is because
the form of the output will depend on whether it is to be checked by hand or by another
prover. The implementation of this coercion by explicit functions which traverse the structure
of terms is quite straightforward. However, the formalisation of the requirement that this is
a faithful representation of the proof components is a meta-level requirement that cannot be
directly expressed as part of the specification. This requirement cannot be expressed in the
formal specification and must be checked informally.
In the rest of this chapter we describe the specification of the checking module in detail.
7.2 The Structure of the Proof Checking Module
7.2.1 Inputs and Outputs
The top-level specification of the proof checker is a schema that takes as input the components
of a proof-object and returns a boolean value which is true or false according to whether the
proof recorded in the proof-object is valid or not. The input to the proof checking program
is a proof-object in an ASCII file. This is read by the parsing part of the program, and the
inputs to the specification described here are the components of a data-structure representing
that proof-object constructed by the parser. The components of a proof-object were described
in Section 4.3, and the data-structures passed to the checking algorithm are as follows.
• A database of the rules available for use in the proof. This is represented by the partial
function RuleDB? from rule identifiers to rules. Representation as a function requires
that no two rules in the list of rules constructed from the context of the proof-object have
the same identifier — a condition that must be enforced by the parser as it builds the
database. In most cases RuleDB? is an injection, but we do not require this, since in some
provers it may be possible to reference a rule by more than one name (for example, via
multiple inheritance of theories).
• A description of the semantic conventions of the theorem prover that affect the proof check-
ing algorithm. This is taken from the logical environment section of the proof context,
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and consists of the single boolean NFIRep. The meaning of this boolean was described in
detail in Section 4.1.3. If NFIRep is true then it is assumed that schematic variables may
have free object-variables and in particular that for any variable A and object variable x
then x not free in A is only true if there is an explicit constraint to this effect. If NFIRep
is false it is assumed that schematic variables have no free variables.
• A statement of the theorem to be proven. The theorem is represented as a rule to cover
the most general case. This rule may be schematic, as when proving a rule, or be a specific
proposition.
• The proof itself, represented as a sequence of proof steps. This sequence is ordered by a
top-down left-to-right traversal of the original proof tree.
To assist in the generation of appropriate fresh variable names when copying rules, the set of
all possible variable names is partitioned into two subsets. The names of variables in the proof
itself are constrained to be of the subset PROOFVAR. The schematic names in rule database
are constrained to be of the subset INTERNVAR which is disjoint from PROOFVAR. Where
new names are required during the checking process, for instance when generating fresh variable
names to change the names of bound variables, these are also selected from INTERNVAR. This
separation ensures that there can be no naming clashes between names used in the proof itself,
and those used in the machinery of checking the proof. (Note that this only applies to normal
rules. If the proof contains ‘local rules’, which represent premises of the theorem, and which
must not be instantiated, then the names in these rules are derived from the theorem itself and
are therefore of type PROOFVAR.)
The main output is the boolean value valid!, indicating whether the proof is deemed valid or
not. We also report the theorem that is the subject of the proof and return a list of provisos
if the proof is valid. We use the OUTPUTTHM type for the representation of the theorem
in the checker’s output. All provisos output from the checker are of the heterogeneous type
OUTPUTOBJ whose components are coercions of the various objects that may be output into
a single type. These types are left uninterpreted by the specification, but in practice the objects
to be output may be converted to ASCII to generate an auditor’s report or may be formatted
for subsequent processing by another program.
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The specification of the proof-object and the checker inputs and outputs is shown in Figure 7.1.
ProofObject
Theorem : RuleBody ;
RuleDB : RealIds 7→ Rule;
NFIRep : B;
Proof : seq Step
∀R : ran RuleDB • ¬ IsLocalRule(R)⇒ VarsOfRule(R) ⊂ INTERNVAR
∀R : ran RuleDB • IsLocalRule(R)⇒ IsValidLocalRule(R) ∧
VarsOfRule(R) ⊂ PROOFVAR
∀S : ran Proof • VarsOfStep(S ) ⊂ PROOFVAR
checker1
ProofObject?;
valid ! : B;
GivenThm! : OUTPUTTHM ;
provisos! : POUTPUTOBJ
valid !⇔ provisos! 6= ∅
GivenThm! = theoremdescr(Theorem?)
Figure 7.1: The Checker Inputs and Outputs
7.2.2 The Structure of the Specification
The specification consists of
• a number of data declarations (given sets and free types),
• a number of axiomatic descriptions defining functions, and
• a single schema which has the required inputs and outputs and which defines and applies
the main checking function.
Operationally the specification is particularly simple, because there is only one primary opera-
tion, which applies the Check function to the proof input. For clarity of exposition this schema
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is specified in a number of separate pieces, from checker1 to checker17, which are combined
by successive schema inclusion. Where possible auxiliary functions are defined globally by ax-
iomatic descriptions. However some auxiliary functions have to be defined locally within the
schema because they refer to schema inputs. These consist of
• some step and rule handling functions that retrieve rules from the input database of rules,
and
• term comparison functions whose behaviour depends on the semantic conventions of the
prover, and which use the list of not-free-in constraints associated with the theorem —
both of these are part of the input.
7.2.3 The Proof Checking Strategy
A proof is represented by a sequence of steps corresponding to the nodes in the original proof
tree enumerated top-down left-to-right. Every step represents the application of an instance of a
rule of the logic to a sequent that needs justification at that point in the proof. The application
of the rule instance for a step justifies the current sequent but may generate further sequents,
which themselves need justification. At any point there are a number of sequents still needing
justification; we call these the ‘subgoals’ of the proof at that point. A proof starts with a single
subgoal — the theorem to be proven — and the proof is complete when the list of subgoals is
empty.
In terms of the tree model of the proof, the theorem is the root of the tree, open subgoals
represent unexpanded nodes at various stages of proof construction, and the criterion for proof
completion is that no further node expansion is possible — that is that the proof tree is closed.
The top-down left-to-right ordering of the proof nodes is such that, when a rule is applied, if it
generates subgoals then the next node in the proof record corresponds to the rule application
at the first of these subgoals. Where the application of a rule generates no subgoals the next
node represents the step applied to the next right sibling or collateral ancestor of the original
node.
This is equivalent to the strategy:
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1. keep unproven subgoals in a list,
2. always apply the next step in the proof to the first subgoal in the list, and
3. prepend any new subgoals to this list, replacing the subgoal to which the step is applied.
7.2.4 Checking the Proof
The proof is checked by a schema which sequentially applies the steps in the proof-object by
recursively calling the function Check (see Appendix B.3.6). This process terminates when the
proof is complete or an error is found. This schema does not set valid! to true on completion
since further checks are required before proof-checking is complete.
Check has the following four parameters.
1. A list of the sequents in the generated proof tree yet to be justified. Initially this list
just contains the conclusion of the theorem to be proven, and if the proof is valid it must
finally be reduced to the empty list. At any point in the proof it can be viewed as a list
of ‘open subgoals’ that must be justified by the remainder of the proof.
2. The remainder of the proof, as a list of proof steps. Initially this is the whole proof and
again must be reduced to empty if the proof is valid. The list of steps in the input Proof?
is processed sequentially and Check removes one step from this list at each recursion, so
the size of this parameter is a reducing measure that ensures that the recursion terminates.
3. The list of theorem premises used in the proof so far. Initially this list is empty. Such
premises are recorded in the proof in two different ways:
(a) By the application of a ‘local rule’ which represents a premise. (These are detected
by IsLocalRule.)
(b) By the occurrence of steps representing ‘open nodes’, which have the rule identifier
OpenNode.
In the former case the premise is represented explicitly by the rule. But in the latter the
premise is not explicitly represented in the proof-object, but must be determined from
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the sequent at that point in the reconstructed proof. Thus in the second case theorem
premises can only be recorded during the checking process, since it is only then that the
fully instantiated sequent at each node in the proof is available.
4. A list of the justifications for the steps of the proof checked so far.
Check returns a triple of values. The first is a boolean indicating whether the proof is deemed
to be valid. For the recursive calls to Check, this indicates whether each embedded subproof
is valid, and all subsidiary subproofs must be deemed valid for the top level call to Check to
return true. The second and third values are only significant where the proof is valid; if the
proof is invalid, then the values returned are immaterial. The second parameter returns the
list of premises generated during the checking process. This comprises the union of those used
in the subproof passed as parameter two and the previous list passed as parameter three. In
a similar way the third parameter returns the list of justifications for the proof, which is used
to generate the list of provisos. During the recursion, while the list of unchecked proof steps
shrinks, the lists of premises and justifications may grow.
The recursion of the Check function terminates when either of its first two parameters are empty
lists. If both lists are empty when the recursion terminates then the proof is complete. If one
list is exhausted before the other, then the proof is deemed invalid. In the one case, where
there are steps remaining in the proof record when the subgoal list is reduced to the empty list,
then the proof was not recorded correctly, since we have reconstructed the original proof tree
using only some of the nodes in the proof-object, and this means that the proof-object cannot
represent a single closed proof tree, with nodes consistent with the rules recorded in the proof
context.1
In the other case, where there are insufficient steps in the proof to complete the tree, then again
the proof is deemed invalid. In this case the tree represents an incomplete proof. Although
incomplete proofs may be valid, this is only the case if they represent the proof of a rule with
premises which are represented by the open nodes. However we have constructed our proof
representation so that it requires the explicit representation of rule premises by the special rule
1Note that the definition of a proof-object contains an explicit eol marking the end of the proof. If we were
to extend the definition of proof-objects so that they may contain several proofs, this will allow the checker to
skip to the end of any proofs which have extraneous proof steps.
137
138 A Specification of the Checker
OPEN-NODE. The relevant branches are thus closed by this rule rather than being left open,
and so with this representation even proofs of rules with premises must be complete.
The main specification of the main Check function, which processes each rule application is
shown in Figure 7.2. Check returns true just in case the list of proof steps is exhausted when
checker16
checker15;
TheoremInst : ThmInst ;
Check : (seq CondSequent × seq Step × seq CondSequent × seq OUTPUTOBJ )
→ (B× seq CondSequent × seq OUTPUTOBJ );
ThmPremises : seq CondSequent ;
ProofOK : B;
ProvList : seq OUTPUTOBJ
TheoremInst = GenThm(Theorem?)
∀X , InPrem,FinalPrem : seq CondSequent ; Y : seq Step; B : B;
InProv ,FinalProv : seq OUTPUTOBJ
| Check(X ,Y , InPrem, InProv) = (B ,FinalPrem,FinalProv) •
( B ⇔ ( (X 6= 〈 〉 ∧ Y 6= 〈 〉 ∧
CheckStep(head X , head Y ) ∧
Check(GenSubGoals(head X , head Y )a (tail X ),
tail Y ,
AddPrems(head X , head Y , InPrem),
ExtractJust(head Y , InProv))
= (True,FinalPrem,FinalProv)))
∨ (X = 〈 〉 ∧ Y = 〈 〉)) ∧
(X = 〈 〉 ∧ Y = 〈 〉 ⇒ InPrem = FinalPrem ∧ InProv = FinalProv)
Check(〈ThmInstConcl(TheoremInst)〉,Proof ?, 〈 〉, 〈 〉)
= (ProofOK ,ThmPremises,ProvList)
Figure 7.2: The Main Check function
the list of outstanding subgoals becomes empty.
In addition to defining the Check function, this schema also contains the initial call to Check.
This checks the proof and returns the boolean result ProofOK and the lists of premises and
provisos. The initial call to Check is passed the parameters: the conclusion of the theorem to
be proven, the complete proof tree, and empty lists of premises and provisos.
The theorem is passed to the checker from the parser as a rule body. However this is an awkward
representation since its premises have their hypotheses represented by hypothesis transformers,
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so for use here and elsewhere it is converted to a more convenient form by the function GenThm
(Appendix B.3.6). GenThm generates a rule instance where the actual hypotheses are the
minimal set required to fulfil the constraints on the rule. For instance the rule:
[add(S), add(R), delete(jprop.and(R, S))] => Q
---------------------------------------------- hyp_and_split
Q
ishyp(jprop.and(R, S))
is converted to the rule instance:
[S,R] => Q
---------------------------------------------- hyp_and_split
[jprop.and(R, S)] => Q
The checking process commences with the conclusion: [jprop.and(R, S)] => Q and should
generate the single premise: [S,R] => Q. This is checked for on completion.
7.2.5 Completing the Checking Process
If the proof is valid we can complete the checking process by confirming that the theorem proven
is the same as that declared in the proof-object. We know that the conclusion matches, since it
was used as the starting point of the proof, so we only need to match the premises in the theorem
against those recorded by the Check function. We actually only require that the premises used
be a subset of those stated in the theorem, that is, we allow that some premises may not actually
be used in the proof. In such cases we have proven a more general theorem than the one actually
stated, however the proof is still valid, and there may well be reasons why a theorem is stated
in a particular way, even if this is not the most general form. The comparison is done by the
function MatchSubLists which applies the comparison function MatchCondSequent, as shown in
Figure 7.3. Note that we do not explicitly check the constraints specified in the proof. These
are extracted from the statement of the theorem to be proven before the proof is checked. They
may then be used during the checking process, and checking will fail if a necessary constraint is
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checker17
checker16
valid !⇔ (ProofOK ∧
MatchSubLists(MatchCondSequent ,
ThmPremises,CondThmInstPr(TheoremInst)))
valid !⇒ provisos! = ran ProvList
Figure 7.3: Checking that the Correct Theorem was Proven
missing. If constraints are specified but not used, then we again have a proof of a more general
theorem than that initially specified.
Finally, where we have a valid proof of the specified theorem, we export the list of provisos.
These are extracted from the list of justifications generated when the proof was checked. The
provisos include all the rules used, and any calls to oracles.
In the following sections we discuss the more important details of the specification. In Section
7.3 we describe the processing of individual proof steps. In Section 7.4 we discuss how rules are
handled. In Section 7.5 we describe how terms are represented and compared.
7.3 Checking the Proof Steps
Each proof step is checked in two stages. We first check that the information recorded at the
step is valid in the sense that it can be used to generate an instance of a rule. We then generate
the instance and check that it can be applied correctly, that is — that the conclusion instance
matches the current sequent, and that any constraints on the rule are satisfied.
7.3.1 Valid Proof Steps
The data recorded for a proof step comprises the name of a rule and a list of instantiations to
be used to generate an instance of that rule. A step is valid if it refers to a rule that is present
in the rule database and its list of instantiations is consistent with the format of the rule.
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A step is checked for validity by the function IsValidStep (see Appendix B.3.5). This checks that
a valid rule identifier is given, retrieves the corresponding rule from the database, and checks
that the list of schematic variables in the rule matches the list of instantiations for the step.
That is, that the sizes of the two lists are the same and also that, wherever the variable in a
rule is an object variable, its instantiation given in the step is also an object variable. (Object
variables are variables that can be bound, as described in Section 7.5.)
7.3.2 Applying a Proof Step
If a step is valid the functions InstStep (see Appendix B.3.5) and GenRuleInst (see Appendix
B.3.6) are used to generate the specified rule instance. InstStep applies the instantiations
at a step to generate an instantiated copy of the body of the given rule. This is not yet a
full rule instance because the hypotheses of each of the premises are only represented by a
list of hypothesis-list transformers relative to the hypotheses of the conclusion. The function
GenRuleInst generates the full rule instance by using the hypotheses from the current subgoal,
which was generated by a previous step, to both supply the hypotheses of the conclusion, and
also generate hypotheses for each of the premises by applying the corresponding hypothesis
transformers.
GenRuleInst is used by the function GenSubGoals (see Appendix B.3.6), which applies a step
to generate a list of new subgoals. In the checking process the current subgoal is replaced by
the new subgoals (if any) generated by GenSubGoals. Where the rule applied is a ‘local rule’
no instantiation is required, although the propagation of hypotheses is still necessary. The local
rule is also recorded as a premise of the theorem.
Having instantiated the rule we can complete the checking for the step. We require that the
current subgoal matches the conclusion of the rule instance and also that all the applicability
conditions of the rule are met. This is done by the function CheckStep (see Appendix B.3.6),
which is described in Section 7.4.4.
In the following two cases a step does not represent the application of a rule from the rule
database (note that ‘local rules’ are stored in that database).
• Where the step specifies an open node. In this case the current subgoal is just removed
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from the subgoal list, but it is recorded in the list of premises of the theorem represented
by the proof.
• Where the step specifies an oracle. In this case the results of the call to the oracle are
recorded in the proof record of the step as described in Section 4.2. These results are
just the new subgoals (if any) generated by the call to the oracle, and replace the current
subgoal in the subgoal list.
7.4 Rule Processing
7.4.1 Modelling
The representation of rules in the proof context is described in Section 4.5.4 and has six com-
ponents. These are modelled in the specification of the checker (see Appendix B.2.3) as follows.
1. Rule Name — this is the label for the rule. In the proof-object a rule name will be a
string with some internal structure significant to the theorem prover (for instance a rule
name qualified by one or more theory names). In the specification it is defined as being a
member of the given set RealIds (see Appendix B.2.3).
2. Conclusion — this is a term representing the succedent of the conclusion of the rule.
(The modelling of terms is discussed in Section 7.5.)
3. Premises — this is a list of the premises to the rule. Each is a pair consisting of a premise
(as a sequent) and a list of not-free-in constraints associated with that premise.
A premise sequent consists of a term representing the succedent, and a list of hypothesis
transformer functions. Hypothesis transformers are represented by the type HypTrans (see
Appendix B.2.3). The variants of this type specify terms that are added to, or deleted
from, the hypothesis list of the conclusion of the rule. The hypotheses of the premises are
thus defined relative to the hypotheses of the conclusion.
A not-free-in constraint for a premise specifies a list of variables that must be not-free-in
the hypotheses of that premise for an application of the rule to be valid.
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4. Applicability Conditions — these are represented by objects of the type AppCond (see
Appendix B.2.3). They may be:
• ishyp — A term that must be matched by one of the hypotheses of the current
sequent.
• rewrite — Two pairs of terms, the second pair of which must be a term and a
rewritten form of that term for the condition to be true. The first pair of terms are
the equivalent subterms that define the rewrite operation.
• nfi — A not-free-in condition that is represented by a (variable, term) pair. The
variable must not be free in the term for the condition to be met.
Together the conclusion, premises and applicability conditions form the RuleBody.
5. Variable List — a list of the variables to be instantiated in the rule. These variables
can be schematic variables, which can be replaced by terms, or object variables, which
can only be renamed, by replacing them by other object variables.
6. Kind — the rule kind is only used in the checking process to identify local rules. It is a
member of the given set KIND.
Rules are defined by the free type Rule (see Appendix B.2.3) which contains a rule body, a
variable list and a kind.
The rule name is not explicitly part of the rule data, rather it is a key used to retrieve the rule
via the function RuleDB (see Appendix B.3.1) whose domain is RealIds and whose range is the
rules themselves. We require that each of the rules in the context has a unique key. This is a
precondition of the checker by virtue of RuleDB being a function, and in an implementation
the parsing process is required to enforce this requirement, and failure generates a parse error.
Note that a successful implementation of the checker requires that the parsing processes for the
context and for the proof steps both generate the same internal representation for the same rule
identifier in the proof-object, otherwise retrieval of the appropriate rule fails. This can always
be achieved by using the ASCII label in the proof-object as the key.
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7.4.2 Copying a Rule
When we check a proof step, we instantiate the variables in the schematic rule used at that
step with the values recorded at the step, giving a rule instance. Both the step and the rule are
derived from the proof-object. The instantiation can be done by simple substitution, since any
specific restrictions on schematic rules are stated explicitly in the applicability conditions.
As described in Section 7.2.1, to avoid problems with possible clashes between variable names
used in the schematic rules and those occurring in sequents of the proof, we require that they
have disjoint name spaces. This is effected by a partitioning of the name-space for variables into
the disjoint types PROOFVARS and INTERNVARS. All variables in the proof itself have names
of the first type, and all variables in the rules in the database (apart from ‘local rules’) have
names belonging to the second. This requirement is made a precondition of the specification,
and must be enforced by the parsing module when it passes the rule database and the proof to
the checking module.
7.4.3 Instantiating a Rule
Rules are instantiated by the substitution of terms for variables. Instantiations are modelled by
functions from variables to terms. The mapping that represents such a function for a particular
proof step is generated by pairing the list of variables in the rule associated with the step, with
the list of instantiating terms recorded for the proof step. The only restriction is that where
an object variable occurs in the variable list it can only be replaced by another object variable
— object variables can only be renamed, not replaced by arbitrary terms. Note that the list of
instantiations in the step and the list of schematic variables in the proof are both generated by
the theorem prover, and we rely on them being in the same order.
Given an instantiation, the function InstTerm (see Appendix B.2.4) instantiates a term in a
rule by applying the appropriate substitutions. InstTerm is used to define the function InstRule
which instantiates a rule to give an item of type RuleBody. To achieve this a number of auxiliary
functions are defined which promulgate the instantiation of terms through the structure of a
rule.
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The result of this instantiation process is a rule body. As noted in Section 7.4.1, a rule body
consists of a conclusion, which is just a term, and a list of premises, which are expressed in
terms of sequents whose antecedents are defined by a list of hypothesis-list transformers. The
instantiation is completed by supplying a hypothesis list for the conclusion, from which the
hypotheses of the premises can be generated and which also allows the applicability conditions
to be checked. The hypothesis list used is derived from the current subgoal and is applied by
the function GenRuleInst, which has already been described in Section 7.3.2.
7.4.4 Checking that the Rule Applies
Having instantiated the rule we need to check that it can be applied at this point in the proof.
We need to check two things: first that the conclusion of the rule matches the sequent at the
current node, and second that the applicability conditions are satisfied. For the first of these we
only need to check the succedent of the conclusion since its hypotheses were derived from the
current node and so trivially match. Implementing this type of condition requires that we can
check the equivalence of two terms. The procedure for doing this is described in Section 7.5.
Applicability conditions are represented schematically as part of the rule. The instantiation of
the rule to a rule instance also instantiates the associated applicability conditions to give the
specific conditions that must be met for the step to be valid. As mentioned in Section 7.4.1
these are of three kinds:
1. That a given term matches one of the current hypotheses.
2. That a given rewrite condition holds.
3. That a variable is not free in a term.
The validation of the first type of condition depends on the procedure for checking the equiva-
lence of two terms described in Section 7.5.2. The second condition is checked by the function
ReplaceCheck (see Appendix B.2.1). This compares two terms by structural induction, and if
they differ at any point checks that this difference is an instance of a rewrite by the pair of
equivalent terms supplied as parameters. Note that all the terms involved are passed explicitly
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as parameters from the theorem prover, so this condition can be checked by direct matching of
terms (rather than equivalence). The third condition requires a function that checks not-free-in
conditions. Since checking not-free-in conditions operates on the structure of terms it is also
described in the next section (see Section 7.5.4).
The specification of the function CheckStep, which applies these checks, is shown in Figure 7.4.2
Special action has to be taken for open nodes and oracles. For open nodes no check is required,
and although the current sequent must be recorded as a theorem premise, this is done at another
point in the specification. In the case of calls to oracles the proof step records the sequents that
comprise the input and output to the call. In CheckStep we check that the sequent recorded as
input to the oracle matches that at the current node, and in this case we must check both the
succedent and the antecedent of the sequent.
checker11
checker10;
CheckStep : CondSequent × Step → B
∀CS : CondSequent ; St : Step; Rb : RuleBody | Rb = InstStep(RuleDB?,St) •
CheckStep(CS ,St)⇔
IsValidStep(RuleDB?,St) ∧
( ( StepRuleId(St) ∈ RealIds ∧
CondSuccedent(CS ) ' RuleConcl(Rb) ∧
CheckRuleApp(CS ,Rb)) ∨
( StepRuleId(St) = OpenNode) ∨
( StepRuleId(St) = Oracle ∧
(∀Z : Sequent | Z = first(OracleSeq(St)) •
(CondSuccedent(CS ) ' Succedent(Z ) ∧
MatchLists(MatchTerms,
CondAntecedent(CS ),Antecedent(Z ))))))
Figure 7.4: The CheckStep function.
In CheckStep applicability conditions are checked by the function CheckRuleApp. Explicit appli-
cability conditions apply to the current sequent (basically to the conclusion of the rule instance)
and must be unconditionally true for the rule application to be accepted. CheckRuleApp eval-
uates the applicability conditions for the rule, and fails if any is not satisfied.
2Note that the relation ' represents term equivalence as described in Section 7.5.
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In addition to explicit applicability conditions a rule may have constraints of the ‘not-free-in
hypothesis’ type attached to the hypotheses of one or more of its premises. As we have discussed
in Section 4.5.4, the checking of these constraints is delayed until the associated hypothesis is
used. Note that, when such a constraint is violated, the strategy of delay will cause a subsequent
rule application to fail, not the rule which applied the constraint in the first instance. It is also
possible that a constraint of this type may never be enforced.
Thus any ‘not-free-in hypothesis’ constraints attached to the current rule can only affect later
steps, and the only ones that can affect the validity of the current rule are those from previous
steps. ‘Not-free-in hypothesis’ constraints are represented in the data structure CondSequent
which is used to record the premises of rule instances. Where CheckRuleApp finds that a
hypothesis is used (that is, where it evaluates an applicability conditions of the form ishyp(..)),
then, as well as evaluating the condition, it also evaluates any ‘not-free-in hypothesis’ constraints
currently in force against that hypothesis. This is done using the function CheckCondNFI (see
Appendix B.2.2).
7.5 Term Processing
7.5.1 Terms
Terms may be constants, variables, function applications, λ-abstractions, substitutions or quan-
tified terms. We define given sets for quantifiers, for identifiers, which represent variables, and
for constants. Within variables we distinguish the subset of object variables, which can be bound
by quantification and abstraction. Other variables generally represent schematic variables in
a proof. The type TERM defines type constructors which construct the various kinds of term
from constants, variables, object variables, quantifiers and other terms. Terms are thus defined
recursively.
As noted in Section 7.2.1, we distinguish two types of both general and object variables. Proof
variables occur in the proof itself, while internal variables only occur internally in the checker
(including the rules database) and are assumed to be separate from proof variables. These
disjoint sets of names are used during rule instantiation to avoid clashes between the schematic
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names used in rules and the names of variables in the proof-object (as described in Section 7.4.2
above). In order to enforce restrictions on the use of these two classes of variable names, we
define the function VarsOf over terms which extracts all the variable names used in the term.
This can be used, for example, to extract all the names used in a rule and apply the restriction
that they are all internal variable names.
7.5.2 Comparing Terms
Checking a proof requires the comparison of terms. Two expressions do not need to be exactly
equal to represent essentially the same term. They can differ with respect to the naming
of bound variables. Also terms can often be simplified to give equivalent simpler expressions.
Simplification can be done by evaluating explicit substitutions or by the β-conversion of λ-terms.
In general, terms that are equivalent have the same values under all type-correct assignments of
values to free variables. However this definition is too broad to be of practical use here. Instead
we define an equivalence relation, based on the manipulation and simplification of terms, such
that two terms that are equivalent under this relation can be seen to be equivalent under the
broader definition. This formulation of equivalence is appropriate here because we are using it
in a situation where the terms that we are dealing with are generated by two parallel systems.
These systems are the theorem prover and the proof checker, and, where terms differ, it will
be because the systems have applied transformations in a different order, or one system has
applied an automatic simplification while the other has not, or some other similar reason.
We therefore define an equivalence on terms, as follows.
1. Two terms that are syntactically equal or differ only in the naming of bound variables are
equivalent.
2. A term that can be simplified is equivalent to its simplified form. It is therefore implicitly
equivalent to the transitive closure of applying simplification to the term.
Note that we are not explicitly asserting that such simplification always generates the same
canonical form (although we believe this to be the case). However, the truth or otherwise of
this assertion does not affect the correctness of the checker, because we only test for equality of
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terms, never for their inequality. If simplification did not behave nicely then it would adversely
affect the efficiency of the checker, by failing some applicability conditions which were in fact
valid, but it could not cause invalid proofs to appear valid. Of course, this type of simplification
does always give the result that we want, but proving this is not required for the verification of
the checker.
To implement this strategy for comparing terms, we define a function TermEq, which determines
whether two terms are equal subject to the renaming of bound variables. We can then define
an equivalence relation between two terms, where they are related if they match under TermEq
after applying simplification to both.
The function TermEq is quite straightforward. It traverses the structure of the two terms in
parallel and tests for equality of components, except where we have bound variables (structures
abs and quant). In this case we generate a set of fresh bound variables names which occur in
neither term, and replace the bound variables in both target terms by these new names (using
the same names in each). We can then compare the bodies of the two terms directly since they
now use the same bound variable names. The replacement is done by substitution so we have
to simplify the replacement terms before continuing the comparison.
7.5.3 Simplifying Terms
Term comparison is preceded by term simplification. The latter is done by evaluating substitu-
tions as far as possible and then attempting β-reduction. Note that in λ-calculus theory, there
are pathological λ-terms for which β-reduction is non-terminating. However, in practice the
λ-terms occurring in proofs are those manipulated by the theorem prover, and therefore such
situations do not occur. Nevertheless an implementation should apply some heuristic check on
the application of β-reduction to ensure that, if in the worst case, such a term did occur in a
corrupt proof, then the program would detect a runaway β-reduction and fail the proof rather
than looping or ultimately crashing.
The key components of term comparison are the algorithms to evaluate substitutions, to perform
β-reduction and to calculate the not-free-in relation between object variables and terms. These
algorithms are complicated by the fact that we are supporting a generic framework which
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covers different conventions on the representation and interpretation of not-free-in conditions.
In respect to substitutions it is important to bear in mind that in the proof checking framework
this occurs both within the logic and at the meta-level.
As a starting point we take the following definitions, which are adapted from [Pau87], where
the checking for free variables (the opposite of not-free-in) and the application of substitutions
are described (in the context of LCF). In the description given here we have combined the
predicate logic [Pau87, pages 26–27] and λ-calculus [Pau87, page 56] cases. We have also
changed substitution from a postfix to prefix operator.
A variable x occurs free in a formula if it occurs outside the scope of every subformula
of the form Quantifier y • A . More precisely, here are the cases in which x occurs
free in a formula:
• x occurs free in Quantifier y • A if x and y are different variables and x occurs
free in A
• x occurs free in ¬ A if x occurs free in A
• x occurs free in A ∧ B , A ∨ B , or A ⇒ B if x occurs free in A or x occurs
free in B
• x occurs free in P(t1, ..., tn), if x occurs in one of t1, ..., tn .
In the substitution [t/x ]A, the free variables of t stand in danger of becoming bound
in A. Substitution requires special care if a free variable of t occurs bound in A.
Only free occurrences of x are replaced by t . In LCF, substitution renames bound
variables of A if necessary to avoid the capture of a free variable. Substitution can
be precisely defined by induction on the structure of a formula:
• in Quantifier y • A , if x equals y then the result of the substitution is
Quantifier y • A. Otherwise, if y is not free in t then the result is Quantifier y •
[t/x ]A. Otherwise, let z be a variable different from x and every variable oc-
curring in A or t; the result is Quantifier z • [t/x ][z/y ]A.
• in ¬ A, the result is ¬ [t/x ]A.
• in A ∧ B the result is [t/x ]A ∧ [t/x ]B .
• in A ∨ B the result is [t/x ]A ∨ [t/x ]B .
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• in A⇒ B the result is [t/x ]A⇒ [t/x ]B .
• in P(u1, ..., um) the result is P([t/x ]u1, ..., [t/x ]um), by substitution in the terms
u1, ..., um
A later discussion [Pau87, page 56] extends the description to cover λ-terms and applications.
λ-terms behave the same way as quantifiers. For applications, constants and variables, the
substitution of a term t for a variable x is given by:
• The result of [t/x ](rs) is [t/x ]r([t/x ]s).
• If u is a constant or variable, if u equals x then the result of [t/x ]u is t ; otherwise the
result is u.
Although this description refers to an object-logic, the general situation in meta-logical systems
is similar. There are some inessential differences; for instance, the description of the cases of
specific object-logical connectives can be subsumed as particular cases of function application.
However a substantial complication does arise from the fact that at the meta-level a term may
contain schematic variables that range over object-level terms. The value of the predicate ‘x is
free in A’, where A is a schematic variable, is not immediately apparent. However, as we have
discussed in Section 4.1.3, when checking proofs the important form of this predicate is that
of ‘x is not free in A’, which occurs as a rule constraint. From the description above it can be
seen that this is also the key predicate in the simplification of substitutions when applied to
quantified terms and λ-terms — the other cases causing no difficulty.
The simplification of terms, and specifically those containing substitutions, is therefore depen-
dent on the mechanism for evaluating not-free-in constraints. This situation also affects term
matching, both because terms are simplified before matching, and also because the compari-
son of quantified terms is implemented by changing variables (to effect α-equivalence) and this
in turn involves substitutions. The discussion in Section 4.1.3 explained that there were two
conventions for representing not-free-in information about schematic proof variables. The con-
vention used is recorded in the proof-object, and is passed to the checking algorithm in the
boolean NFIRep.
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Bearing this in mind, we can define the substitution operation by cases depending on the
structure of the term.
• Constants are unaffected by substitutions.
• For object-variables, if the variable is in the domain of the substitution function, then
it is replaced by the corresponding term from the range of that function, otherwise it is
unchanged.
• For schematic variables, the action depends on the not-free-in status of the elements in
the domain of the substitution function with respect to the target variable. For any items
in the domain which are not free in the target variable the substitution has no effect, and
the corresponding pairs can be ignored when considering the effect of the substitution.
(The evaluation of not-free-in conditions is described in the next section.) In general the
result is a term that is a restriction of the original substitution, with any items for which
the not-free-in condition is true removed, applied to the variable.
• For function applications, the substitution is applied to the function term and each of the
parameters.
• In the case of abstraction and quantification, the substitution is pushed through to apply
to the body of the quantified term. However, the substitution applied to the body is
the original substitution restricted by removing all elements whose variable is in the list
of bound variables of the abstraction or quantification. This is because those variables
are hidden when in the scope of their binding. We also have to avoid the capture of
any free object-variables that occur in the terms comprising the range of the restricted
substitution. This can be done in a uniform way by changing the names of the binding
variables of the abstraction or quantification to fresh ones (that is ones that have not yet
been used in the proof and can therefore not capture any existing object-variables), before
pushing the substitutions through.
• In the case of substitutions, that is, where we have one substitution applied directly to
another, we merge the substitutions, and then apply the merged substitution.
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This mechanism for simplifying substitutions is specified in the simplification procedure Simp-
Subs (see Appendix B.3.2).
7.5.4 Checking Not-Free-In Conditions
Checking whether a given object variable is ‘not-free-in’ an arbitrary term is done by the
boolean-valued function NotFreeIn (see Appendix B.3.4). It returns false if the variable is free
in the term, otherwise true. The process of checking a not-free-in condition operates by cases on
the structure of the term. Since checking a not-free-in condition on a term that contains general
substitutions is complicated, the NotFreeIn function first simplifies substitutions by applying
SimpSubs and then applies the case-driven not-free-in checking procedure NFI to the result.
Note that this means that we cannot use the NotFreeIn procedure within the simplification
procedure SimpSubs itself, and there not-free-in checking is done explicitly on particular cases.
The simplification procedure involves ‘pushing through’ substitutions on compound terms, and
leaves only residual substitutions of the form [A/x,B/y,...]V where V is a variable. This means
that NFI only has to deal with substitutions of this form.
The procedure used by NFI is:
• For a constant, NFI returns true, since a variable is never free in a constant.
• For object-variables, if the variable is in fact the target variable the not-free-in condition
is false. However, if the two variables are not the same then the result may depend on
the value of NFIRep.
Where NFIRep is true, then the not-free-in condition is true in two cases.
1. There is an explicit not-free-in constraint between the two object variables in the
statement of the theorem.
2. One or other of the variables is not among the variables of the theorem. Object-
variables local to the proof can be introduced by the application of rules. Since they
are local to the proof they can be assumed to be different from any of the variables
that appear in the original theorem.
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Where NFIRep is false, then the not-free-in condition is true.
• For schematic variables the evaluation of the not-free-in constraints again depends on the
setting of NFIRep. If this is true, then the not-free-in condition is only true if there is an
explicit not-free-in condition given in the statement of the theorem.
Where NFIRep is false, then the not-free-in condition is false. This is because the rep-
resentation of theorems assumes that any object-variables in the theorem are not-free-in
any of the schematic variables, while if the object-variable is a ‘local’ one then again it
must be assumed to be not-free-in any of the schematic variables. (If this were not the
case it would restrict the valid instantiations of the schematic variable without this being
reflected in the rule itself.)
• For a function the result is the conjunction of NFI applied to the functor and each of the
parameters.
• For abstractions and quantifications, if the target variable is among the bound variables
in the term, then it is not free in the term and true is returned. Where this is not the
case, then the result depends on the value of NFIRep. The default situation here is that
the target variable is indeed distinct from any of the binding variables, and the result
of applying NFI to the body of the term is returned. This is always the case if NFIRep
is false, since then we can assume that distinct names at the meta-level refer to distinct
object-variables since we use constants to refer to object-variables. If NFIRep is true
however, we use meta-level variables to refer to object-variables, and two variables with
different names may refer to the same object-variable. Thus in this case, unless we know
the not-free-in status of the target variable with respect to each of the binding variables
we cannot evaluate the not-free-in status of the abstraction or quantification with respect
to the target variable. In this case we return false, since we are always checking for a
guaranteed not free in condition. Note that when NFIRep is true the not-free-in is not
simply ‘not free-in’, since we may not have enough information to decide whether free-in
is true or false.
• For substitutions we note that NFI is only applied after term simplification, so they are
all of the form [A/x,B/y,...]V where V is a variable. In this situation we require two
conditions for NFI to return true.
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1. First we require that a free occurrence of the target variable cannot be introduced
by any of the terms in the range of the substitution. Thus for every variable/term
pair in the substitution list, we require that the target variable is not free in the
term of the pair, in which case the application of that pair cannot introduce a free
occurrence of the target variable.
2. Secondly, we require that, unless the target variable is replaced by the substitution,
it is not free in the body (that is, in variable V). We therefore require that either the
target variable is one of the variables in the variable/term pairs in the substitution
list — in which case it will be replaced by the substituting term, and the situation
is covered by case 1 — or the target variable is not free in the body, which is just a
variable, so this case resolves to a not-free-in check on that variable.
7.5.5 Matching Sequents
Sequents are defined by a free type which represents a single succedent and a sequence of
antecedents. During the process of proof checking we sometimes need to qualify the hypotheses
of sequents with delayed not-free-in conditions. We therefore define the free type CondSequent
which is a sequent with such qualifications added. Where we need to check the equivalence of
two sequents, this is done by applying term matching to corresponding components throughout
the structure of the two sequents.
7.6 The Complete Specification
In Sections 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 we have described the components of the specification of the
proof checking algorithm in detail. The complete specification is given in Appendix B. It is
primarily in standard Z, with the exception that we have used the boolean datatype bool. The
bool datatype is an Object-Z extension to Z [Smi99], which is convenient for this particular
specification. The specification has been type-checked using the Object-Z type checker wizard
[Joh96], and a modified version has also been type checked by fuzz2000 [Spi00].
In this section we discuss two general issues relating to the specification we have given. First
we address the issue of the justification of the claim that this specification correctly describes
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a proof checker for the proof representation that we have given in Part II. Secondly we discuss
the implementation of a checker based on the specification that we have described.
7.6.1 Justification
In this chapter we have described (by means of a concrete specification) how the various parts
of the envisaged checking algorithm achieve their objectives. But can we be sure that the
complete algorithm only accepts as valid, proof-objects that are in fact the records of valid
proofs of theorems in the logic?
The proof system that the specification describes is very general, and is generic with respect to
its rules. Thus for any particular use of the proof recording and checking system the correctness
of the results depends both on the correctness of the checker itself and on the set of rules. For
instance, the consistency of the logical system is a property of the set of rules used and not of
the checking process. However, among the essential properties that we do require of the checker
is that given any set of rules it should generate valid instances of these rules. Note also that,
where we have added extra rules (such as assumption or rewriting), any existing consistency
arguments will have to be reviewed in the light of these extensions.
Another important feature of the checking algorithm is that it only guarantees that a proof is
valid relative to the correctness of the provisos listed by the checker. It is therefore vital to the
correctness of the checker that this proviso list is correct.
Since the checker has been specified formally it should be possible to demonstrate its properties
using formal proof. Among the properties of the specification that might be proven to show its
adequacy as a formal description of the proof system are the following.
1. Every step has a justification, which establishes the overall correctness of the algorithm.
2. Each rule instance is a valid instance of a rule schema.
3. Every rule used is in the rule database.
4. Every rule used is reported in the provisos.
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The current position is that these properties have been ‘engineered in’ by careful design and
inspection of the specification. Demonstration by formal proof has not been attempted. Such
a process is complicated by the fact that the specification has been written at a concrete level,
to aid verification of an implementation, rather than a very abstract level, which would have
facilitated the proof of high-level properties.
7.6.2 Implementing a Proof Checker
The specification given in Appendix B as a basis for the formal verification of a proof checker
program consists of about 850 lines of Z. About half consists of data definitions and simple
functions, such as extraction functions for retrieving the components of compound objects,
or the propagation of functions through the structure of such objects. The specification has
deliberately been kept at a fairly concrete level. For instance, sequences (which are easily
implemented as lists) are generally used in preference to sets. Thus we can make some reasonable
assumptions about possible implementations. This is discussed further in Chapter 9.
As noted earlier we have only formally specified part of the proof checker. The parser, which
generates the input to the checker module, has not been specified in this way. These two modules
share an interface with common data-structures. These data-structures will be generated by
data refinement from the abstract data-structures defined in the specification.
The input proof tree Proof? is defined as a sequence of proof steps; however it is intended
in an implementation that access to the proof tree will be by a function which interfaces to
the parser. This will return either the next step in the proof or end-of-file. In this way the
steps are supplied on demand, and the checker program does not need to store the complete
proof-object. With this implementation the Check function performs a single sequential pass
over the steps in the proof, returning false on the first error. The linkage between the parser
and the checker must therefore be such that steps can be passed incrementally to the checking
module on demand.
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The algorithm described above, and in Appendix B, is intended as a basis for a formal verifica-
tion. A formal verification has not yet been attempted, but the task is assessed in Chapter 9.
Nevertheless, the concept of a generic checker has been tested by the informal development of
a prototype proof checker, which is described in Chapter 8.
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A Prototype Proof Checker
This chapter describes a prototype proof checker. It was written as a ‘proof-of-concept’ program
to validate the overall proof checking framework. The prototype is a stand-alone Qu-Prolog
program called pc.ql. This program reads a proof-object file and checks a single proof contained
in it. The source code can be found in Appendix C. It was not developed formally from the
specification described in Chapter 7, but it does adopt the same strategy and implements the
same general algorithm. It has been used in conjunction with the proof recorders for Ergo 5
and Isabelle 98 proofs to establish the feasibility and genericity of this approach.
In Section 8.1 we describe the way the proof-object is read by the checker, and then in Section
8.2 how the proof contained in the proof-object is checked. Finally in Section 8.3 we summarise
the results.
8.1 Reading the Proof-Object
The input to the proof checker is an ASCII file which contains a proof-object in the represen-
tation described in detail in Chapter 4. The recognition of the components of the proof-object
is generally straightforward and is, as far as possible, based on the direct recognition of items
in the proof-object as Qu-Prolog terms by the Qu-Prolog parser. In order to achieve this the
representation used is a restriction of that described in Appendix A. Naming conventions that
match those of Qu-Prolog have been applied to maximise the automatic recognition of items by
Qu-Prolog. As examples, meta-variables are distinguished by starting with a capital letter, and
quantifiers are quoted where necessary, thus ’ALL’ rather than ALL. Also the terminal NEWL is
implemented by a period (‘.’) followed by a newline, which is the Qu-Prolog clause terminator.
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Note that these restrictions are only conventions applied to the terminal symbols of the gram-
mar described in Appendix C – the grammar itself is not affected. The two prototype proof
recording systems also conform to these conventions, producing output in the form required by
the prototype checker.1
In the proof representation, lists are represented in two ways. Small lists are represented by
the syntax [...,...,...] which is interpreted directly by Qu-Prolog as a list. Larger lists,
such as the complete context or the list of steps in the proof, are represented by a sequence
of newline-delimited terms terminated by an eol term. The termination of these larger lists is
recognised by a read-ahead, which checks for an eol representing the end of the list.
8.1.1 Terms
The terms in the proof-object list are of a number of types, all of which are recognised by
Qu-Prolog as valid terms in its own syntax, as follows.
• Atoms, such as: eol, or rule.
• Strings representing constants, such as: ’jprop.=>’, ’1’.
• Variables, such as: R.
• Object variables, such as: !x16.
• Function application, such as: ’jprop.=>’(R, S).
• Quantified terms, such as: !!’jpred.ex’ [!x1] A.
• Lambda terms, such as: lambda [!x1] P(x) are recognised as quantified terms, since we
declare lambda as a quantifier in the prototype checker.
• Explicit substitutions, such as [!x16/!x0]A, or
[’jprop.=>’(R, S)/!y]!!’jpred.ex’ [!x] (’jprop.&’(!x,!y)).
1As an exercise the EBNF given in the Appendix was converted by hand to a yacc grammar description. When
used with a lex description of the lexical conventions just described, this successfully parses the proof-objects
generated by the two prototypes.
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• Lists of the form [...,...,...].
The interpretation of proof-object terms as Qu-Prolog terms is also utilised in the checking of
the proof. For instance:
• The instantiation of variables during the checking process uses the fact that proof-term
variables are interpreted as Qu-Prolog variables in the checker.
• Some substitutions can also be performed by invoking Qu-Prolog simplification on terms
that have been interpreted as substitutions by Qu-Prolog.
• The decomposition of lists is performed automatically by Qu-Prolog when they are inter-
preted on input as Qu-Prolog lists.
The interpretation of quantifiers and object-variables is also utilised during the process of match-
ing terms. This procedure involves the structural decomposition of terms, and Qu-Prolog op-
erations for the decomposition of such terms can be used directly. For example, quantified
terms can be split into quantifier, bound variable list, and body (see Appendix C, procedure
match terms b, page 277). Note, however, that while Qu-Prolog recognises the structure of
such terms, in general the specific functions, constants and quantifiers have not been declared
in the checker, and so the semantics of individual components is uninterpreted at the Qu-Prolog
level. (lambda is an exception to this. It is declared as a quantifier and its properties are defined
in the code. There are, for example, clauses defining beta reduction.)
8.1.2 The Proof-Object
As described in Section 4.3 a proof-object consists of a sequence of three lists: the header, the
context and the proof itself.
The Header
The proof header is just a list of four strings that are read and stored as Qu-Prolog quoted
atoms. They are used for reporting purposes in the checker output (see Appendix C, procedure
check proof aux, page 263).
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The Context
The context consists of three lists. Each is represented by a sequence of items terminated by an
eol term. The first list is the logical context, and contains a single item — the indicator of the
semantic convention used by the theorem prover. This is described in Section 7.2.1 where it is
called NFIRep. This is represented by one of the values: true or false, which is read by the
procedure get sem (Appendix C, page 266), and is directly interpreted as a Qu-Prolog atom
with the appropriate value and stored for reference in the rest of the proof. The second list is
the type signature, which is always empty.
The final list in the context is the list of rules of the logic. This is read by procedure get rules
(page 266). In Prolog the most efficient way of storing information like the list of rules is to
use the internal database of Prolog facts (by using assert and retract clauses). When a fact
is retrieved, a copy with fresh variables is returned, and this can then be instantiated without
affecting the stored copy. This is the usual situation with the retrieval and processing of rules
in the proof steps, and so the facts database is used as the main mechanism for storing rules.
Note that the automatic generation of a copy of a rule with fresh variables, which takes place
on retrieval of a rule stored as a fact, corresponds to the requirement, which is a precondition
of the specification, that all the names in the rules in the database are of type INTERNVAR.
This implementation does not strictly conform to the specification in this respect, although it
achieves the same end. The two aspects in which it deviates from the specification, are, first
that although it ensures that distinct names are used for rules and proofs this is not done by
having two disjoint sets, but rather by generating fresh names for each rule instance. The second
deviation from the specification is that new names are generated each time, so strictly speaking
the ‘retrieval function’ for the rule database returns a different value each time it is applied.
However, although this is generally what is required for the retrieval of rules, this is not the
case for every rule. In particular ‘local’ rules must not be instantiated at all. We have therefore
implemented the rules database in two parts, using the fact database for most rules, but a
different mechanism for local rules. The database for local rules is implemented using a feature
of Qu-Prolog called implicit parameters. The implicit parameter mechanism allows data to be
stored and retrieved globally in a Qu-Prolog program and is designed for situations (such as
here) where a global state is to be recorded. The implicit parameter containing the database of
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local rules is called RULE-DB. It acts like an associative array to which local rules are added
as the context is read, and from which they can later be retrieved by the Qu-Prolog function
ip lookup. This retrieval function returns the original rule, with the original variables, which is
what is required in the case of local rules.
This bipartite implementation of the rules database differs from the specification. Where possi-
ble it uses the efficiency of the facts database, with the extra convenience of automatic generation
of fresh variables, while allowing the exceptional case of local rules to be handled by a separate
mechanism that avoids unwanted instantiation.
The Proof
The proof is represented by a statement of the theorem followed by the proof itself as a list
of proof steps. The variables in the theorem are extracted and the list is stored for reference
in the implicit parameter THMVARS. This is because they must not be instantiated during
the proof, and must be treated specially in some of the instantiating and matching procedures.
Since the checker is written in Qu-Prolog these variables are frozen to ensure that they are not
instantiated by mistake. Any constraints on the proof, which will be in the form of not-free-in
constraints, are used to generate Qu-Prolog not-free-in constraints. Finally the theorem itself
is converted from rule format to sequent format by the routine genthm (page 267), as is done in
the specification by GenThm (see Appendix B.3.6), and the conclusion of the theorem is used
to initialise the proof checking algorithm. The rest of the proof-object is a representation of
the proof itself, as a sequence of proof steps terminated by an eol. The process of checking the
proof steps is described in the next section.
8.2 Checking the Proof
The proof checking algorithm is basically that which has been described in Chapter 7. It
processes one proof step at a time. For each step it checks the validity of the rule application,
applies the instance of the rule, and stores a list of the resultant subgoals for checking against
later steps in the proof.
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The main function in the algorithm given in the Z specification is Check which is described
in Section 7.2.4. This function is defined recursively, but a recursive implementation is not
efficient since it generates a runtime call-stack of the same order as the number of steps in the
proof. In an imperative programming language this recursion can be replaced by a loop. In a
declarative language like Qu-Prolog, a recursive implementation is natural, but in the prototype
checker described here a compromise is used, which reflects the tree structure of the proof but
also reduces the depth of recursion required. In the prototype, processing the children of a node
is implemented by recursion, while checking siblings is implemented by list processing. In this
implementation the depth of recursion is limited by the depth of the tree (rather than its total
size), and the current subgoal list is distributed between the levels. The top level predicate
(procedure check on page 267) that implements this scheme is:
check([]). %% check checks a list of subtrees
%% terminating when the list is empty
check([Seq|SL]) :- %% Seq = current subgoal, SL = other subgoals
check_node(Seq,SeqList), %% check_node checks a node (step) returning
%% the resulting child subgoals in SeqList
check(SeqList), %% check the children
check(SL). %% check the rest of the subgoals
Thus the iteration of the Check function is handled by check, while the detailed processing of
each node, which is the body of Check, is handled by the check node routine. In the specification
Check has four input parameters. These are implemented as follows.
1. The list of open subgoals — this is the parameter to check. The head of this list is the
sequent Seq, which is processed by check node. In the specification Check replaces the
current subgoal by any new subgoals generated by the current proof step before proceeding
to check the next subgoal. In the implementation any new subgoals are represented by
the parameter SeqList which is returned by check node. check is called to process this
list of goals before the rest of the original subgoal list (that is SL) is processed.
2. The remainder of the proof, as a sequence of steps — this is the rest of the input proof-
object. check node reads the proof-object directly, so the ‘rest’ of the proof is represented
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implicitly by the data after the current file pointer. In each iteration Check only accesses
the head of the list of remaining steps, which is implemented by reading the next step
from the file.
3. The list of theorem premises used so far — this is stored in a global list implemented by
the implicit parameter PREMISES, which may be updated by check node.
4. A list of justifications for the proof so far — again this is implemented by a global list in
an implicit parameter, RULES-USED, which may also be updated by check node.
Check returns three values. One of these is a boolean indicating whether the proof has been
successfully checked so far. In the Qu-Prolog implementation this corresponds to the success
or failure of the predicate check node. The other two values are only significant when a proof
is checked successfully, and they correspond to the final values of the implicit parameters con-
taining the premises and justifications lists when the initial call of check returns successfully.
In order to manage not-free-in constraints on hypotheses, the specification uses sequences of
type CondSequent, in which each hypothesis has an associated not-free-in list. The prototype
implements this by storing sequents in the form:
[Conclusion, [(Hyp-1, [nfi-list-1]), (Hyp-2, [nfi-list-2]) ...]]
where [nfi-list-1] is the list of not-free-in constraints on the individual hypothesis Hyp-1.
This structure is unpacked by individual routines as required. In the check node routine, the
list of hypotheses with associated not-free-in constraints for the current sequent is stored in the
list CondAnt. For convenience the list of simple hypotheses is also stored, as Antecedents.
The steps recorded in the proof-object are checked sequentially. For an individual proof step
the checking process may be divided into a number of stages:
1. Generating the instance of the rule applied at the node (see Section 8.2.1).
2. Checking the validity of the application of the rule instance at this node (see Section
8.2.2).
3. Generating and passing forward the list of new subgoals (see Section 8.2.3).
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Checking stops when either the list of steps in the proof-object is exhausted or when the proof
of the theorem, which is being reconstructed by the checker, is complete (see Section 8.2.4).
That is when no subgoals remain to be justified. For a valid proof these two conditions should
occur simultaneously.
If the process of checking the proof steps completes successfully there is one further check that
has to be made before the checker can declare that the proof is valid. We must check that the
theorem that was proven by the checking process is the same as the theorem that is declared
in the proof-object (see Section 8.2.5). Once this has been confirmed the checker can report its
result, this is either that the checking failed, or else that it was successful together with a list
of provisos on which the judgement of success depends.
8.2.1 Instantiating a Rule
In the specification, rules are instantiated by the functions InstStep and InstRule. InstRule
(which is described in Section 7.4.3) applies an instantiation to a rule, while InstStep uses
InstRule to generate the specific rule instance required for a particular proof step. In the Z
specification, InstRule uses explicit substitution, but in the prototype Qu-Prolog instantiation
is used. The mechanism used is to create a copy of the schematic rule retrieved from the
database of rules, extract the list of schematic variables used in it, and execute a Qu-Prolog
clause of the form: Var = Instantiation for each variable. This performs a trivial unification
by instantiation the variable on the left-hand-side with the value on the right.
This process is implemented in the procedure inst rule (Appendix C, page 272) which is
invoked from check node. Rules are stored in the fact database, and the Qu-Prolog retrieval
process automatically generates a copy containing fresh variables. The rule description includes
the list of rule variables, and this list can be matched directly with the list of instantiations to
give the list of variable/term pairs necessary to instantiate the rule. This mechanism instantiates
variables throughout the rule, and this includes instantiating any occurrences of the variables
in any constraints on the rule.
The handling of the special cases of open nodes and local rules is as described in the specification.
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8.2.2 Checking the Validity of the Rule Application
An application of an instance of a rule is valid at a node if the conclusion of the instance of
the rule matches the current subgoal, and also all the constraints on the application of the rule
are satisfied. These checks are specified by the function CheckStep described in Section 7.4.4.
CheckStep uses term matching to check the conclusion is correct, and this is implemented in
pc.ql by using the function match terms, which is described in Section 8.2.6.
In CheckStep the rule constraints are checked using the function CheckRuleApp, which is de-
scribed in Section 7.4.4. Rule constraints are of three kinds: not-free-in constraints, hypothesis
constraints and rewrite constraints. In the prototype the routine check ruleapps corresponds
to the function CheckRuleApp.
A not-free-in constraint requires that an object-variable is not-free-in a specified term. The
algorithm for checking not-free-in constraints is discussed in Section 7.5.4, and the implementa-
tion is described in Section 8.2.7. These constraints are evaluated by check for nfi (see page
273).
The ishyp(...) constraint requires that the specified hypothesis occurs in the hypothesis list
at the current node. In the prototype, this is implemented by check hyp (see page 271) which
conducts a serial search through the hypothesis list, checking each in turn to see if it matches
the constraint.
A hypothesis constraint may trigger the checking of delayed not-free-in constraints. A de-
layed constraint is activated when a hypothesis is used (as when a hypothesis is specified in an
ishyp(...) constraint). In particular such constraints are triggered by the assumption rule. In
this way irrelevant hypotheses are ignored by the not-free-in checking mechanism. In the spec-
ification this check is performed by CheckCondNFI which is implemented by check cond nfis
in pc.ql. The implementation of not-free-in checking is described in Section 8.2.7. Note that if
a delayed constraint on a hypothesis is not satisfied, then the initial match of that hypothesis
with the ishyp constraint is failed, and the ishyp check continues through the rest of the hy-
pothesis list. This is because it is possible for there to be multiple matching hypotheses in the
list, with different lists of associated not-free-in constraints, and the required conditions may
be met by a hypothesis later in the sequence.
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Rewrite constraints are checked by the function rewrite check (see page 270). This uses
Qu-Prolog structural decomposition functions to implement the specification of the function
ReplaceCheck in a direct fashion.
8.2.3 Generating the Subgoals
The result of instantiating a copy of a rule by substituting the appropriate values for its variables,
is a partial rule instance, in which the conclusions of the sequents are complete, but in which the
hypotheses are represented by hypothesis transformers, albeit instantiated instances of these.
To generate the complete instance of the rule the checker has to supply a list of hypotheses
to which these transformers can be applied. In the specification this function is performed
by GenSubGoals, which is implemented in the prototype by the procedure gen subgoals (see
Appendix C, procedure gen subgoals, page 274).
gen subgoals processes each premise of the current rule instance in turn to generate a subgoal.
It first calls function apply nfis, which adds any per-premise not-free-in constraints to the list
of delayed constraints associated with the current hypothesis list. Then apply hyp trans list
applies any hypothesis transformers to the resultant list to give the final hypothesis list for
that subgoal. These two procedures are implemented by standard Qu-Prolog list processing
operations, and involve packing and unpacking the sequent format which has not-free-in lists
associated with its hypotheses. These two functions implement the specifications ApplyNFI and
ApplyHypTrans respectively.
As described in Section 8.2 the subgoals generated in this way are passed back from the function
check node as the list parameter SeqList, to be processed by later iterations of the function
check.
8.2.4 Proof Termination
The condition for valid termination of the proof checking process is that the list of outstanding
subgoals is reduced to empty at the same time as the list of proof steps is exhausted. In the
specification this condition is defined by the conditions under which the boolean value returned
by Check can have the value true. In the implementation of the prototype the reduction of
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the list of subgoals corresponds to a successful return from the top level call of check. The
exhaustion of the list of steps is checked by following this by a final read of the input file by
the routine get endnode (see page 267)— in the case of a valid proof a final eol symbol will
be read, anything else giving an error. The opposite error — where the list of subgoals is not
reduced to empty before the last step is completed — is detected by the function check node.
This expects to read the next node and gives an error if the eol symbol is read instead.
In order to provide a graceful exit whenever an error is detected, the Qu-Prolog exception
mechanism is used. An exception handler is declared which allows failures at lower levels to
be recoverable, and be reported back rather than causing the program to fail (see Appendix C,
page 264). This mechanism simplifies the management of Qu-Prolog backtracking which would
otherwise take place when an error occurs.
8.2.5 Checking that the Correct Theorem was Proven
The final stage in checking that a proof is correct is checking that it proves the theorem that
was stated initially. In fact this requirement reduces to checking any premises in the theorem,
since,
1. the required conclusion is actually used as the starting point for checking and so is correct
by construction, and
2. any missing constraints will cause the checker to fail the proof.
In the specification the premises are returned as a list by the Check function and this list is
checked using the function MatchSubLists. In the implementation this function is performed as
part of the code of the check proof aux routine (see Appendix C, page 263). The premises used
by the proof are stored in the PREMISES implicit parameter. These are retrieved and compared
with the list of premises given in the original statement of the theorem. If an extra premise has
been used we fail the proof. In the specification we only require that the premises used be a
subset of those stated in the theorem, that is, we allow that some premises may not actually be
used in the proof. This is also the case with the prototype, however in addition, this situation
is detected and a warning message output, since it is usually the case that all premises will be
used in a proof.
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8.2.6 Matching Terms
Term comparison in the specification is described in Section 7.5. In that algorithm several
factors besides simple equality are taken into account. These include:
• Keeping track of bound variables so that the α-equivalence of λ and other quantified terms
is recognised.
• The automatic β-reduction of λ-terms during comparison.
• The recognition of the equivalence of terms that contain substitutions.
Some of these operations are applied automatically by Qu-Prolog. Thus Qu-Prolog recognises
proof-object quantifiers as Qu-Prolog quantifiers, and so the α-equivalence of quantified terms is
automatic in the checker. Similarly, proof-object substitutions are also recognised as Qu-Prolog
substitutions and handled as such. Also the interaction between substitution and quantification
is handled automatically by Qu-Prolog. However, Qu-Prolog does apply a particular semantics
to object variables, and in the general case the handling of proof terms may differ slightly from
the standard Qu-Prolog behaviour.
The structure of λ-terms is very similar to that of quantified terms, and advantage is taken of
this to declare lambda, as a quantifier in Qu-Prolog. This quantifier is given the semantics of
λ by code which evaluates λ-expressions (see page 280). The quantifier declaration means that
bound variables in λ-terms are handled automatically by Qu-Prolog, in the same way that it
handles bound variables in quantified expressions.
Term matching is implemented by the function match terms (see page 276). The implementa-
tion uses the Qu-Prolog structural decomposition operators to decompose the two terms being
compared. It follows the algorithm given in the specification, but is complicated by the fact
that some features need to be handled explicitly, rather than by the inbuilt mechanisms. This
is necessary where the default Qu-Prolog behaviour does not correspond to that required by
the specification; this is the case, for instance, in the management of bound variables.
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8.2.7 Not-Free-In Constraints
The algorithm for checking not-free-in constraints is that given in Section 7.5.4. Qu-Prolog
has its own in-built not-free-in constraint mechanism, but this cannot be used directly in all
cases, since it does not necessarily agree in detail with the mechanism that we have specified.
However, the Qu-Prolog mechanism does agree with that required for provers that use explicit
not-free-in constraints and it can be used in that case. Where not-free-in constraints are rep-
resented implicitly, the Qu-Prolog mechanism can be used, provided that the object-variable
being checked for is set to be not-free-in any of the schematic variables in the proof. The code
therefore temporarily sets the appropriate constraints and does a standard Qu-Prolog not-free-
in check with these constraints in place. It releases these temporary constraints after the check
is completed.
8.2.8 Reporting
The output defined in the specification is the boolean valid!, and in addition the list of provisos,
if the proof is valid. However, the prototype checker includes extra reporting facilities to give
feedback on the checking process.
Initially the proof checker displays the following information.
• The name and details of the proof file being checked.
• A list of all the rules in the context.
• The theorem to proven which is recorded at the start of the proof.
This information is generated by the routine check proof aux (page 263), with the list of rules
being generated by the call to get rule (page 269). The specification only prescribes the nec-
essary requirements for reporting, and does not define a detailed output format. The prototype
satisfies these requirements but gives more detail than is suggested by the specification. In the
prototype a full list of rules is printed at the start of checking (basically to provide an on-going
record of the contents of the proof-object) while the final provisos list simply gives the names
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of the rules actually used in the proof. These can then be matched by name back to the initial
list. The specification simply requires that the proviso list be reported at the end.
While checking the proof, the proof checker also outputs a printed log of its progress. This may
include the information recorded for each step, and the various actions taken to instantiate it
and check its validity. The amount of detail may be controlled by runtime switches.
If checking completes successfully the checker prints out the theorem proved and lists the pro-
visos upon which the proof is conditional. Oracles are not supported by the prototype, so the
provisos are just a list of the theorems used in the proof. If the proof fails, the checker prints
out a message at the point of failure and aborts the processing.
8.3 Summary
In this chapter we have described a prototype proof checker for proof-objects recorded in the
format described in Chapter 4. The prototype is written in Qu-Prolog, and we were able to
take advantage of this in a number of ways. For example, in many cases elements of the ASCII
proof-object were recognised directly by the Qu-Prolog interpreter as items of a corresponding
Qu-Prolog type, and could be used as such in the checker. The implementation closely follows
the algorithm defined by the specification described in Section 7.5.
The prototype checker is designed to handle generic proof-objects and its success depends on
how well it performs this task. It was therefore tested in conjunction with the proof recorders for
Ergo 5 and Isabelle 98 which were described in Part II. The results of these tests are described
in Chapter 9, which gives an the evaluation of the prototyping project as a whole.
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CHAPTER 9
Evaluation
In this chapter we evaluate the thesis in respect to its main objectives. These are,
1. to demonstrate the feasibility of a generic proof checker,
2. to establish that formal verification of such a checker is possible, and
3. to show that such a system is scalable to real-world situations.
How far we have achieved each of these aims is addressed in Sections 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 respectively.
9.1 Genericity
It is not clear on what theoretical basis a comprehensive generic checker could be founded. There
are many different theorem provers using different architectures, different styles of proof, and
different logics. Perhaps something akin to Logical Frameworks [HHP93, Pfe96, BC92] could be
used, but any such meta-logical notation would seem to be inevitably large and complex if it were
to be truly generic. In this thesis we adopt a more empirical approach, and investigate whether
the goal of genericity can be achieved by mechanising a very simple inference mechanism, and
then recording proofs in a format compatible with this. In this framework, the basic process
of applying a logical rule is mechanised to the extent that an implementation can be used as a
proof checker. Individual theorem provers of interest can then be investigated on a case-by-case
basis, to see whether it is possible to adapt them to record their proofs in the formalism required
by the checker. Genericity is established if we can show that such an approach can handle a
variety of different theorem provers.
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9.1.1 The Recorder/Translator and Checker Architecture
In Section 3.4 we described the general architecture of a recorder/translator plus a separate
checker for the implementation of a proof checking system. In this scheme the checker is
truly generic while the recorder/translator is implemented afresh for each theorem prover. The
assurance of the results is primarily dependent on the checker, so, while the generic checker
should be formally verified, this is not required of the recorders or translators. The effort
required to implement a recorder, or recorder and translator, can vary from quite small to
possibly very large (such as where proofs have to be converted from a form very different from
that required by the checker). Thus the Ergo 5 prototype required a simple recorder while
Isabelle required a more extensive recorder and also a translator system.
We are, therefore, advocating genericity that derives in part from a flexible strategy for imple-
menting a checking system, rather than being completely embodied in the implementation of a
single proof checking program. Nevertheless, the degree of assurance is provided by the one-off
investment in the verification of the checker component. This investment is independent of how
many theorem provers we choose to create proof recorders for. Indeed, although the cost of
supporting a large range of provers in this way may be expensive, we have argued that this is
offset by the amortisation of the verification effort expended on the single checker across several
systems.
Before considering the two case studies reported here, we may make the observation that ideally
a proof recorder would be integrated into the theorem prover at a deeper level than is the case
with the prototypes described in this thesis. For example, in the case of Isabelle the recorder
is written as a post-processor to the standard proof derivation. This is at a superficial level
in the code. We found that some of the information necessary for checking is not recorded in
the derivation record or is difficult to access. Ideally the code that actually records the proof
derivation would be revised to conform to the requirement that all information necessary for
checking be recorded. Note also that we have tacitly assumed an ‘open source’ theorem prover.
Some theorem provers, such as PVS [ORS92], are proprietary and implementing a recorder may
require access to the code of the product.
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9.1.2 The Effectiveness of the Two Case Studies
To demonstrate genericity we implemented proof recorders for two different provers, namely
Ergo 5 and Isabelle 98. (The latter comprising a recorder and translator.) These recorders are
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. They were validated using the prototype proof checker described
in Chapter 8. Ergo and Isabelle were chosen as being two quite different provers that have been
used to support program verification, our prime area of interest. Points of difference include
the following.
• Implementation technology — Isabelle uses SML while Ergo is implemented in Qu-
Prolog. An important consequence of this is that in Ergo meta-variables are automatically
instantiated by Qu-Prolog, whereas this does not occur in Isabelle with SML. This is a
major reason why we use a translator phase for Isabelle but not for Ergo.
• Approach to typing — Isabelle uses typed logics, whereas Ergo uses untyped ones.
• Representation of not-free-in constraints — Ergo represents these explicitly, whereas
they are implicit in Isabelle.
On the other hand both theorem provers are generic, in that they support user-defined logics,
both support higher-order logics, and both support backwards proof.
Test Cases
The Ergo and Isabelle recorders were tested by interfacing them to the prototype proof checker
described in Chapter 8, and using the combined system to validate a number of test proofs.
The initial tests consisted of a set of 18 propositional logic proofs. These were selected from the
proofs in the Ergo 5 release. They comprise a small set of these proofs that exercise all of the 12
rules in Ergo 5’s definition of propositional logic. (More than 12 proofs were required because
where a proof in the set referred to a derived rule, we required that the test set also include
the proof of that rule.) These 18 proofs were then translated to Isabelle and the same test was
run there. This translation was done line by line from the Ergo scripts, that is using the basic
rules of propositional logic directly in an Isabelle script. In addition, where the theorems were
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provable in Isabelle by a simple invocation of the general purpose tactic blast tac, these proofs
where also run and checked. (Some of the theorems, those that had premises in the theorem
statement, could not be proven directly in this way, and were omitted from this second test
set.) All these tests were successful.
Of course simple proofs in propositional logic are not very demanding tests of a proof checker.
So in addition a number of more complicated proofs were checked as well. These were taken
from sets of examples provided with the theorem prover.
In the case of Ergo 5, only a few example proofs come with the release. Nevertheless those
proofs that were in the classical predicate logic theory were used for testing. (A much larger
number of proofs were available in the theories of the earlier Ergo 4 theorem prover, and these
are being ported to Ergo 5, but they are not yet available in the released version.) In all an
extra 30 proofs were used, some were from the available Ergo 5 examples, one or two were Ergo
versions of Isabelle proofs, and some were proofs created for this exercise. The sizes of the
proofs varied from just 2 nodes to 40 nodes. Some larger proofs were created as part of the
scalability testing described in Section 9.3.4. The largest of these proofs had 355 nodes.
With the exceptions noted below, all these proofs were checked correctly by the proof checker.
The only problem was that the Ergo 5 prover itself was unable to rerun some of the proof tactics
that it had previously recorded. (The example proofs came in the form of Ergo proof files which
contained the tactic recorded when the proof was originally created.) Since the proof recording
system for existing proofs is dependent on the proofs being rerun, this meant that these proofs
could not be checked. There are known problems with Ergo 5 in this area.
In the case of Isabelle the situation is different. The Isabelle release comes with a large num-
ber of theories, each with many proofs. A number of these were used to test the Isabelle
recorder/translator prototype.
The Isabelle example proofs are arranged in a number of example sets in separate ML files. A
group of these proof sets were selected for testing. The selection included 164 theorems, and
in most cases the proofs were done by using high-level tactics. When the proofs were run a
further 45 were discounted. This was because the implementation of the proof recording system
for Isabelle is not yet complete. A certain class of rules generates a derivation subtree which
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does not contain sufficient information to be able to record a complete proof record (see Section
6.6). This problem is still outstanding in the prototype recorder, and where the proof tactic
invoked one of these rules the proof was eliminated from the test. Of the remaining 119 proofs,
111 checked correctly. There still remain 8 spurious rejections, of which most seem to be due
to incorrect naming of bound variables by the Isabelle proof recorder.
Thus the recording of Isabelle proofs is still not completely satisfactory, but sufficient progress
has been made to indicate that the approach is clearly feasible.
9.1.3 Extending the System to Handle Other Provers
The two prototype systems have been quite successful, but will the same framework extend to
other theorem provers? In this section we examine two examples of other theorem provers, and
discuss how far they fit into the framework. At this stage we attempt to highlight some of the
problems that they pose, and how we might overcome them.
The approach adopted in this thesis makes a number of assumptions, including the following.
1. The logic is available as data. That is, it is either accessible as a data structure within
the theorem prover (where a generic prover is used), or it is available as a hard-coded list
of rules (such as an explicit representation of the fixed logic of a non-generic prover).
2. The logic can be written in ‘text-book’ style, since the checker applies a mechanised version
of the checking process implicit in this style. An example of a rule that cannot be handled
directly in this way is a multiple conjunction introduction rule, in which the number of
premises depends on the form of the conclusion.
3. The logic is written in a backwards style — as has been mentioned in earlier chapters, we
cannot handle some formulations of rules for forward proof.
These assumptions place a number of limitations on the claim that our approach is ‘generic’.
Also, as discussed in Section 4.5.2, types and signatures are not represented or checked in our
system. This decision was made in the interests of genericity, since different theorem provers use
different type systems and it was not clear how all the variations could be handled in a generic
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way. Although it may have been possible to have incorporated some relative type checking —
that is, assuming some general properties of the typing system, to check that the premises of a
rule instance were type consistent with the conclusion — it was felt that this was too weak to
be useful. Instead, type correctness is assumed to be a separate issue from the checking of the
application of the logical rules. Hence it is required that type correctness should be established
either by a separate type checker, or, conceivably, by a separate proof conducted within a logical
theory that describes the type system of the prover.
Example 1 : HOL
The theorem prover HOL is not generic. It has a fixed higher-order logic encapsulated in the
program code. This logic has eight primitive rules of inference (shown in Figures 9.1, 9.2 —
adapted from [Gor94, pages 117–119]).
Assumption introduction [ASSUME]
t ` t
Reflexivity [REFL]
` t = t
Beta-conversion [BETA CONV]
` (λ x .t1)t2 = t1[t2/x ]
Where t1[t2/x ] is the result of substituting t2 for x in t1, with suitable renaming of variables
to prevent free variables in t2 becoming bound after substitution.
Substitution [SUBST]
Γ1 ` t1 = t1′ . . . Γn ` tn = tn ′ Γ ` t [t1, . . . , tn ]
Γ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Γn ∪ Γ ` t [t1′, . . . , tn ′]
Where t [t1, . . . , tn ] denotes a term t with some free occurrences of subterms t1, . . . , tn singled
out and t [t1′, . . . , tn ′] denotes the result of replacing each selected occurrence of ti by ti ′ (for
1 ≤ i ≤ n), with suitable renaming of variables to prevent free variables in ti ′ becoming bound
after substitution.
Figure 9.1: The HOL Rules — 1
In addition to these eight rules, there are also five axioms which could be regarded as rules of
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Abstraction [ABS]
Γ ` t1 = t2
Γ ` (λ x .t1) = (λ x .t2)
Provided x is not free in Γ.
Type instantiation [INST TYPE]
Γ ` t
Γ ` t [σ1, . . . , σn/α1, . . . , αn ]
Where t [σ1, . . . , σn/α1, . . . , αn ] is the result of substituting, in parallel, the types σ1, . . . , σn
for type variables α1, . . . , αn in t , with the restrictions:
1. none of the type variables α1, . . . , αn occur in Γ;
2. no distinct variables in t become identified after the instantiation.
Discharging an assumption [DISCH]
Γ ` t2
Γ−{t1} ` t1 ⇒ t2
Where Γ−{t1} is the set subtraction of {t1} from Γ.
Modus Ponens [MP]
Γ1 ` t1 ⇒ t2 Γ2 ` t1
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ` t2
Figure 9.2: The HOL Rules — 2
inference without hypotheses (although HOL does not treat them in this way).
Thus HOL does not initially meet our first assumption which is that rules are data — in HOL
they are code. However, it would be possible to implement a recorder for HOL which inserted
into the context of every proof-object a representation of the eight basic rules and five basic
axioms of the HOL logic in the standard ASCII representation that we are using for rules.
In fact, although the above observation in regard to the HOL axioms is correct in respect to the
HOL theory, the implementation in the HOL prover uses a larger set of axioms. For reasons of
efficiency it implements a small set of core derived rules as ML functions rather than in terms
of sequences of the base inferences in the formal logic. Wong [Won93b] distinguishes between
the latter as ‘primitive inferences’ and the former as ‘basic inferences’. His HOL proof recorder
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uses the larger set of ‘basic inferences’, thus reducing the size of its proof records. Adopting
the alternative approach, that of recording down to ‘basic inferences’, would require replacing
any uses of the derived rules by equivalent subproofs that only used ‘primitive inferences’. This
replacement could be done by the proof recorder. For brevity we only discuss the issues raised
by the ‘primitive inferences’ described above.
The implementation of a proof recorder for HOL raises a number of issues. One is that HOL’s
native proof mode is forwards proof. The HOL checker does not record full proofs, but a step by
step record would resemble a Hilbert style proof. This is the format of Wong’s proof recording
system [Won95].
Similarly, HOL rules are formulated for forwards proof. For example, as shown in Figure 9.2,
in the modus ponens rule the hypotheses of the conclusion are the union of the two sets of
hypotheses of the two premises. The checker assumes rules in a backwards style in which the
hypotheses of the premises are derivable from those of the conclusion by information explicit
in the rule. This may not be a major problem in practice, since HOL (at least when used
for program verification) is often used with the subgoal package — which simulates backwards
proof. In this use it may be that the rules are effectively used as if they were backwards rules,
and if this is so HOL could be incorporated into the current framework, albeit with a modified
set of rules and with the requirement that the recorder police the use of the rules in this way.
In any case it should be possible for a HOL recorder to simulate forwards rules by using a
backwards version of the rule, and interpolating delete hypothesis steps as required to achieve
the same effect. Specifically, in the case of modus ponens, we could use the backwards version
of the MP rule, MP2:
[MP2]
Γ ` t1 ⇒ t2 Γ ` t1
Γ ` t2
This is just a special case of the MP rule. Any occurrence of MP can then be replaced by the
equivalent proof-tree schema:
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Γ1 ` t1 ⇒ t2.... delete hypotheses Γ2 \ Γ1
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ` t1 ⇒ t2
Γ2 ` t1.... delete hypotheses Γ1 \ Γ2
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ` t1
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ` t2 MP2
A HOL recorder could systematically replace occurrences of the use of the MP rule by equivalent
subtrees using MP2.
The other basic HOL rule which has an overtly backwards formulation is SUBST. This also poses
another difficulty, in that it is a rule schema with an arbitrary number of premises. Rules of
this form cannot be expressed in our rule representation, and they also violate the requirements
for being able to recover the tree structure of a proof from a simple list of nodes, for the
information in this list would not contain the number of premises for instances of SUBST. There
are a number of ways to handle these difficulties. However they would all probably require
expanding the proof tree for each use of SUBST. One possibility is to replace occurrences of
SUBST by the rule:
Substitution [SUBST2]
Γ ` t1 = t1′ Γ ` [t1/x ]t
Γ ` [t1′/x ]t
This could be used to replace each occurrence of the original SUBST by a cascade of instances
of SUBST2 plus the delete hypothesis rules required to trim the hypothesis lists.
There is also another possible difficulty with the application of the current framework to HOL.
This is the rule INST TYPE which involves the instantiation of type variables. This rule is re-
quired in the HOL logic because HOL is polymorphic. The INST TYPE rule is used to specialise
a polymorphic rule for a particular use. An example is the rule EQ SYM EQ. This rule is poly-
morphic, and to use it to prove (3 = 4) = (4 = 3 ) requires that its type be particularised
to num. This is done by: (INST TYPE [‘:num’, ‘:*’] EQ SUM EQ).
We have separated type checking from the checking of the proof itself, only the latter is done
by the proof checker. From the point of view of proof checking we can, therefore, ignore uses
of the INST TYPE rule. This situation highlights the fact that a critical proviso in our proof
checking scenario is the type-correctness of the proof. Polymorphic logics, such as HOL, add an
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extra complexity to this dependency, and it may be desirable to flag uses of INST TYPE so that
their implications for type-checking are recorded, even if this rule does not generate a checkable
proof step. If a proof checker for HOL were to be developed some ingenuity may be required to
ensure that polymorphism is handled correctly, in, for instance, the proof of polymorphic rules.
Example 2 : Coq
It is not clear how provers that use the ‘propositions as types’ paradigm would be accommodated
within our checking framework. An example is Coq [BBC+97, HKPM97]. Some features of Coq
are compatible with the requirements of the current proof-checking system, for example, Coq
proceeds by backwards proof (decomposition into subgoals). In Coq proof is effected by means
of tactics which are derived from five primitive tactics [BBC+97].
1. Introducing a universally quantified variable into the local context of the goal.
2. Defining an undefined existential variable.
3. Changing the conclusion of the goal for another definitionally equal term.
4. Changing the type of a variable in the local context for another definitionally equal term.
5. Erasing a variable from the local context.
Thus, at the primitive level, Coq’s logic could possibly be dealt with in a manner similar to that
posited for HOL’s fixed logic. It is also encouraging that Coq facilitates proof transformations,
such as the derivation of code and the generation of natural language proofs. Adding another
type of transformation may be easier to accomplish for Coq than for some other systems.
However the structure of Coq terms is encoded in their types and inference is contingent upon
the application of type checking. It is therefore not clear how feasible the mapping of Coq logics
and proofs into our framework would be. Possibilities for incorporating such a representation
into our framework needs further investigation. Any solution will need to distinguish between
the following uses of types in Coq.
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• The representation of the proof as a type — that is as a λ-term. In this respect, the proof
recorder might perform the equivalent of type checking when converting a λ proof-term
to a tree structured proof.
• The representation of the types of the objects within the proof – here the problem does
not differ from other provers.
9.1.4 Summary
Genericity is effected by having a recorder specific to a particular theorem prover pass a proof-
object to a common generic checker. The proof recording component of this system is specific
to the theorem prover and utilises a recorder/translator architecture to generate a proof-object
in a standard format. Unlike the recording component, the same checker is used for all provers.
The genericity of the checker is achieved by using a simple algorithm that implements checking
in the style of checking textbook proofs.
We have validated this framework by successfully implementing a generic checker and also
recorders for two different theorem provers — Ergo 5 and Isabelle 98. These two case studies
show that the system can handle proofs from very different theorem provers. In respect to the
proof recording, the flexibility of the framework adopted supports the contention that recording
proofs in the necessary format should be possible for a number of other theorem provers, al-
though the effort required to do so may vary considerably. The preliminary review of the HOL
prover tends to confirm this. However more work needs to be undertaken to ascertain whether
the requirements of the checker itself prevent particular provers or types of prover, such as
possibly Coq, being amenable to checking in this way, or perhaps make the costs of developing
a suitable recorder prohibitive in some cases.
9.2 Verifiability
We have outlined a formal specification of the proof checker in Chapter 7 and given its detail
in Appendix B. We have asserted that this specification describes a checking algorithm that
establishes the correctness of a proof relative to a logic described by a set of rules. To establish
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verifiability we need to show that deriving an implementation which is demonstrably consistent
with this formal specification is an achievable goal.
At the outset we should reiterate that only the checking module has been specified formally
and need be subject to formal verification. In the complete implementation of the checker this
module interfaces with a parser for the proof-object which may be developed informally. It is
envisaged that the implementation will proceed by first defining the data structures common
to both modules, and then each can be developed separately. The parser could be implemented
by something like yacc [LMB92], or GNU’s bison [DS95], or possibly by ayacc [TTSC94], if Ada
is the implementation language.
9.2.1 The Specification
We have described the specification of the proof checker using the Z specification language. Z
can be written in many styles and in our case the formal specification has been written in a
style, and at a level of detail, that is suitable as a basis for formal refinement. However, this
is not necessarily the level most suitable for reasoning about the system. In Section 7.6.1 we
have suggested that it should, nevertheless, be possible to prove some basic properties of the
specification that show its adequacy as a formal description of the proof system. We could also
derive a logically equivalent specification that generates an explicit proof tree. We could then
express and check high-level properties in terms of this proof tree, for example that every proof
that is passed as valid by the checker has a closed proof tree.
9.2.2 Approaches to Implementation
The specification is written with a bias towards implementation by some sort of refinement
technique. An alternative would be to develop a program independently from the specification
and then show formally that the final program does in fact satisfy that specification. However, a
specification at a somewhat higher level of abstraction would be more suitable for this approach.
A number of tools exist to support automated or machine-assisted program refinement. For
instance the B Tool [Abr96] can generate C from formal specifications by refinement, while the
Cogito tool-set developed at the SVRC [THK+97] can be used to refine specifications in the
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Sum specification language to Ada programs [KW98]. B requires that the initial specification
be in the AMN specification language rather than Z. On the other hand, Sum is a superset
of Z, and the Cogito tool-set includes prototype tools for the conversion of standard Z to
Sum. An experiment was undertaken to use these tools to generate a Sum version of the
current specification. This proved quite possible, although numerous small changes to the
source were required. For instance, the converter did not support some Z features used in the
specification (such as let expressions and user defined infix operators), nor did it allow the
bool datatype, which is an Object-Z extension. (We had used the Object-Z type-checker to
check the specification and had incorporated some convenient features of Object-Z.) The Sum
specification obtained in this way could be used as the starting point for a formal refinement to
Ada code using the Cogito tool-set.
Another approach to implementation is to use refinement direct from the Z specification in a less
mechanised way. This involves data and operational refinement to produce an implementation
that is correct with respect to the Z specification [PST91, Mor94]. In the current case it is
envisaged that this development could be done manually after the fashion of [PST91]. It is one
of the aims of this chapter to assess the feasibility of the task of refining the Z specification
given in Appendix B to code. For this exercise we have chosen to examine refinement from Z
in more detail below.
We stress that we are not necessarily recommending this approach as the method of choice for
the verification of the checker; it was chosen since it is both direct and immediately accessible.
We have mentioned that experiments with adapting the specification for use with the Cogito
tool-set (that is conversion from Z to the Sum superset of Z) were encouraging. Given the close
structural correspondence between the formal specification and the expected implementation
code, there is no reason to suppose that using Cogito (or other methods) would give results
that differ radically in size or complexity from those, based on informal refinement, which are
presented here. Note that using a mechanised system, such as B or Cogito, for formal verification
has many advantages, which would possibly outweigh the costs of ‘porting’ the specification from
Z to another notation.
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9.2.3 Implementation by Refinement from Z
The inputs of the specification are abstract data structures corresponding directly to the com-
ponents of the proof-object. As mentioned previously, the Z style has been kept deliberately
concrete to reduce the refinement distance between the specification and the implementation.
Where possible, types that have a direct translation to program-level data types are used in
preference to more abstract types, for instance lists have been used in preference to sets. There-
fore the data refinement of the inputs should be reasonably straightforward, and would generate
common data structures that interface to the parser.
Operation refinement may also be performed on a one-to-one basis with the Z functions. At
the top level the specification is reasonably simple, with a main schema that applies the Check
function to decide whether the theorem is valid. This function also generates lists of the premises
of the theorem and the justifications of all the steps of the theorem. If the theorem is valid
the list of provisos is generated from the list of justifications. Of course the implementation
resulting from such a strategy will be naive in some respects and this may have implications for
the scalability of the resultant program (see the next section). However such difficulties can be
addressed by suitable program transformation techniques in accordance with the adage: ‘write
the program first and optimise it afterwards’.
The Size of the Implementation Task
Details of specific formal development projects are difficult to find in the literature. One exam-
ple, however, is the development of control software for a radiation therapy machine described in
a series of papers by Jonathan Jacky and others [UJ95, RRP+97]. In this project Z was used to
specify a control system, both at a high level to express overall safety requirements, and also at
a ‘concrete’ level in which paragraphs correspond to data structures, functions and procedures
— the latter is similar to the approach taken here. The code was mostly developed by hand,
but using the formal description as the specification. An intermediate report [RRP+97, Table 2]
cites 1137 lines of Z producing 4786 lines of code (in a version of Pascal). In a separate exercise,
the Z specification of the top level loop of the controller was also developed more formally:
requirements were defined formally, were refined to concrete versions, and were then used as
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invariants in the actual code. However this was a small-scale development: the main transition
function was only 14 lines of Z which was implemented in about 30 lines of code [UJ95, Figure
3].
By comparison our specification has about 850 lines of Z. Of the 850 lines of specification
about 290 are data declarations and the rest predicates. The very limited example cited above
suggests that this will refine to between twice and four times that many lines of Pascal or Ada
code. The anticipated close correspondence between the structure of this code and the original
specification should make the task of demonstrating or evaluating their consistency relatively
straightforward, at least at an informal level of reasoning.
Even with an expected program size of 2-3,000 lines, the overall refinement task, including
the proofs needed to meet the verification conditions, will be significant. However, if formal
development is to play a meaningful role in software engineering, developments of this size
and complexity have to be within the capacity of the techniques available. Giving the addi-
tional assurance of a verified proof checker appears, therefore, to be at least as feasible as the
developments that it is intended to support.
9.2.4 Summary
We have supplied a complete specification in the Z language of an algorithm for our proof
checker. This formal specification is confined to the main checking function. This function
operates on an internal representation of the information in the proof-object which is generated
by a separate parsing component that reads the actual proof-object. Verification will be confined
to the checking module.
The specification is written in a style oriented towards implementation by refinement, and
manually refining to code should be fairly straightforward. The specification is some 850 lines
long and will probably generate a few thousand lines of code. A refinement tool such as Cogito
could be used to support the generation of code from the specification. We have not attempted
the actual verification in this thesis, but we have investigated the size of the task and a refinement
of this size should be feasible.
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9.3 Scalability
Scalability is essential if the checker described here is to be used for real-world safety-critical
applications, since in such cases proofs may be very large. We need to ensure that a system
that has been tested on proofs of the order of tens or occasionally hundreds of steps can be
used successfully on proofs with thousands or tens of thousands of steps. Although we have
prototype systems for two theorem provers, we do not have proofs of this size available for the
two test systems, so we cannot investigate scalability directly. Instead we used two indirect
strategies.
1. Theoretical — where we looked for scaling problems in the structure of likely implemen-
tations and the way that they might use resources.
2. Empirical — in which we ran a series of small-scale tests and extrapolated the results to
large proofs.
Note that the following discussion relates to the intrinsic scalability of the system that we
are proposing here. A different issue is whether the general approach of recording proofs at
a very low level is itself inherently un-scalable. This issue is discussed in [Bou92, Bou94] but
the attitude taken here is that the problem perceived at that time was essentially a practical
one, which the constantly falling costs of computer storage and processing power have since
overcome.
The checking system comprises two components: the recorder and the checker, and we consider
the scalability of each of these separately. We also note that since we will be checking proofs
that were generated by a theorem prover, scalability may be measured relative to the resources
required to prove the theorem in the first place. In other words, since we can only check a proof
that has already been successfully proven by the theorem prover, then we can assume that at
least the same resources are available for checking as were used for proving it in the first place.
It is to be expected that checking a large proof will consume more resources than checking a
small proof, however scaling problems arise if the resources used depend on proof size in a way
that is significantly worse than linear. The two key resources here are storage size and processing
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time (and for many applications there is a trade-off between the optimal use of these two). In
discussing the scalability of the proof checker we consider these two resources separately.
9.3.1 Scalability of the Recorder/Translator System
We observe that, in order to generate a proof-object of the required form, the recorder will,
at some point, have to have access to the whole of the proof record. Since we are checking
our proof in a backwards fashion the proof recording and checking must be done consecutively.
That is, we must, at some point, have first constructed the whole proof-object before checking
can begin — we cannot ‘pipe’ the proof to the checker from the theorem prover while proof
construction is in progress. This is because, if the proof is constructed backwards, it may
need to be completed before all meta-variables are resolved, or if it is constructed forwards,
the root theorem, which is the starting point of the backwards checking process, is only added
at the last step in the construction. This generally means that either the theorem prover
stores the whole proof during its construction, or that the translator assembles the complete
proof from the prover before transmitting it to the checker. The circumstances depend on the
particular theorem prover. Where a translator phase is used this observation applies to the
recorder/translator system as a whole rather than the recorder in isolation.
The main implication of this requirement is on the scalability of the system to the checking of
very large proofs. At some point prior to checking, the complete proof-object must be assembled,
and this may mean that the resources needed for checking a proof in a particular system are
greater than those needed by the theorem prover for simply proving the theorem. For example,
where a prover purges completed subsections of a proof, the size of proof that it can handle may
be effectively unlimited, whereas for checking we require that sufficient storage of some kind is
available so that all parts of the proof be recorded and stored in a single proof-object. Where
the proof is large this constraint requires that the resources needed are also large, although there
is a trade-off in the implementation between the resources of processing time and storage space.
Thus in the case of meta-variables the instantiation could be done in main memory, or via an
intermediate file (requiring one or more read/write passes), changing the storage requirement
but with corresponding implications for processing time.
Proof recorders may need to reorganise the structure of the whole proof. For example, the
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Isabelle prototype recorder utilises the proof derivation facility of Isabelle. This records the
derivation structured as a flat list. To recover the proof tree, Isabelle has a function that
converts this data structure to a tree format. At this point we have two copies of the derivation.
The proof recorder function then makes another pass over this second structure to generate
another copy of the derivation in proof-object format, but this time the data structure is written
directly to disk. (The translator then has to make two passes over this file to instantiate all the
meta-variables.)
In general however these requirements are not seen as a major limitation on the scalability of
the recorder/translator system for the following reasons.
• Any auditable system is required to record the complete derivation, so a proof that could
not be recorded at all would simply be unacceptable in this context. However recording
the derivation in the form we require is more restrictive than the simple requirement to
record a derivation.
• Large amounts of disk space are cheap, and any excessive memory requirements can in
most cases be converted to disk usage by suitable changes to the recording system, at a
cost of processing time.
• Time penalties in proof recording are seen as somewhat more acceptable than correspond-
ing penalties in ordinary theorem proving, since in normal use the formal auditing of sets
of proofs by the proof checker is a ‘one-off’ activity as part of the finalisation of a project,
rather than part of the iterative development cycle.
These considerations are very general in nature (and as general remarks apply to the checker
as well as the proof recorder) however this is inevitable, since we have allowed a wide discretion
in the implementation of the recorder via the recorder/translator architecture.
9.3.2 Scalability of the Checker — Storage Requirements
In assessing scalability we need an appropriate measure of proof ‘size’. A number suggest
themselves and these tend to be related in a general way. These include
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• some complexity measure of the theorem proven,
• the size of the proof file in ASCII characters,
• the number of proof steps, or
• some measure of the depth and/or breadth of the proof tree.
The checking algorithm that we have described processes one proof node at a time. However, the
main function Check is recursive and a naive implementation might make this a recursive func-
tion, and hence require a call-stack of the size of the number of proof steps. In the specification
this recursion is required by the declarative nature of the Z language, however, a non-recursive
imperative version is simple to implement and avoids the number of steps in the proof being
a direct limitation in this way. (As described in Section 8.2, the Qu-Prolog prototype uses a
solution intermediate between these two options.)
But we can identify one data structure used by the checking algorithm that does depend directly
on the proof size and structure. This is the subgoal list that is one of the parameters to the
Check function. We must therefore consider the implications of this for the scalability of the
checker. The overall size of this list can be considered in two parts. The first is just the number
of goals in the list. The second is the size of each subgoal. Of course these depend on the
particular theorem being proven, but in a general sense the size of a subgoal depends on the
number of hypotheses that it has. In turn the number of hypotheses in a subgoal depends on
the rule used to generate it, and also on the number of hypotheses passed down to that rule
application from the root of the proof tree. In the following sections we consider these issues
in more detail, and then examine the implications of their occurrence in combination for the
scalability of the checker.
The Size of the Subgoal List
The checking algorithm maintains a list of unchecked subgoals. Initially this is just the theorem
being proven and it grows and shrinks as rules are applied: shrinking where a rule such as
assumption is used which discharges a subgoal without adding new ones, and growing when
a rule generates more than one new subgoal to replace the one it has discharged. Since the
193
194 Evaluation
checker reads the proof step by step, this list of subgoals is a key factor in determining the
gross storage requirements of the checker. In principle, assuming it involved backwards proof,
the original theorem prover must have maintained a similar subgoal list during the construction
of the original proof, so it is fairly clear that the proof checker does not require significantly
more resources in this respect than the prover did. In practice, the prover will not necessarily
have applied the rules in the same order as the checker, and the subgoals were not necessarily
represented in a comparable fashion. However we can examine the situation more closely.
A simple measure of the number of steps is not a good indication of the size of the subgoal
list. For example, at one extreme a proof consisting of a very long sequence of applications of
implies introduction to a theorem consisting of a sequence of implications would maintain the
subgoal list at size 1 for the entire proof. On the other hand, a cascade of applications of rules
that each generate a number of new subgoals could generate a long list very quickly. Thus some
compound measure between the breadth and depth of the proof tree is more likely to give an
indicator of the resources required.
For any particular set of rules we can be more specific. The upper bound on the number of
new subgoals generated at any step is P-1, where P is the maximum number of premises in any
of the rules of the logic. For a node at depth d in the tree, an upper bound on the number of
subgoals in the list is given by (P — 1)(d — 1) + 1. Here, at each step in proof so far we have
1. added the maximum number (P) of new subgoals, and
2. only discharged the first subgoal.
This is an upper bound since if at any point we have either generated fewer than the maximum
subgoals, or discharged more than one subgoal in a list of premises, then the size of the list is
reduced. We can thus assert that there is an upper bound on the size of the subgoal list of any
proof which is of the order of PD, where D is the maximum depth of that particular proof tree.
(We may also note that the upper-bound can only be attained where the maximum depth of
the tree occurs at the left-most branch.)
This argument has assumed that all the steps in the proof are justified by using rules of the
logic. Where oracles are invoked the situation could be different. We have assumed that there
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is a fixed upper bound on the number of subgoals generated by a rule. This also holds for the
case where we allow calls to a fixed set of oracles each of which always returns a fixed number
of subgoals, however if we also allow justification by oracles that may return a list of subgoals
whose size depends on the input term, then the bound no longer applies. Although this weakens
the strict application of the upper bound this is not seen as a serious consideration in practice,
since such oracles are special cases and their use may be assumed to be infrequent. In addition
we note that in general the use of oracles is a strategy to reduce the size of proofs.
Prima facie, such a linear dependency on the depth of the tree indicates that the memory
required for the subgoal list is scalable to very large proofs. However we also need to consider
the size of the individual subgoals in the list, and in particular the number of hypotheses in
each subgoal.
The Size of the Hypothesis List
In the checking algorithm, each subgoal in the list includes an explicit representation of its hy-
potheses. With backwards style rules, proof hypotheses are carried forward from the conclusion
to all the premises. Thus when a rule with n premises is applied we get roughly n-1 new copies
of the original hypotheses (subject to any differences in hypotheses between conclusion and
premises as determined by the rule). Backwards proofs generally work by splitting complicated
terms into smaller ones, and in fact hypothesis lists tend to grow, either by the splitting of
existing hypotheses or by the movement of parts of a complex conclusion term back into the
hypothesis list. So a hypothesis list deep in a proof is, in general, larger than one nearer the
root. This could lead to a rapid expansion on the size of the list of subgoals, however several
circumstances mitigate this.
• Firstly, rules generally have only a few premises, so for any one rule application the number
of new hypothesis lists created in this way is restricted.
• Secondly, the checking algorithm runs left-to-right and up and down the tree. This means
that at any point in the processing the subgoal list always contains a mixture of premises
generated at different depths of the tree. While those generated lower down (which are
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towards the front of the list) may, for the reason we are discussing, be large, other subgoals
in the list have been generated near the root and will be smaller.
• In individual provers, tactics may ‘tidy up’ hypothesis lists where appropriate. For in-
stance, when the Isabelle propositional logic tactic applies an elimination rule to simplify
a hypothesis, the application of the rule leaves both the original hypothesis and the sim-
plified component in the list, and the tactic then automatically applies a delete hypothesis
step to remove the original hypothesis.
Overall Scalability
Unfortunately when the scaling characteristics of the subgoal list and of the hypothesis list (both
of which are o(depth-of-tree)) are combined, we find that the size requirement increases as the
square of the tree depth. However, assuming that the size of the tree (that is, the number of
nodes in the tree) is also of the order of the square of the tree depth, then the size requirement
is just o(size-of-tree), which is reasonably scalable.
It is possible to devise schemes which reduce the overhead of storing all the hypotheses for each
subgoal by utilising a delta scheme for sharing hypothesis data between steps. The deltas of this
scheme are effectively the hypothesis list constructors that are defined by the rules, and include
negative values of delta where hypotheses are deleted. Such a system only needs to record the
changes to the hypothesis list on the current branch and at each remaining unchecked subgoal.
This system minimises storage requirements for individual hypothesis lists at the expense of an
increase in complexity of the data structures and the operations used for handling hypotheses.
Note that if the complete tree were to be stored without structure sharing of hypotheses, that
is a scheme that stored both a complete tree and complete hypothesis lists, then this would
cause a combinatorial explosion with increasing size of proof. Although this is not an issue in
the checker described here, it is relevant to the recorder/translator part of the system which
may need access to the complete proof.
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Testing by Simulation
It was not possible to test these conclusions directly, since a suitable sample of large proofs was
not available. Instead they were tested by a simple simulation experiment. A small C program
was written that generated proof trees by applying rules chosen at random from the set of rules
used by Isabelle for predicate logic. In addition, in order to generate closures of proof branches,
the assumption rule was used with a frequency of one in three with respect to the application
of other rules. This corresponds to its frequency in a small sample of Isabelle proofs. Obviously
the ‘proofs’ constructed in this way take no account of the semantics of the rules, but for the
current purpose we are primarily concerned with the gross structure of proof trees, such as the
total number of nodes. However, the simulation does take into account other aspects of the
rules not considered in the analyses given earlier, namely the distribution of rules with different
numbers of premises and the frequency with which rules add new hypotheses to their premises.
For simplicity, we ignored the deletion of hypotheses in this simulation, but this does not affect
the conclusions.
The simulator generated dummy ‘proof trees’. Each tree started with a single open node, and
this tree was extended by applying rules to its open nodes. These rule applications either
extended the tree at that node, or closed the branch. (Closure was mainly by assumption,
but also some of the rules were derived rules that closed the branch.) The choice of rule was
determined by the result of a call to the rand function. The random choice selected assumption
33% of the time or a rule 67% of the time, all rules being chosen with equal likelihood. The
simulator generated a sequence of trees, each tree being completed when it was closed (i.e had
no open nodes). There was a facility to abort the process if the tree grew excessively large, but
this was not triggered in the simulation tests. The simulator was run to generate a test set of
100 000 trees and for each ‘proof’ generated we recorded the following.
1. The total number of nodes in the tree.
2. The maximum depth of the tree.
3. The maximum number of subgoals in the subgoal list in a top-down left-to-right traversal
of the proof tree.
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4. The maximum size of the subgoal list measured by the number of hypotheses. The root
was seeded with a size of 1 and this was passed forward, being incremented for every
subgoal of every rule that added a hypothesis.
The results confirm the conclusions that we drew from a direct analysis. First, Figure 9.3 shows
a linear relationship between the maximum number of subgoals and the depth of the tree.
Figure 9.3: Subgoals vs Depth (by simulation)
In our earlier analysis we derived an upper bound for this list of PD. However, although P
was 4 in the set of rules used, the maximum number of subgoals is in fact only about D in
the simulation. As mentioned during the discussion, the upper-bound is only approached in
exceptional circumstances. (For instance, in the test set of rules only one rule had 4 premises.)
Secondly, Figure 9.4 shows the relationship between the size of the subgoal list (measured by
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Figure 9.4: Hypotheses vs Nodes (by simulation)
the number of hypotheses recorded) and the size of the proof in nodes. The points are well
scattered, but there is a generally linear trend.
9.3.3 Scalability of the Checker — Performance
The considerations presented in the previous section suggest that the checking algorithm is
no more expensive in space requirements than the theorem prover that generated the proof.
However we still need to consider the timing performance of the checker.
The performance of the checker is mainly determined by the processing of the body of the
proof. Of course, the checker first reads and records the rules and theorems that are used
by the proof. But although theories gradually expand as theorems are proven, the rules and
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theorems constitute a relatively fixed overhead that does not cause scaling problems with proofs
of differing sizes. In fact this overhead reduces in proportion as the size of the proof increases.
The checker checks the proof itself one step at a time — each step being checked and discarded
before the next one is read. A step only contributes to the subsequent proof insofar as it has
changed the ongoing list of subgoals. Thus the cost of checking the whole proof is the sum of
the cost of checking each node individually.
total cost of proof =
N∑
i=1
cost(nodei)
If the cost of checking a single node is relatively constant then the total processing cost is linear
in the size of proof (as measured by the number of nodes). However, if the cost of checking a
node depends on the size of the proof then there is a possibility that the processing cost will be
quadratic or worse in the size of proof and hence non-scalable. Such an undesirable dependency
occurs if either of the following occur.
1. The individual steps of a large proof are intrinsically larger or more complex, to a non-
scalable degree, than those of smaller proofs.
2. The complexity of some aspect of the checking process depends on the depth of a node in
the proof in some non-scalable way. An example would be if the time taken to interrogate
the current context during the processing of terms increased unacceptably with the depth
of the node in the proof.
The Complexity of Steps
First we consider whether the individual steps of a large proof are intrinsically more complex
than those of smaller proofs.
It seems reasonable to assume that the complexity of the original theorem is related to the
size of the proof, complex theorems requiring larger proofs. However this is only a rule of
thumb derived from intuition. To test this assertion a sample of 100 Isabelle predicate logic
proofs was examined. The sample was taken from the example proofs contained in the Isabelle
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release. Theorem size was measured roughly by the number of characters in the statement of the
theorem, while proof size was measured by the number of nodes. Since we are concerned here
with the details of particular theorems, we had to use real proofs for this analysis. Although
we had a number of Isabelle proofs available, most were quite small — it is assumed that we
can extrapolate from this sample to larger proofs.
Figure 9.5: Nodes vs Theorem Size (sample of 100 proofs)
The graph of theorem size versus proof size shown in Figure 9.5 exhibits a wide spread. There
was also an outlier, with the most complex theorem (of size 447) having by far the largest proof
(1620 nodes). This outlier is omitted from the graph. In contrast the next largest theorem (335
characters) has a proof of only 169 nodes. An analysis of the 99 proofs (excluding the outlier)
showed a positive correlation of 0.52 between theorem size and proof size which supports the
hypothesis that complex theorems have larger proofs.
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Conversely, in general a large proof implies a complex theorem. If the complexity of the theorem
is promulgated to all the nodes of the proof, then we may get a worse then linear relationship
between proof size and processing time because not only are there more nodes, but also each
will take longer to process. But is it the case that the complexity of the theorem is promulgated
to all the nodes of the proof?
A proof step is simply the application of a rule, and a rule applied to a complex goal may
generate subgoals that are more, less, or of similar complexity to the original goal. In many
logics rules come in pairs: elimination rules generate terms more complex than the current
subgoal, and introduction rules generate less complex terms. Similarly definitions may enable a
complex term to be expressed more succinctly, but they may also be used to unfold definitions
making terms more complex. Rules may also add or delete hypotheses — which may make a
sequent in a subgoal more or less complex than that in the original goal. In addition some rules
may be quite complex in themselves, for example the rule to apply mathematical induction may
generate subgoals considerably more complex than the original goal.
The general philosophy of backwards proof is to break each goal down into subgoals and this
indicates that in most steps the complexity of the succedent in most of the subgoals will be
less than the complexity of the original goal. This is done either by the rules splitting the goal
to generate several subgoals, or perhaps by applying modus ponens or a similar rule, which
simplifies the succedent of the subgoal at the expense of adding a hypothesis. An examination
of the 100 test proofs confirmed the effect of this general strategy, since the average size of the
term in the subgoals of the proofs was just 25% of that of the original theorem.1
There is a positive correlation between the complexity of the proof nodes and the size of the
proof. In consequence the processing cost of a proof will be rather more than linear in the size
of proof as measured simply by the number of nodes in the proof. However, except in the worst
cases this deviation from linearity is unlikely to be unacceptably large. It may also be argued
that it is too naive simply to use the number of nodes in a proof as a measure of proof size.
For instance if we used the number of characters in the proof-object as a measure of proof size,
then this would automatically include both the number of nodes and their sizes.
1This is rather a crude measure, but the format of proof-objects makes it difficult to extract more precise
information, such as the distribution of subgoal size with depth of proof.
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The Implications of Depth of Proof
In the previous section we discussed the implications for processing of increasing proof size. This
was done from the point of view of the general structure of proofs, and it was tacitly assumed
that the processing cost of any particular node was independent of its position in the proof
tree. Proof steps are checked sequentially. In a non-recursive implementation of the checking
algorithm the only ‘history’ that is maintained is the current subgoal list and the ongoing lists of
premises and provisos. If the sequents at the two nodes are the same and the same rule instance
is applied, then the processing of the two nodes will be the same. However, as we have seen
when discussing space resources, the size of the subgoal list increases, in general, with depth in
the tree. Also nodes usually have hypothesis lists of different sizes depending on their depth in
the tree, even where they have the same succedent.
However the number of hypotheses is not actually an important factor in processing time.
Whereas we always have to generate the succedent of the rule and compare this with that
brought forward from the parent as the term at the current node, in the case of hypotheses
we only have to copy the list and then apply the hypothesis transformers. Copying is not
expensive in processing time (and the storage implications have been discussed previously).
Besides applying hypothesis transformers to generate the hypotheses of the premises we may also
need to check conditions and constraints on hypotheses. The possible operations on hypotheses
comprise the following.
1. Adding a hypothesis — this should be independent of the list size.
2. Deleting a hypothesis — this involves searching the list for the hypothesis to delete. The
match relation of the search is the term comparison function — we cannot use simple
equality because we cannot be sure that a hypothesis generated by the checker will be in
exactly the same form as that recorded by the prover. Typically a comparison terminates
quickly for all except a matching term (except in particular cases where another hypothesis
has a very similar structure to the target hypothesis). However, the matching algorithm
that we are using does require that we simplify both terms before matching them. The
cost of simplifying a term will depend on its complexity and its form, simplification only
operates on substitutions and λ-terms. So the list size, although a factor, is not a major
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one.
3. Matching a hypothesis against the hypothesis list — usually when applying the assumption
rule or an equivalent. The previous comments concerning the deletion of hypotheses also
apply here.
4. Checking a not-free-in condition applied to a hypothesis list. As discussed in Section
7.4.4 such checks are delayed until the hypotheses are actually used. Thus checking is
done against a specific hypothesis (the one used), and is not affected by the size of the
hypothesis list.
Thus although hypothesis lists tend to increase with the depth of the proof, this does not result
in a corresponding increase in processing cost.
The Optimisation of Performance for Large Proofs
We have seen that the algorithm is scalable with increasing proof size, both with respect to pro-
cessing time and storage requirements. Nevertheless inefficiencies that would be tolerable when
checking small proofs may still have an undesirable impact when checking much larger ones. In
this section we highlight some features that may need to be optimised in an implementation to
improve the general performance of the checker.
Since performance is very sensitive to the details of the implementation it is difficult to inves-
tigate this issue in any detail in a way that will be relevant to all cases. However we can look
at some of the lower level components of the algorithm to see whether these have the potential
for impacting on performance and how we can reduce such effects.
For example, term matching is a critical part of the algorithm and it involves repeated uses
of the function FreshVars to apply change of bound variable names, both in the simplification
of terms prior to comparison and during matching itself. The efficiency of this, and similar
functions, is very important in the performance of the algorithm, especially its time efficiency.
As we noted when discussing details of the specification, the approach taken to changing variable
names in the algorithm is less than optimal, opting for a blanket change to fresh variables in
some circumstances where prior checking could often designate a smaller list of variables that
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need to be changed. This was done to simplify the specification, but it means that there is
room for optimisation when constructing the implementation.
Another efficiency that could be introduced is to incorporate term simplification into the check-
ing algorithm. The cost of term matching is proportional to the complexity of the term. If
terms, such as those produced when instantiating rules, are simplified when first generated
then subsequent matches involving such terms can be done more efficiently. Of course such
simplification is an additional overhead, but, for instance, beta-reduction of the result of an
application of Isabelle’s allI at an early stage in a large proof may reduce the cost of many
later comparisons.
We can thus identify a few points at which performance could be enhanced by optimising the
implementation. We have deliberately specified the checker at a fairly ‘concrete’ level with
the intention that refinement to the ‘obvious’ code (that is, code that corresponds in a direct
way to the structure of the specification and in which the implementation data structures are
simply related to those in the specification) will be straightforward. As a result, the kind of
optimisations described here will incur extra costs during the refinement process, since the
distance from the specification to the optimised implementation is larger than for the un-
optimised one. This requires a trade-off between the requirements of simplicity in verification
and efficiency and scalability of implementation.
9.3.4 Empirical Testing of Scalability
A small-scale test was undertaken to validate the theoretical conclusions on the scalability of
the proof checking system. The aim was to show that the performance did not deviate wildly
from the predictions made. The testing was done using the prototype proof checker described
in Chapter 8. This prototype was written in Qu-Prolog while the target for implementation of
a production proof checker is intended to be an imperative language. For this reason it was felt
that no meaningful extrapolation could be made from the behaviour of the prototype in respect
to storage use. However it was thought worthwhile to do some limited testing to confirm that
the processing time behaviour did not deviate significantly from linear.
205
206 Evaluation
The Generation of the Test Proofs
An empirical test of the scalability of the proof checker was undertaken using a sequence of
proofs of increasing size. These were generated by the Ergo 5 proof recorder from an initial
proof of the theorem:
(all [!x] ((P or Q) -> not R )) and
(all [!x] ((Q -> not S) -> (P and R)))
=> all [!x] (not not S)
This proof was encoded in an Ergo 5 tactic file which was written so that it was context
independent.
Larger proofs were created by generating proofs of form:
P <-> P
------------ Definition of <->
P -> P and P -> P
--------------------------- and-introduction
P -> P P -> P
--------- --------- ->-introduction
P |- P P |- P
Proof of P Proof of P
Of course the theorem P <-> P has a trivial proof, but using the proof structure described
an artificially complicated proof can be constructed. This proof is slightly more than twice the
size of the original proof of P. The tactic files for proofs of this form could be automatically
generated by duplicating the original tactic and prefixing it with the proof commands that split
the larger theorem as shown above.
This mechanism was applied to the initial theorem and tactic file. The original tactic produced
a proof with 40 nodes, while the ‘doubling’ mechanism gave a tactic file that generated a proof
with 85 nodes. The process was iterated to give proofs with 175 and 355 nodes. For each of
these proofs the Ergo recorder was used to record a proof-object. The scalability testing was
done using these four proof records.
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Testing
The aim of the testing was to produce a graph of processing time versus complexity of proof
for a series of proofs of increasing size. The testing was done by running the prototype checker
with each of the generated proof-objects as input and measuring the elapsed time for each run.
Timing was done using the TCL time script. This method only gives a rough measure but was
thought to be sufficient given the other uncertainties in the procedure.
A compiled version of the proof checker, with all debugging and logging output turned off2, was
used for the test. Testing was on a stand-alone PC with no other foreground tasks active. The
machine was a PC with a Celeron 400 processor and 64 Meg of RAM using the Linux operating
system. Each test was run 5 times and the times were averaged.
The complexity of the proof was estimated by multiplying the number of nodes in the proof
with the average size in characters of the term at each step (that is the size of the succedent
of the full sequent). This value was scaled by a factor of 1/100. This allowed for the fact that
the larger proofs were, by construction, generated by more complex terms. The hypotheses
were not included in the estimation of proof complexity. Note, however, that the method of
creating the test proofs generated unwanted hypotheses (of size equal to half the size of the
initial theorem) which would be propagated throughout the proof. This effect was multiplied
in the larger proofs.
Results
The data obtained using this procedure is shown in the following table.
2 Initial investigation showed that two-thirds of the processing time of the unmodified checker was spent in
outputting log messages.
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Proof Nodes Succedent Complexity Time
Size Index (secs)
1 40 32.3 12 0.5
2 85 66.5 56 1.4
3 175 100.7 176 3.9
4 355 135.0 479 11.9
These results are plotted in Figure 9.6. The resultant graph shows that the prototype proof
checker has a processing time behaviour a little worse than linear with respect to complexity
measured by a combination of the number of nodes and term size, but not very much so.
Figure 9.6: Time vs Proof Complexity
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9.3.5 Summary
We have approached the question of scalability from two points of view. First we have examined
the specification and identified features that might cause scalability problems in likely imple-
mentations. Secondly we have performed some limited simulation and testing and attempted
to extrapolate from these to predict the behaviour with much larger proofs.
The first approach highlighted some storage issues which were assessed to be scalable with
order ‘size of proof’. Since the arguments that lead to this conclusion are somewhat tentative,
a simulation exercise was undertaken, which confirmed the conclusion. Runtime processing
performance was more difficult to assess. However the analysis that we conducted indicated
that performance should be scalable from small to large proofs with an order a little worse than
linear. This was confirmed by timing tests done on a series of proofs of increasing complexity.
Some features were noted which were amenable to further optimisation if required, however
any such optimisation would complicate the cost of verifying the implementation against the
specification.
9.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have reviewed the achievement of the thesis with respect to its primary aims.
In respect to genericity, we have evaluated the two implementations used as case studies, and
shown that, with some reservations, they have been successful. We have also discussed in general
terms the possible extension to cover other theorem provers, although here the conclusions
are less clear cut. In respect to verification, we have given reasonable grounds to support the
feasibility of the refinement of the Z specification presented in Appendix B to a formally verified
program. The size of this task is the refinement of a specification of about 850 lines of Z to code.
We estimate that this will generate a program of 2-3,000 lines of code in a suitable high-level
target language, which is arguably no greater than the applications whose formal development
the checker might be used to check. Finally, we have demonstrated that the system described
here should be scalable to handle the size of problem necessary for real world use. In the
next chapter we discuss the overall results of this work and consider some ways in which the
framework can be extended.
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CHAPTER 10
Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter we review the achievements of the thesis. We discuss its general relevance and
describe future work. First, in Section 10.1, we describe the contribution of this thesis to the
field of formal methods, and then, in Section 10.2, we discuss related work that has already
been done in this area. In the next four sections we discuss topics related to the larger vision
of a verified generic proof checker, and ways in which the project, as presented here, could be
enhanced. First, we discuss the completion of the basic project and how the proof recorders
might be upgraded from the current prototypes (in Sections 10.3 and 10.4). Then (in Section
10.5) we discuss the prospects for developing proof recorders for other theorem provers, and (in
Section 10.6) various ways in which the system might be expanded. Finally, in Section 10.7, we
draw conclusions from the work done in this thesis.
10.1 The Contribution of this Thesis
The overall goal of this thesis is progress towards a proof-checking system for integration into
a software engineering environment using formal methods. The system that is envisaged is a
generic proof checker, which can check proofs from a number of different theorem provers, and
which has also been formally verified, so that we have a high level of confidence in its results.
The specific contributions to this aim that have been achieved in the thesis are as follows.
1. The definition of a generic proof representation for proof-objects for recording by theorem
provers.
2. The specification of a proof checker that can process a proof recorded using this represen-
tation, and determine whether that proof is valid or not.
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The proof representation has been validated by constructing recorders/translators for the Ergo 5
and Isabelle 98 theorem provers. This has shown that proofs from two disparate theorem provers
can be successfully and adequately recorded in the representation that we have devised.
The feasibility of the proof checker has been demonstrated by constructing a prototype. This
shows that the approach is practical. We have also carefully evaluated the verifiability of the
specification, to show that a formally verified implementation of the checker is achievable.
Based on this experience positive conclusions regarding genericity, verifiability and scalability
of the specification have been drawn.
10.2 Relation to Similar Work
The aims of this thesis differ from those of the closest similar work, that of the HOL ‘Verified
Proof Checker’ [GHH+95, vWWG+95]. The HOL project was larger, drawing on the work of
Von Wright, Wong and others, and proceeded further, in that it did produce a verified checker,
which the current work did not attempt. However the HOL verified checker was a prototype
developed from the theory, and the practical checker produced by the project was unverified.
The current project is also more circumscribed than the HOL project in certain other ways, since
it is targeted at one particular use of a proof checker — for auditing proofs related to program
verification. The implementation is also somewhat more restricted, in that, for instance it does
not handle typing. However these limitations are offset by the goal of genericity in which it
goes further than the HOL project, which was theorem-prover specific.
The typing issue is addressed by the general mechanism of provisos. The proviso mechanism is
to a great extent motivated by the auditing environment model. This assumes an open model
for the checker. The result of the checking process, assuming that it is successful, is an assertion
of the form: This proof is valid provided that .... The proviso list includes the theorems and
axioms assumed in the proof, thus implementing the aspect of genericity, but is wider in scope
than this and is used to accommodate both typing and oracles.
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10.3 Completing the Generic Verified Proof Checker Project
The ultimate objective of the work described in this thesis is a proof checking system that
includes a fully verified proof checker. However, time restrictions on the thesis prevented a
verified development of the proposed checker being attempted. It is important, nevertheless, to
consider how the project could be completed.
The primary uncompleted task is the formal development of a verified version of the proof
checker. This topic was discussed in detail in the previous chapter when evaluating the aim
of verifiability. The amount of work necessary to complete this was assessed as the formal
development of several thousand lines of code. This is a significant task, but the specification
style has been designed to make it as easy as possible. The discussion in Chapter 9 focused on the
strategy of refinement by hand from Z to code. If the formal development and implementation
were indeed to be attempted, then the first task would be to re-assess alternative approaches.
The possibility of using the Cogito tool-set, which uses a superset of Z and which has tools to
assist refinement to Ada code, was mentioned, but other paths to implementation using other
tools may be possible.
In order to assist in verification the specification is written at a fairly concrete level. This leaves a
credibility gap between the specification, even if verified, and a high level view of what comprises
the checking of a proof. Even if a checking program were to be formally developed from the
specification given in this thesis, it could not be claimed to be ‘a verified proof checker’ unless
this gap can be bridged. The application of logic rules which the checker claims to implement
is a complete decision procedure for proofs represented as proof trees in logics that can be
expressed as sets of schematic rules. However it is necessary to develop formal arguments to
show that the processes described at a detailed level in the specification do effectively implement
this procedure. This can be done by showing that key properties of the checking procedure are
true of the specification. A number of such properties, such as that ‘every rule instance used
in the proof is a valid instance of one of the rules in the database’, were mentioned in Section
7.6.1.
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10.4 Upgrading the Current Proof Recorders
If the verified proof checker were to be used for serious work, and we have suggested that it
could be used for ‘industrial-strength’ applications, it would be preferable to re-engineer the
prototype proof recorders. Ergo 5 is a research tool, so the need is not so pressing in that
case. In fact the current Ergo 5 proof-checking module is a useful addition to that theorem
prover. Isabelle is however, a mature system and the proof recorder that was developed for
this thesis is a prototype. This prototype validated the concept, but the exercise also indicated
that other approaches to some aspects of the implementation might give better results. It has
several shortcomings and not all features were implemented. In addition, the work was done
using Isabelle 98 which has now been superseded (the current version being Isabelle 99-2). Some
preliminary tests have been done with an intermediate version (Isabelle 99) and these showed
that some details of the derivation structure had changed. In consequence the current recorder
also needs to be modified to accommodate these changes.
Issues that would need to be addressed when re-engineering the Isabelle recorder include the
following.
1. Upgrading to accommodate changes in the derivation structure with current versions of
the prover.
2. Reviewing the machinery that was put in place to handle re-writing, the use of swapped
rules, and the like, to see whether more efficient or flexible methods might be used.
3. Completing the recorder by fixing some deficiencies in the current proof recorder and
translator prototypes.
If the development of a revised Isabelle recorder were to be more than a short-term research
project, it would be preferable to look at the possibility of integrating proof recording more di-
rectly into the Isabelle code. Also, there have been hints that a different mechanism for recording
the details of proofs, other than the current derivation record, may be under consideration in
future releases of Isabelle.
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10.5 Proof Recorders for Other Theorem Provers
In order to firmly establish that the goal of genericity has been achieved we require proof
recorders for other theorem provers. We have already discussed a recorder for HOL in Section
9.1.3. This discussion raises a number of issues with respect to the handling of the HOL logic.
Resolving these issues requires further research. One approach would be to develop a prototype
recorder for HOL based on Wai Wong’s existing recorder for HOL ([Won93b], see Section 3.2.1).
It might be possible to prototype a HOL proof recorder by implementing a ‘translator’ for proof
records generated by Wai Wong’s system into the format required by our proof checker. A
prototype using such a strategy would be cheap to build, relying on existing work for its basics.
It could be used to test different approaches to the outstanding technical issues in the recording
of HOL proofs. Once the best approaches were determined, a practical HOL proof recorder
could be designed and built, incorporating the lessons learned during the prototyping exercise.
The evaluation in Chapter 9 has discussed the implementation of proof recorders in general,
but the implementation in any particular case can only be assessed by a detailed examination
of the mechanics of the particular prover. We have not assessed all theorem proving systems in
detail, so we cannot assess the feasibility of proof recorders for other theorem provers without
further work. The field is constantly changing but other possible candidates can be gleaned
from [Wat98, Gru96].
10.6 Expanding the Scope of the System
The setting that we have proposed for the proof checker prototyped in this thesis is that of an
‘industrial strength’ formal software verification environment, with the proof checker as one of
the tools used. The evaluation of the performance of possible implementations of the checker in
the previous chapter took this scenario as its yardstick. The niche that we envisage the proof
checker occupying in this environment is that of the auditing of results of theorem provers,
and in particular that of giving authoritative certification to proofs, thus contributing to our
confidence in their correctness.
Such systems are not yet in wide use, but the proof checker that we have proposed is very basic
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in form, and may be limited in some ways for the role required of it. In this section we discuss
some improvements to the proof checking system that enhance its suitability for this type of
role. In this discussion it is important to recall that the checker is seen as comprising a verified
core checker plus an unverified interface component. The latter is, for instance, responsible for
parsing and storing the proof-object. It is preferable that, wherever possible, the extensions
canvassed here be implementable by enhancements to the non-verified interface, with changes
to the core checker kept to a minimum. This allows a verified implementation of the original,
simpler version of the checker to be enhanced without affecting the verification argument.
The main enhancement described below is the handling of theories. We also consider the impli-
cations of a standard representation for proofs, and the general issue of an auditing environment.
10.6.1 Handling Theories
In order to concentrate on the key issues the prototype proof checker is limited to proof-objects
which contain a single proof. However, in practice, program verification generates theories which
model the system being verified, and in which a number of theorems of interest are proven. It is
not difficult to extend the definition of a proof-object to include the case of a theory, represented
by a list of proofs in a single file. This can be the basis for a theory checker rather than a proof
checker.
Such an extension would require a change to be made to the way that logics and rule sets are
used. Thus when a derived rule is proven it is be added to the rules available to the next proof.
(All theorems can in fact be used as derived rules.) On the other hand, the implementation
of ‘local rules’, that we have adopted for some provers, would need some modification in the
context of theories. In this scenario there are three types of rule which have different scopes in
the theory file.
1. Assumed rules, whose scope is the whole file.
2. Derived rules that are proved during the course of checking the proof-object. The scope
of these is from the point that they are proven for the rest of the file.
3. Local rules, whose scope only extends for a single proof.
216
10.6 Expanding the Scope of the System 217
Theory handling along these lines could be added as a layer on top of the current checker
specification. This layer would handle the sequencing of proofs and manage the addition of
proven theorems to the rule database, while beneath it the checker, as originally specified,
handles the detailed checking of individual proofs. The segregation of local and non-local rules
would require some minor changes to the handling of the rule database.
One issue that arises with theories is that of circular reasoning, where two proofs each depend
on the other. On the small scale, this cannot occur in theory objects of the type being con-
sidered here because of the strictly sequential checking of proofs and the incremental addition
of derived rules to the logic. However, theories are usually structured and may be developed
and checked in parts. Circularity can then occur between parts of the theory which have been
checked separately. In this larger frame, circularity checking is seen as a separate problem from
the checking of individual proofs and is not included in the remit of the proof checker itself.
Nevertheless, the proof checker does generate a certified list of provisos of which the list of
theorems used is a part. This can be used as a proof dependency list, and so could provide the
input to a separate system for checking for circularities.
Extending the checker to process theories also facilitates the integration of the checker into
more sophisticated proof support systems. It is commonly the case that theories are organised
hierarchically with each layer assuming the validity of the one below. Extensions to the checker
could simplify the use of theories in such situations. One possibility is the referencing of whole
theories by name in the rule list. On encountering such a name the complete set of rules in
the theory would be included. (The use of such a facility would obviously be predicated on
the existence of some similar facility in the theorem prover being used.) Such theories are
assumed to have been previously certified by the checker, and perhaps their rules stored in an
external database. This mechanism could, for instance, be used to support the reuse of theories.
However, it would still be the case that the checker produces a full list of the provisos for each
proof, allowing dependencies to be checked in full, either by a human auditor or an auditing
program.
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10.6.2 Representation
In this thesis we have also advocated a specific representation of proofs. This is based on a
‘text-book’ (or pedagogical) style for the representation of proof rules and a tree-structured
representation of the proof. This representation is biased towards proofs generated in a ‘back-
wards’ or ‘top-down’ fashion. This bias is defended on the grounds that it is the typical proof
style of interactive theorem provers. It also facilitates a top-down left-to-right proof checking
algorithm. The details of the representation are to some extent ad hoc and are adopted from the
two theorem provers used as prototypes. This is because the details were not seen as especially
important for the purpose in hand.
One aspect to genericity that is considered briefly in Section 4.7 is that of a standard repre-
sentation for proofs generated by theorem provers. While we are aware of proposals for the
interchange of theorems [Gru96], and we have mentioned, in Section 3.1.2, investigations of the
import of libraries in the Eves system [SCKP92], we are not aware of corresponding work on the
interchange of proofs. (Although the ‘block calculus’ used in the ILF system may be a possible
candidate [DW95, Dah].) However, an accepted standard of this type has obvious advantages
for the exchange of proofs and their reuse.
If such a general representation were to be adopted then it would be advantageous if it were
also to be used as the base representation in the proof checker. Of course input in this standard
representation could be handled by means of a translator that pre-processed all input to the
checker and converted between the generic representation and that used by the checker. In
this case the translator would be checker-specific, as opposed to the prover-specific translators
proposed in the general architecture described in Chapter 3. However, it would be preferable
if the checker itself were adapted to use the generic representation, and again it is anticipated
that a change of this sort would only affect the non-verified part of the checker.
Where a generic proof representation exists, and is acceptable as input to the checker, then
the requirement for a proof recorder reduces to that of generating a proof record in the generic
format. In this scenario it would be a general requirement of theorem provers that they have
the ability to produce a proof record in the common format, so the requirement for a specific
recorder for proof-checking is subsumed by this more general one.
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As we also noted in Section 4.7, the representation for proofs that has been developed from
the investigations described in this thesis could be a useful input to the development of a
more general proof representation. Although the representation that we have used is designed
specifically for proof checking and has limitations when considered from other points of view,
the design should be useful to the developers of a more general representation. The current
representation has been validated as adequate for proof checking, so a more general design that
is consistent with it will inherit the property of satisfying the requirements for proof checking.
10.6.3 The Proof Auditing Environment
We have discussed some enhancements to the original proof checker which would make it more
suitable for use in a ‘real-word’ situation. Although we have no specifics in mind, we envisage this
situation as an ‘auditing environment’ within a software verification system. While the industrial
take-up of formal methods is still in its infancy we can only speculate on such environments.
However they will no doubt share many aspects of current non-formal software engineering
environments. For instance, the proof checker and its proof-objects will interact with the version
control component of the overall environment. This should not be difficult because such systems
are usually designed to handle heterogeneous collections of objects, often generated by loosely
coupled tools. Since proof-objects as prototyped here are just ASCII files, and the proof header
has a comment field in which miscellaneous information can be recorded, this could easily
include information for the use of the version control system.
Although in this thesis we have concentrated on the input to the checker, the checker can also
interact with other components via its output. We have generally assumed that the output is
going to be inspected by human auditors, but it can also be used for other purposes. We have
alluded previously to the possibility of extracting dependency information for trapping circu-
larities in theories. Another possibility is that the auditing process itself might be automated.
A requirement of this kind could be met by post-processing the output of the checker.
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10.7 Conclusions
The aims of this thesis were described in detail in Part I, and in particular in Chapter 3. The
long-term aim is a verified generic proof checker that can take its place as an important tool in
formal software development environments. The short-term aims, which are the specific subject
of this thesis, are the delineation of a proof recording and checking system, the confirmation of
the feasibility of such a system by prototyping, and the development of a formal specification
which could be used as the basis for the formal development of the core of the checker itself.
The way that this program is defined and implemented is described in Parts II and III. The
definition of the program is organised around three key concepts.
1. Genericity — which allows the system to work with various theorem provers. This re-
quirement has been primarily justified on economic grounds.
2. Verifiability — which guarantees the correctness of the system, and which we have argued
is only necessary in the core of the checker itself.
3. Scalability — which is essential if the work is ever to be completed and used in the type
of working environment for which it was intended.
In the previous chapter (Chapter 9) we evaluated the work described in the thesis with respect
to these three requirements. The basic conclusions reached there were as follows.
1. In respect to genericity, we have evaluated the two implementations used as case studies,
and shown that, with some reservations, they have been successful. We have also discussed
in general terms the possible extension to cover other theorem provers, although here the
conclusions are less clear cut.
2. In respect to verification we have given reasonable grounds to suppose that the Z specifi-
cation presented in Appendix B can be refined to a formally verified program. The size
of this task is the refinement of a specification of about 850 lines of Z.
3. Finally, we have demonstrated that the system described here should be scalable to handle
the size of problem likely to be encountered in real-world use.
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Thus the short-term aims of the project have been achieved. However, it is necessarily a
relatively limited research project, and the longer-term aim is dependent on further work as
discussed in this chapter and on the take-up of these results in a more industrial setting. We have
also pointed out that this is only one of several approaches to increasing verification assurance,
and which is best depends on the circumstances. However, where a certified proof checker is the
most appropriate solution, we believe that the work of this thesis will form a useful foundation
on which to build.
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APPENDIX A
EBNF of the proof representation
A.1 Conventions used in the EBNF
Non terminal: Word — not all upper case — e.g., NFI-constraint
Terminal: Word — upper case — e.g., STRING
Concrete symbol: ‘text-string’
Production: LHS := RHS.
Alternatives: Alt1 | Alt2 ...
List (non-empty): { Repeated-element [separator] }
A.2 EBNF
Proof-File := Ident Context Proof
Ident := ‘[’ Source ‘,’ Version ‘,’ Proof-Id ‘,’ Comment ‘]’ NEWL
Source := STRING
Version := STRING
Proof-Id := STRING
Comment := STRING
Context := Environ Signature Rules
Environ := Closed-Vars NEWL ‘eol’ NEWL
Closed-Vars := ‘true’ | ‘false’
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Signature := ‘eol’ NEWL
Rules := { Rule } ‘eol’ NEWL
Rule := ‘[’ Rule-Name ‘,’ Kind ‘,’ Conclusion ‘,’ Constraints ‘,’ Premises ‘,’ Rule-Vars ‘]’ NEWL
Rule-Name := STRING
Kind := Native-kind | ‘premise’
Native-kind := STRING
Conclusion := Succedent
Succedent := Term
Constraints := ‘none’ | ‘[’ { Constraint [ ‘,’ ] } ‘]’
Constraint := Hyp-Constraint | NFI-Constraint | Rewrite-Constraint
Hyp-Constraint := ‘ishyp’ ‘(’ Term ‘)’
Rewrite-Constraint := ‘rewrite’ ‘(’ Term ‘,’ Term ‘,’ Term ‘,’ Term ‘)’
NFI-Constraint := ‘nfi’ ‘(’ OBJVAR ‘,’ Term ‘)’
Premises := ‘[]’ | ‘[’ { Premise [ ‘,’ ] } ‘]’
Premise := ‘[’ Prem-Antecedent ‘,’ Premise-Succedent ‘,’ Prem-Constraints ‘]’
Prem-Antecedent := ‘[]’ | ‘[’ { Hyp-Transformer [ ‘,’ ] } ‘]’
Hyp-Transformer := Add-Hyp | Delete-Hyp
Add-Hyp := ‘add’ ‘(’ Term ‘)’ | ‘post’ ‘(’ Term ‘)’
Delete-Hyp := ‘delete’ ‘(’ Term ‘)’
Premise-Succedent := Succedent
Prem-Constraints := ‘[]’ | ‘[’ { Prem-Constraint [ ‘,’ ] } ‘]’
Prem-Constraint := ‘nfi’ ‘(’ OBJVAR ‘)’
Rule-Vars := ‘[]’ | ‘[’ { Variable [ ‘,’ ] } ‘]’
Proof := Theorem Proof-Tree
Theorem := Rule NEWL
Proof-Tree := { Proof-Step } ‘eol’ NEWL
Proof-Step := Step NEWL
Step := Rule-Instance | Open-Node | Oracle
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Rule-Instance := ‘[’ Rule-Name ‘,’ Rule-Instantiation ‘]’
Rule-Instantiation := ‘[]’ | ‘[’ { Inst [ ‘,’ ] } ‘]’
Inst := OBJVAR | Term
Open-Node := ‘[’ ‘OPEN-NODE’ ‘]’
Oracle := ‘[’ ‘ORACLE’ ‘,’ Orc-Explanation ‘,’ Orc-Conclusion ‘,’ Orc-Premises ‘]’
Orc-Explanation := STRING
Orc-Conclusion := Sequent
Orc-Premises := ‘[]’ | ‘[’ { Sequent [ ‘,’ ] } ‘]’
Sequent := ‘[’ Antecedent ‘,’ Succedent ‘]’
Antecedent := ‘[’ { Term [ ‘,’ ] } ‘]’
Succedent := Term
Term := Br-Term Args | Simp-Term
Br-Term := ‘(’ Term ‘)’
Simp-Term := Basic-Term Args | Subs-Term | Quant-Term | Lambda-Term Args
Basic-Term := CONSTANT | SCHEMATIC-VAR
Args := ‘(’ { Argument [ ‘,’ ] } ‘)’
Argument := Term | OBJVAR
Subs-Term := Substitution Term
Substitution := ‘[’ Term-List ‘/’ Var-List ‘]’
Var-List := { Variable [ ‘,’ ] }
Variable := SCHEMATIC-VAR | OBJVAR
Term-List := { Term [ ‘,’ ] }
Quant-Term := QUANTIFIER ‘[’ ObjVar-List ‘]’ Term
Lambda-Term := LAMBDA ‘[’ ObjVar-List ‘]’ Term
ObjVar-List := { OBJVAR [ ‘,’ ] }
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List of Terminal Symbols:
NEWL
STRING
OBJVAR
CONSTANT
SCHEMATIC-VAR
QUANTIFIER
LAMBDA
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Specification of the proof checker
An index to the sets, types, functions and schemas of this specification can be found on page
xii (following the Table of Contents). This includes cross-references to Chapters 7 and 8.
This specification has been type-checked using the wizard [Joh96] type-checker. Wizard is a
type checker for Object-Z, which is essentially a superset of Z. However the specification given
here is plain Z with the exception that we have utilised the boolean datatype bool, which is one
of the Object-Z extensions, since this proved very convenient for this particular specification.
We have used wizard rather than fuzz, partly because it was a local product, but also because
initially fuzz was not freely available. Both fuzz and wizard type check a LATEX source file,
but each supports a different set of conventions for type-setting Z. During the course of this
research fuzz2000 (a freely available version of fuzz) was released, and a modified version of the
specification has been type-checked by fuzz200 as part of a trial conversion from Z to the Sum
specification language.
Note that there are two ways that a proof can be failed by an implementation of this specifica-
tion. The first is if it fails to pass the main Check function. The second is if the proof-object is
never examined by this function, but is rejected by code prior to the module which implements
the main specification. This may be by the parser declaring that the syntax of the proof-object
is incorrect, or by the inputs passed to the checking module failing to satisfy the preconditions of
that module (for instance there are restrictions on the format of the rules in the database). It is
also possible that during the detailed checking of the proof steps some component of an invalid
proof will fail to satisfy the preconditions of one of the operations applied to it, rather than the
error being detected by explicit checks written into the specification, although the intention is
that all errors be detected in the latter way. In any case, the way in which errors are detected
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does not affect the correctness of the checker, for a proof-object can only be declared valid if it
meets the specification in full.
B.1 Auxiliary functions
We define the functions map, fold and zip for sequences:
[X ,Y ]
map : (X → Y )→ seq X → seq Y ;
fold : (((X ×Y )→ Y )×Y )→ seq X → Y
∀ f : X → Y • map f = (λ s : seq(dom f ) • s o9 f )
∀ f : ((X ×Y )→ Y ); b : Y ; s : seq X •
((s = 〈 〉 ⇒ fold(f , b)s = b) ∧
(s 6= 〈 〉 ⇒ fold(f , b)s = f (head s, (fold(f , b)(tail s)))))
[X ,Y ]
zip : seq X × seq Y 7→ seq(X ×Y )
∀ sx : seq X ; sy : seq Y ; sz : seq(X ×Y )
| #sx = #sy •
sz = zip (sx , sy)⇔ sx = map first sz ∧ sy = map second sz
We also define the boolean valued function allOK, which tests that all the values in a sequence
satisfy a given boolean valued function. In the checker we maintain list of hypotheses, and
represent these by sequences. However we are assuming that the order of hypotheses is not
significant and we therefore define two functions that compare sequences irrespective of the
their orderings. (We cannot just compare them set-wise, because we have to allow for duplicate
hypotheses.) MatchLists matches two sequences using a boolean valued comparison function.
Note however, that in a given theorem prover hypotheses will usually be stored in a determin-
istic sequence. A computationally efficient implementation, therefore, will try matching in the
sequence order first, and only apply the general case if this fails.
We also define the variant MatchSubLists where we only require that the first list matches some
sublist of the second (that is the second may have unmatched elements).
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[X ]
allOK : (X → B)× seq X → B
∀ x : seq X ; f : X → B • allOK (f , x )⇔ (∀ b : ran(map(f )x ) • b)
[X ]
MatchLists : ((X ×X )→ B)× iseq X × iseq X → B;
MatchSubLists : ((X ×X )→ B)× iseq X × iseq X → B
∀ x , y : seq X ; f : (X ×X )→ B | #x ≤ #y •
MatchSubLists(f , x , y)⇔ (∃ p : 1 . .#x  1 . .#y •
∀ i : 1 . .#x • f (x (i), y(p(i))))
∀ x , y : seq X ; f : (X ×X )→ B •
MatchLists(f , x , y)⇔ MatchSubLists(f , x , y) ∧ #x = #y
B.2 Data Structures
We define a given set of characters and strings over characters.
[CHAR]
STRING : P(seq CHAR)
B.2.1 Terms
We define given sets of quantifiers and identifiers from which we construct TERMS. Identifiers
represent variables and constants. Within variables we distinguish object variables which can
be bound by quantification and abstraction. We also distinguish two types of both general and
object variables. Proof variables can occur in the proof object itself, local variables can only
occur internally in the checker and are assumed to be separate from proof variables. These
disjoint sets of name are used to avoid clashes between the schematic names used in rules and
the names of variables in the proof during rule instantiation.
Note that the type VAR can represent both object variables and schematic-variables. This
general type is required, for instance, to define the list of variables that may be instantiated in
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a rule — which can contain both types of variables. Both sorts of variables can also be coerced
to TERMS. Thus, for example, in a function application, the function can be represented by
a constant, or by a schematic-variables (as when proving a rule), or by an object-variable (as
when bound by a higher-order quantifier) as well as by a more complex term.
[IDENT ,QUANT ,CONST ]
VAR : P IDENT ;
PROOFVAR : P IDENT ;
INTERNVAR : P IDENT
〈PROOFVAR, INTERNVAR〉partitions VAR
ObjVAR : PVAR;
ProofObjVAR : PPROOFVAR;
LocalObjVAR : P INTERNVAR
〈ProofObjVAR,LocalObjVAR〉partitions ObjVAR
Terms may be constants, variables, function applications, λ-abstractions, substitutions or quan-
tified terms. To ensure the well-formedness of terms we use the extended sequence type iseq1
which is a non-empty sequence all of whose members are unique. We also require that all the
variables in a substitution list are different.
iseq1[X ] == iseq X ∩ seq1 X
TERM ::= var〈〈VAR〉〉 |
const〈〈CONST 〉〉 |
func〈〈TERM × seq1 TERM 〉〉 |
abs〈〈iseq1 ObjVAR × TERM 〉〉 |
quant〈〈QUANT × iseq1 ObjVAR × TERM 〉〉 |
subst〈〈seq1(ObjVAR × TERM )× TERM 〉〉
∀T ,T1 : TERM ; S : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ) •
(T = subst(S ,T1)⇒ map(first)S ∈ iseq ObjVAR)
We explicitly name λ-abstractions. This is so that we can deal with the β-reduction of such
terms.
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LambdaExpr : PTERM
LambdaExpr = {T : TERM | ∃LO : seq1 ObjVAR; LT : TERM • T = abs(LO ,LT )}
LVars : LambdaExpr → seq1 VAR;
LBody : LambdaExpr → TERM
∀X : LambdaExpr ; LO : seq1 VAR; LT : TERM | X = abs(LO ,LT ) •
LVars(X ) = LO ∧ LBody(X ) = LT
Note that for consistency we use the same style for the definition of all datatype extraction
functions. This style enhances the readability of the more complex cases, and avoids very long
expressions and their associated typesetting problems. Note also that from the implementation
point of view, this type of extraction function only serves to unpack data structures, and
application of these functions correspond in an implementation to the naming of subcomponents,
and not to any executable code (at least at the high-level).
We define the function VarsOf over terms, which extracts all the variable names used in the
term. This is used later to enforce restrictions on the set of variable names used in a rule.
Similarly we define the function ObjVarsOf over terms.
VarsOf : TERM → FVAR;
ObjVarsOf : TERM → FObjVAR
∀T ,T1 : TERM ; ST : seq1 TERM ; V : VAR; C : CONST ; O : iseq1 ObjVAR;
S : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ); Q : QUANT ; SV : FVAR •
(T = var(V )⇒ VarsOf (T ) = {V }) ∧
(T = const(C )⇒ VarsOf (T ) = ∅) ∧
(T = func(T1,ST )⇒
VarsOf (T ) = VarsOf (T1) ∪∪(ran(map(VarsOf )ST ))) ∧
(T = abs(O ,T1)⇒ VarsOf (T ) = ran O ∪VarsOf (T1)) ∧
(T = quant(Q ,O ,T1)⇒ VarsOf (T ) = ran O ∪VarsOf (T1)) ∧
(T = subst(S ,T1)⇒
VarsOf (T ) = ran(map (first) S )∪
∪(ran(map (VarsOf ) (map (second) S ))) ∪VarsOf (T1))
ObjVarsOf = (λT : TERM • VarsOf (T ) ∩ObjVAR)
Note that this definition could be written more succinctly, but, for consistency, we specify all
structural inductions over terms in the same style.
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We also define the function ReplaceCheck. This is used later to check the rewrite applicability
condition, which may be attached to a rule. A rewrite condition, is parameterised by two pairs
of terms (as four parameters). The first pair of terms are definitionally, or otherwise equivalent.
The condition is true when the first term of the second pair (the third parameter) is related to
the second term of the second pair (the fourth parameter) by having zero or more occurrences
of the first parameter term each replaced by an occurrence of the second parameter term. This
function is defined here because it is can be specified purely in terms of the structure of the
four terms involved. Note that the rewrite condition is used to record the results of rewriting,
and is a purely structural relation, it is not a substitution operation, and considerations such
as variable capture do not apply.
ReplaceCheck : (TERM × TERM × TERM × TERM )→ B;
ReplaceCheck2 : (TERM × TERM × TERM × TERM )→ B;
CurryReplCheck : (TERM × TERM )→ (TERM × TERM )→ B
∀T ,U ,V ,T1,T2 : TERM •
(CurryReplCheck(U ,V ))(T1,T2)⇔ ReplaceCheck(U ,V ,T1,T2)
∀U ,V ,T1,T2 : TERM •
ReplaceCheck(U ,V ,T1,T2)⇔
(T1 = T2) ∨
(T1 = U ∧ T2 = V ) ∨
ReplaceCheck2(U ,V ,T1,T2)
∀U ,V ,T1,T2 : TERM •
ReplaceCheck2(U ,V ,T1,T2)⇔
(∃T ,T ′ : TERM ; ST ,ST ′ : seq1 TERM | #ST ′ = #ST •
T1 = func(T ,ST ) ∧ T2 = func(T ′,ST ′) ∧
ReplaceCheck(U ,V ,T ,T ′) ∧
allOK ((CurryReplCheck(U ,V )), zip(ST ,ST ′))
) ∨
(∃T ,T ′ : TERM ; O : iseq ObjVAR •
T1 = abs(O ,T ) ∧ T2 = abs(O ,T ′) ∧ ReplaceCheck(U ,V ,T ,T ′)
) ∨
(∃T ,T ′ : TERM ; Q : QUANT ; O : iseq ObjVAR •
T1 = quant(Q ,O ,T ) ∧ T2 = quant(Q ,O ,T ′) ∧ ReplaceCheck(U ,V ,T ,T ′)
) ∨
(∃S ,S ′ : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ); T ,T ′ : TERM | #S = #S ′ •
T1 = subst(S ,T ) ∧ T2 = subst(S ′,T ′) ∧
map (first) S = map (first) S ′ ∧
allOK ((CurryReplCheck(U ,V )), zip(map (second)(S ),map (second)(S ′))) ∧
ReplaceCheck(U ,V ,T ,T ′)
)
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B.2.2 Sequents
Sequents are defined by a free type which represents a single succedent and a sequence of
antecedents. During the process of proof checking we sometimes need to qualify the hypotheses
of sequents that are generated with not-free-in conditions. We therefore define the free type
CondSequent to use in the checker, which is a sequent with such qualifications added to its
hypotheses.
Sequent ::= sequent〈〈TERM × seq TERM 〉〉
CondSequent ::= condseq〈〈TERM × seq(TERM × seq ObjVAR)〉〉
We have extraction functions for sequents.
Succedent : Sequent → TERM ;
Antecedent : Sequent → seq TERM
∀S : Sequent ; Succ : TERM ; Ant : seq TERM | S = sequent(Succ,Ant) •
Succedent(S ) = Succ ∧ Antecedent(S ) = Ant
We also have the corresponding functions for sequents with not-free-in conditions, and a con-
version function from a sequent to a CondSequent with no conditions.
CondSuccedent : CondSequent → TERM ;
CondAntecedent : CondSequent → seq TERM ;
CondNFI : CondSequent → seq(TERM × seq ObjVAR);
SeqToCondSeq : Sequent → CondSequent
∀S : CondSequent ; Succ : TERM ; Ant : seq(TERM × seq ObjVAR)
| S = condseq(Succ,Ant) •
CondSuccedent(S ) = Succ ∧ CondNFI (S ) = Ant ∧
CondAntecedent(S ) = map (first) Ant
∀S1 : Sequent ; S2 : CondSequent
| S2 = SeqToCondSeq(S1) •
Succedent(S1) = CondSuccedent(S2) ∧ Antecedent(S1) = CondAntecedent(S2) ∧
ran(map (second) (CondNFI (S2))) = {〈 〉}
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B.2.3 Rules
We define two given sets for rules. RULEID is the type for the identifiers which are used
to retrieve rules from the database. The identifier is not defined explicitly as part of the
rule datatype, but implicitly by the function RuleDB which is defined later. There are two
distinguished RULEIDS - OpenNode and Oracle - which label open nodes and calls to oracles.
The remaining identifiers form the set RealIds.
The given set KIND represents the names of the types of rule, which is theorem prover-specific.
However, it has a distinguished element which identifies local rules, whose variables must not
be instantiated.
[RULEID ,KIND ]
LocalRule : KIND ;
OpenNode,Oracle : RULEID ;
DummyIds,RealIds : PRULEID
OpenNode 6= Oracle
DummyIds = {OpenNode,Oracle}
RealIds = RULEID \DummyIds
In the datatype that represents rules, we separate the RuleBody (the bit that is instantiated)
from the other information about the rule, which comprises the list of schematic variables in
the rule and the rule kind. The rule body comprises the conclusion of the rule, the list of
premises of the rule, and the applicability conditions for the rule. The conclusion of the rule
is represented simply by a TERM, since the hypotheses are implicit in our rule representation.
The rule premises are defined by the type RelPrem which represents a premise sequent by a
TERM, for the succedent, plus a list of hypothesis-list transformers for the hypotheses. Each
premise also has a possibly empty list of not-free-in constraints, which are represented by a
sequence of type ObjVAR.
The hypotheses of the premises are thus relative to the hypotheses of the conclusion. Hypothesis
transformers are defined by the type HypTrans. The variants of this type specify terms that
can be added to, or deleted from the hypothesis list of the conclusion of the rule.
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Applicability conditions are elements of the type AppCond. There are three alternatives, al-
though, as mentioned above, a rule may also have not-free-in constraints attached to particular
premises.
• ishyp – which specifies a term. The condition is that this term must appear in the
hypothesis list.
• nfi – which specifies a term and an object variable. The condition is that the variable
does not occur free in the term, this condition is normally on the conclusion of a rule.
• rewrite – which specifies four terms. The condition is that term 4 is equal to term 3
modified by having zero or more occurrences of term 1 replaced in situ by term 2.
HypTrans ::= addhyp〈〈TERM 〉〉
| posthyp〈〈TERM 〉〉
| delhyp〈〈TERM 〉〉
AppCond ::= ishyp〈〈TERM 〉〉
| nfi〈〈ObjVAR × TERM 〉〉
| rewrite〈〈TERM × TERM × TERM × TERM 〉〉
RelPrem ::= relprem〈〈TERM × seq HypTrans × seq ObjVAR〉〉
RuleBody ::= rulebody〈〈TERM × seq RelPrem × seq AppCond〉〉
Rule ::= rule〈〈RuleBody × iseq VAR ×KIND〉〉
There are a set of functions to extract the components of a rule. The function ExtractNFI
extracts the not-free-in conditions from a rule. This is used to generate the list of global not-
free-in-constraints We also require that all elements of the list of schematic variables be unique
within a rule.
Finally we have functions to extract the components of an applicability condition,
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RuleVars : Rule → iseq VAR;
BodyOfRule : Rule → RuleBody ;
RuleKind : Rule → KIND ;
RuleConcl : RuleBody → TERM ;
RulePrems : RuleBody → seq RelPrem;
RuleConditions : RuleBody → seq AppCond ;
ExtractNFI : RuleBody → (F(ObjVAR × TERM ))
∀R : Rule; Rb : RuleBody ; SV : iseq VAR; K : KIND
| R = rule(Rb,SV ,K ) •
BodyOfRule(R) = Rb ∧ RuleVars(R) = SV ∧ RuleKind(R) = K
∀Rb : RuleBody ; T : TERM ; AC : seq AppCond ;
RP : seq RelPrem
| Rb = rulebody(T ,RP ,AC ) •
RuleConcl(Rb) = T ∧ RulePrems(Rb) = RP ∧
RuleConditions(Rb) = AC
∀Rb : RuleBody •
ExtractNFI (Rb) = {AC : ObjVAR × TERM |
nfi(AC ) ∈ ran(RuleConditions(Rb))}
AppCondHyp : AppCond 7→ TERM
∀AC : AppCond ; T : TERM | AC = ishyp(T ) • AppCondHyp(AC ) = T
Local rules are identified by their kind, this is checked by the predicate IsLocalRule. Local rules
need special handling, since they are of a particular form. First they cannot be instantiated
(although they may be schematic in form, as when proving a schematic rule), and therefore
their variable list is empty. Secondly, since they represent the premises of the original theorem,
they themselves have no premises. Thirdly, the only applicability conditions that they may
have are those of the form ishyp() which represent their hypotheses. The definition of the
predicate IsValidLocalRule checks these conditions. We also define a function ExtLocRule which
converts a local rule of this form to a CondSequent. This function is used to extract the premise
corresponding to a local rule when formulating the theorem proven by a proof.
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IsLocalRule : Rule → B;
IsValidLocalRule : Rule → B;
ExtLocRule : Rule 7→ CondSequent
∀R : Rule • IsLocalRule(R)⇔ RuleKind(R) = LocalRule
∀R : Rule | IsLocalRule(R) •
IsValidLocalRule(R)⇔
RuleVars(R) = 〈 〉 ∧ RulePrems(BodyOfRule(R)) = 〈 〉
∧ (∀A : ran(RuleConditions(BodyOfRule(R))) • (∃T : TERM • A = ishyp(T )))
∀R : Rule; T : TERM ; ST : seq(TERM × seq ObjVAR)
| IsLocalRule(R) ∧ ExtLocRule(R) = condseq(T ,ST ) •
T = RuleConcl(BodyOfRule(R)) ∧
ran(map (second) ST ) = {〈 〉} ∧
ran(map (first) ST ) =
ran(map(λA : AppCond • (µT : TERM | A = ishyp(T )))
(RuleConditions(BodyOfRule(R))))
Finally to police the distinction between PROOFVARS and INTERNVARS we need the function
VarsOfRule which uses VarsOf to list the variables in a rule. We also check that the items in
the list of variables to be instantiated, which is given as part of the rule, do indeed occur in the
rule.
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VarsOfRule : Rule → FVAR;
VarsOfPrem : RelPrem → FVAR;
VarsOfAppCon : AppCond → FVAR;
VarsOfHypT : HypTrans → FVAR
∀R: Rule; Rb : RuleBody | Rb = BodyOfRule(R) •
VarsOfRule(R) = ran(RuleVars(R))∪
VarsOf (RuleConcl(Rb))∪
∪(ran(map (VarsOfPrem) (RulePrems(Rb))))∪
∪(ran(map (VarsOfAppCon) (RuleConditions(Rb))))
∀P : RelPrem; C : TERM ; H : seq HypTrans; O : seq ObjVAR
| P = relprem(C ,H ,O) •
VarsOfPrem(P) = VarsOf (C ) ∪∪(ran(map (VarsOfHypT ) H )) ∪ ran(O)
∀A : AppCond ; SV : FVAR; T : TERM ; ST : iseq TERM ;
NO : ObjVAR; NT ,U ,V ,T1,T2 : TERM ; STV : VAR
| SV = VarsOfAppCon(A) •
(A = ishyp(T )⇒ (SV = VarsOf (T ))) ∧
(A = rewrite(U ,V ,T1,T2)⇒
(SV = VarsOf (U ) ∪VarsOf (V ) ∪VarsOf (T1) ∪VarsOf (T2))) ∧
(A = nfi(NO ,NT )⇒ (SV = {NO} ∪VarsOf (NT )))
∀H : HypTrans; SV : FVAR; T : TERM ; ST : seq TERM ; STV : VAR
| SV = VarsOfHypT (H ) •
(H = addhyp(T )⇒ (SV = VarsOf (T ))) ∧
(H = posthyp(T )⇒ (SV = VarsOf (T ))) ∧
(H = delhyp(T )⇒ (SV = VarsOf (T )))
∀R : Rule • ran(RuleVars(R)) ⊆ VarsOfRule(R)
B.2.4 Instantiating a Rule
Rules are instantiated by the substitution of terms for variables. Instantiations are modelled
by functions from variables to terms. Such functions are generated by matching the lists of rule
variables with the lists of instantiating terms in the proof steps. The only restriction is that
where an object variable occurs in the variable list it can only be replaced by another object
variable.
Instant : P(VAR 7 7→ TERM )
∀S : Instant ; V : VAR • V ∈ ObjVAR ⇒ (∃O : ObjVAR • S (V ) = var(O))
Given a set of instantiations represented by a list of variables and a list of terms, InstTerm
instantiates a term in a rule by applying those instantiations. Note that this is simple replace-
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ment in the text of a schematic rule, not a substitution subject to the rules for free and bound
variables. Note also that object variables behave in two different ways in this process. Object
variables that occur as variables of the rule template may only be replaced by object variables
in the instance, however object variables may also be instantiations of schematic variables. In
both cases they occur in the instantiation list as TERMs.
InstTerm : Instant → TERM → TERM ;
InstObjVar : Instant → ObjVAR → ObjVAR
∀T1,T2,T : TERM ; S : Instant ; V : VAR; C : CONST ;
ST : seq1 TERM ; SO : seq1 ObjVAR; Sb : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ); Q : QUANT
| T2 = InstTerm(S )T1 •
(T1 = var(V )⇒
(V ∈ dom S ⇒ T2 = S (V )) ∧ (V 6∈ dom S ⇒ T2 = T1)) ∧
(T1 = const(C )⇒ T2 = T1) ∧
(T1 = func(T ,ST )⇒
T2 = func(InstTerm(S )T ,map (InstTerm(S )) ST )) ∧
(T1 = abs(SO ,T )⇒
T2 = abs((map (InstObjVar(S )) SO), InstTerm(S )T )) ∧
(T1 = quant(Q ,SO ,T )⇒
T2 = quant(Q ,map (InstObjVar(S )) SO , InstTerm(S )T )) ∧
(T1 = subst(Sb,T )⇒
T2 = subst(zip(map (InstObjVar(S )) (map (first)Sb),
map (InstTerm(S )) (map (second)Sb)),
InstTerm(S )T ))
∀O : ObjVAR; S : Instant • InstObjVar(S )O = (µO2 : ObjVAR | S (O) = var(O2))
InstTerm is used to define the function InstRule which instantiates a rule to give an item of
type RuleBody. The instantiation function is generated by matching the list of rule variables
with a list of terms (which will be provided by a proof step). To achieve this a number of
auxiliary functions are defined which promulgate the instantiation through the structure of a
rule.
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InstHypTrans : Instant → HypTrans → HypTrans;
InstRulePrem : Instant → RelPrem → RelPrem;
InstRuleCond : Instant → AppCond → AppCond
∀H 1,H 2 : HypTrans; T : TERM ; ST : seq TERM ; M : Instant
| H 2 = InstHypTrans M H 1 •
H 1 = addhyp(T )⇒ H 2 = addhyp(InstTerm M T ) ∧
H 1 = posthyp(T )⇒ H 2 = posthyp(InstTerm M T ) ∧
H 1 = delhyp(T )⇒ H 2 = delhyp(InstTerm M T )
∀X 1,X 2 : RelPrem; T1,T2 : TERM ; H 1,H 2 : seq HypTrans;
V 1,V 2 : seq VAR; M : Instant
| X 1 = relprem(T1,H 1,V 1) ∧ X 2 = relprem(T2,H 2,V 2) ∧
X 2 = InstRulePrem M X 1 •
T2 = InstTerm M T1 ∧ H 2 = map(InstHypTrans M )H 1 ∧
V 2 = map (InstObjVar M ) V 1
∀C 1,C 2 : AppCond ; T ,U ,V ,TR1,TR2 : TERM ; ST : seq TERM ; NO : ObjVAR;
NT : TERM ; M : Instant
| C 2 = InstRuleCond M C 1 •
C 1 = ishyp(T )⇒ C 2 = ishyp(InstTerm M T ) ∧
C 1 = rewrite(U ,V ,TR1,TR2)⇒
C 2 = rewrite(InstTerm M U , InstTerm M V ,
InstTerm M TR1, InstTerm M TR2) ∧
C 1 = nfi(NO ,NT )⇒ C 2 = nfi(InstObjVar M NO , InstTerm M NT )
We can now define InstRuleBody which instantiates the body of a rule and finally use this to
define InstRule itself.
InstRuleBody : RuleBody × Instant → RuleBody ;
GenInstant : Rule × seq TERM 7→ Instant ;
InstRule : Rule × seq TERM → RuleBody
∀R1 : RuleBody ; M : Instant •
InstRuleBody(R1,M ) =
rulebody(InstTerm M (RuleConcl(R1)),
map(InstRulePrem M )(RulePrems(R1)),
map(InstRuleCond M )(RuleConditions(R1)))
∀R : Rule; T : seq TERM | #(RuleVars(R)) = #T •
GenInstant(R,T ) = ran(zip(RuleVars(R),T ))
InstRule = (λR : Rule; T : seq TERM •
InstRuleBody(BodyOfRule(R),GenInstant(R,T )))
The instantiated RuleBody is still schematic in respect to the hypotheses of its conclusion,
with the hypotheses of the premises generated from this by hypothesis transformers. To fully
instantiate a rule we need both an instantiated rule body and a sequent to supply the hypothesis
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list from which the hypotheses of the premises can be generated by applying the hypothesis
transformers. To effect the hypothesis transformer delhyp, where we must match a term against
the current hypothesis list, we need to be able to compare terms. Terms can only be compared
in the context of a specific proof, since particulars of the algorithm depend on the setting of the
boolean NFIRep. This is done in Section B.3.3.
B.2.5 Steps
A Step is the representation of a proof node in the proof-object. If the step represents a call to
an oracle it has an extra component that provides a justification for the action of the oracle, and
in this case the list of instantiations is empty. This justification consists of some text explaining
how the oracle was called and the inputs to and outputs from the oracle. The justification
should enable a human auditor to determine how the oracle was called.
OracleInfo ::= nilorc | ruleorc〈〈STRING × (Sequent × seq Sequent)〉〉
Step ::= step〈〈RULEID × seq TERM ×OracleInfo〉〉
There is a set of functions to extract the components from a step.
StepRuleId : Step → RULEID ;
StepInst : Step → seq TERM ;
OracleJust : Step 7→ STRING ;
OracleSeq : Step 7→ (Sequent × seq Sequent)
∀St : Step; RId : RULEID ;
Inst : seq TERM ; Orc : OracleInfo; str : STRING
| St = step(RId , Inst ,Orc) •
StepRuleId(St) = RId ∧ StepInst(St) = Inst ∧
(StepRuleId(St) 6= Oracle ⇒ (Orc = nilorc)) ∧
(StepRuleId(St) = Oracle ⇒ StepInst(St) = 〈 〉 ∧
(∃W : STRING ; Sq : Sequent × seq Sequent •
(Orc = ruleorc(W ,Sq) ∧
OracleJust(St) = W ∧ OracleSeq(St) = Sq)))
We also need to list the variables used in a proof step.
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VarsOfStep : Step → FVAR;
VarsOfOrc : Step → FVAR;
VarsOfSeq : Sequent → FVAR
∀S : Step •
VarsOfStep(S ) =
∪(ran(map (VarsOf ) (StepInst(S )))) ∪VarsOfOrc(S )
∀S : Step | StepRuleId(S ) 6= Oracle • VarsOfOrc(S ) = ∅
∀S : Step; X : Sequent ; Y : seq Sequent
| StepRuleId(S ) = Oracle ∧ OracleSeq(S ) = (X ,Y ) •
VarsOfOrc(S ) = VarsOfSeq(X ) ∪∪(ran(map (VarsOfSeq) Y ))
∀S : Sequent • VarsOfSeq(S ) = VarsOf (Succedent(S ))∪
∪(ran(map (VarsOf ) (Antecedent(S ))))
B.3 The Proof Checker
B.3.1 Inputs and Outputs
The top-level specification of the proof checker is a schema that takes as input the components
of a proof object and returns the valid ! boolean value which is true or false according to whether
the proof recorded in the proof-object is valid or not. The components of a proof object are:
• Theorem – A statement of the theorem to be proven. This is given as a rule instance to
cover the most general case. It is represented by a RuleBody (a rule without the list of its
variables or its kind).
• RuleDB – A database of rules to be used in the proof, represented by a partial function
from rule identifiers to rules. This requires that no two rules in the set of rules extracted
from the context of the proof-object have the same identifier - a condition that must be
enforced by the parser as it builds the database. In most cases RuleDB is an injection,
but we do not require this, since in some provers it may be possible to reference a rule by
more than one name (e.g. via multiple inheritance of theories).
When we check a proof step we instantiate the schematic rule used at the step with
the recorded instantiations to give a rule instance. To avoid problems with clashes of
names we arrange that all the variable names in the rules in the rule database are of
type INTERNVAR, that is they are names that cannot occur in the proof itself. It is
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one of the functions of the parser to ensure that the preconditions of the specification
are met, and this will include policing the naming requirements. This may necessitate
systematically replace the names in the rules to corresponding ones of type INTERNVAR
when generating the RuleDB database to pass to the checking module. This could be
done in the checking module itself (and a function to do this was initially included in the
specification). However, the renaming function need not necessarily be verified, since the
list of rules as given to the checker is taken as a proviso of the proof, and so must be
independently checked in any case. The requirement that all the variables in the rules
database be of type INTERNVAR is therefore a precondition of the checking module.
Note however, that since this condition is used to facilitate the instantiation of rules,
it does not apply to ‘local rules’, which represent premises of the theorem being proven
and must not be instantiated. In this case we require that the variables are of type
PROOFVAR.
• A description of the semantic conventions of the theorem prover that affect the proof
checking algorithm. This consists of a single boolean NFIRep. If this is true it is assumed
that for any schematic-variable A and object variable x then x not free in A is only true
if there is an explicit constraint to this effect. On the other hand, if it is false then it is
assumed that the not-free-in status of object variables with respect to schematic-variables
is represented implicitly by structuring proof terms with dependent variables. This implies
that none of the object variables in the theorem are free in any of the schematic-variables.
• Proof – The proof itself, represented as a sequence of proof steps. This sequence is ordered
by a top-down left-to-right traversal of the original proof tree. We also check that the
instantiation lists of the proof only contain proof variables.
ProofObject
Theorem : RuleBody ;
RuleDB : RealIds 7→ Rule;
NFIRep : B;
Proof : seq Step
∀R : ran RuleDB • ¬ IsLocalRule(R)⇒ VarsOfRule(R) ⊂ INTERNVAR
∀R : ran RuleDB • IsLocalRule(R)⇒ IsValidLocalRule(R) ∧
VarsOfRule(R) ⊂ PROOFVAR
∀S : ran Proof • VarsOfStep(S ) ⊂ PROOFVAR
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In addition to the boolean output valid!, we also report the theorem itself and return a list
of provisos if the proof is valid. The provisos are the outputs that inform the auditor what
assumptions were made during proof checking. These include the theorems used and details of
any calls to oracles. For the present purpose we define the heterogeneous type OUTPUTOBJ
whose components coerce the various objects that may be part of the provisos list into a single
type. In practice the elements of the proviso list may be converted to ASCII to generate an
auditor’s export or may be formatted for input to some other program for reporting. We use
the similar type OUTPUTTHM to represent the formatted form of the theorem which is also
part of the checker’s output.
OUTPUTOBJ ::= seqdescr〈〈Sequent〉〉 |
ruledescr〈〈Rule〉〉 |
oracledescr〈〈Sequent × seq Sequent〉〉 |
stringdescr〈〈STRING〉〉
nullstring : OUTPUTOBJ
nullstring = stringdescr(〈 〉)
OUTPUTTHM ::= theoremdescr〈〈RuleBody〉〉
checker1
ProofObject?;
valid ! : B;
GivenThm! : OUTPUTTHM ;
provisos! : POUTPUTOBJ
valid !⇔ provisos! 6= ∅
GivenThm! = theoremdescr(Theorem?)
The evaluation of not free in conditions depends on the setting of NFIRep, and also on any global
not free in constraints applied to schematic variables in the theorem. These are extracted by the
function ExtractNFI and stored in GlobalNFI. NFIRep and GlobalNFI are used in the function
NotFreeIn which is defined in Section B.3.4.
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checker2
checker1;
GlobalNFI : F(ObjVAR × TERM )
GlobalNFI = ExtractNFI (Theorem?)
B.3.2 Comparing Terms
Checking a proof requires testing the equivalence of terms. Terms can often be simplified,
both in respect to applying substitutions and to the β-reduction of λ-terms, so we apply term
matching only after simplifying the terms as much as possible. We also equate terms that only
differ with respect to the naming of bound variables.
The function SimpSubs simplifies substitutions. It uses a number of auxiliary functions. Fresh-
Vars generates a sequence of object variables that do not occur in a given list. This is used
here and elsewhere to change bound variables. ObjVarsOfSub lists the target variables of a
substitution. RestrictSubs reduces a substitution by eliminating pairs whose target variable is
in a given list, and CombineSubs merges substitutions. During simplification the evaluation of
substitutions can be pushed through the structure of the term, and in this way substitutions
can always be eliminated except in some cases of the form subst((x,A),var(V)), where, for some
provers and depending on the not free in constraints, we may not be able to completely evaluate
the substitution.
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FreshVars : N× PVAR → iseq1 ObjVAR;
ObjVarsOfSub : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM )→ FObjVAR;
RestrictSubs : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM )× seq ObjVAR → seq1(ObjVAR × TERM );
CombineSubs : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM )× seq1(ObjVAR × TERM )
→ seq1(ObjVAR × TERM )
∀N : N; V : PVAR; SO : iseq ObjVAR | SO = FreshVars(N ,V ) •
#SO = N ∧ disjoint〈ran SO ,V 〉
∀SS : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ); PSO : FObjVAR; SO : seq1 ObjVAR; ST : seq1 TERM
| PSO = ObjVarsOfSub(SS ) ∧ SO = (map first SS ) ∧
ST = (map second SS ) •
PSO = (ran SO) ∪ (∪(ran(map ObjVarsOf ST )))
∀OT1,OT2 : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ); O : seq ObjVAR
| OT2 = RestrictSubs(OT1,O) •
OT2 = squash{X : OT1 | first(second(X )) 6∈ ran O}
∀OT1,OT2,OT : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ); F2 : seq1 ObjVAR; S2 : seq1 TERM
| OT = CombineSubs(OT1,OT2) •
(let F == (λX : (ObjVAR × TERM ) •
(first(X ), subst(OT1, second(X )))) •
OT = map F OT2a RestrictSubs(OT1, (map first OT2)))
In SimpSubs, the evaluation of a substitution applied to a variable requires checking not free
in constraints on that variable, this is done by consulting the global variable NFIRep? and the
GlobalNFI list.
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checker3
checker2;
SimpSubs : TERM → TERM
∀T1,T2,T3,T : TERM ; S ,S1 : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM );
SF : ObjVAR → TERM ; V : VAR; C : CONST ; ST : seq1 TERM ;
SO : seq1 ObjVAR; Q : QUANT
| T1 = subst(S ,T ) ∧ T2 = SimpSubs(T1) ∧ SF = ran(S ) •
(T = var(V ) ∧ V ∈ dom SF ⇒ T2 = SF (V )) ∧
(T = var(V ) ∧ V 6∈ dom SF ⇒
(let OT == squash{X : S |
¬ (NFIRep? ∨ ((first(second(X )),T ) ∈ GlobalNFI ))}
•
(OT = 〈 〉 ⇒ T2 = T ) ∧ (OT 6= 〈 〉 ⇒ T2 = subst(OT ,T ))) ) ∧
(T = const(C )⇒ T2 = T ) ∧
(T = func(T3,ST )⇒
(let F == (λ t : TERM • SimpSubs(subst(S , t))) •
T2 = func(F (T3),map (F ) ST ))) ∧
(T = abs(SO ,T3) ∧ S1 = RestrictSubs(S ,SO)⇒
(S1 = 〈 〉 ⇒ T2 = SimpSubs(T )) ∧
(S1 6= 〈 〉 ⇒ (∃SN : iseq1 ObjVAR; NS : TERM •
SN = FreshVars(#SO , ran SO ∪ObjVarsOfSub(S1) ∪ObjVarsOf (T3)) ∧
NS = subst(S1, subst(zip(SO ,map (var) SN ),T3)) ∧
T2 = abs(SN ,SimpSubs(NS ))))) ∧
(T = quant(Q ,SO ,T3) ∧ S1 = RestrictSubs(S ,SO)⇒
(S1 = 〈 〉 ⇒ T2 = SimpSubs(T )) ∧
(S1 6= 〈 〉 ⇒ (∃SN : iseq1 ObjVAR; NS : TERM •
SN = FreshVars(#SO , ran SO ∪ObjVarsOfSub(S1) ∪ObjVarsOf (T3)) ∧
NS = subst(S1, subst(zip(SO ,map (var) SN ),T3)) ∧
T2 = quant(Q ,SN ,SimpSubs(NS ))))) ∧
(T = subst(S1,T3)⇒ (let Z 1 == CombineSubs(S ,S1) •
(let Z 2 == map (λX : (ObjVAR × TERM ) •
(first(X ),SimpSubs(second(X )))) Z 1 •
T2 = SimpSubs(subst(Z 2,T3)))))
We also define the function BetaRed which simplifies a term by applying β-reduction to function
applications where appropriate. Again this is applied through the structure of a term. Where
a β-reduction is performed, this results in the generation of a substitution. Where BetaRed
generates a substitution in this way, SimpSubs is applied before continuing with the BetaRed
simplification.
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checker4
checker3;
BetaRed : TERM → TERM
∀X 1,X 2 : TERM ; ST : seq1 TERM ; V : VAR; C : CONST ;
T : TERM ; S : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ); Q : QUANT ; SO : seq1 ObjVAR
| X 2 = BetaRed(X 1) •
(X 1 = var(V )⇒ X 2 = X 1) ∧
(X 1 = const(C )⇒ X 2 = X 1) ∧
(X 1 = abs(SO ,T )⇒ X 2 = abs(SO ,BetaRed(T ))) ∧
(X 1 = quant(Q ,SO ,T )⇒ X 2 = quant(Q ,SO ,BetaRed(T ))) ∧
(X 1 = subst(S ,T )⇒ X 2 = subst(zip(map (first) S ,map BetaRed (map (second) S )),
BetaRed(T ))) ∧
(X 1 = func(T ,ST )⇒
X 2 = (if (X 1 ∈ LambdaExpr)
then(let LO == LVars(X 1); LT == LBody(X 1) •
(let NT == SimpSubs(subst(〈((head LO), (head ST ))〉,LT )) •
(let NewL == (if (#LO = 1)
then NT
else abs((tail LO),NT )) •
(if (#ST = 1)
then(BetaRed(NewL))
else(BetaRed(func(NewL, (tail ST ))))))))
else func(BetaRed(T ),map BetaRed ST )))
We can now define a relation ' which checks for the equivalence of terms. It compares them
after applying simplification to both. We simplify a term by first evaluating any substitutions
and then performing any β-reductions. We also define a function MatchTerms which compares
a pair of terms using '. The comparison has to be independent of the naming of bound
variables. Wherever a pair of terms containing bound variables is being compared, a fresh set
of variables names which occur in neither term is substituted for the bound variables in both,
this implements α-equivalence. The function FreshVars is used to generate the fresh sets of
bound variable names. Note that although TermEq has a clause to handle substitutions, since
TermEq is only used on terms to which SimpSubs has been applied, this case is only activated
on residual substitutions that have not been evaluated by SimpSubs, and these are all in the
form of substitutions applied to variables. In this case we just compare the individual sub-terms
throughout the structure of the two substitutions.
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checker5
checker4;
': TERM ↔ TERM ;
TermEq : TERM ↔ TERM ;
MatchTerms : TERM × TERM → B;
SimpTerm : TERM → TERM
SimpTerm = (λT : TERM • BetaRed(SimpSubs(T )))
∀T1,T2 : TERM • T1 ' T2⇔ SimpTerm(T1) TermEq SimpTerm(T2)
∀X 1,X 2 : TERM ; V : VAR; C : CONST ; ST : seq1 TERM ; SO : seq1 VAR;
T : TERM ; S : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ); Q : QUANT •
(X 1= var(V )⇒ X 1 TermEq X 2⇔ X 2 = X 1) ∧
(X 1= const(C )⇒ X 1 TermEq X 2⇔ X 2 = X 1) ∧
(X 1= func(T ,ST )⇒ X 1 TermEq X 2⇔
(∃1 ST2 : seq1 TERM ; T2 : TERM | #ST = #ST2 •
X 2 = func(T2,ST2) ∧ T TermEq T2 ∧
ran(zip(ST ,ST2)) ⊂ TermEq)) ∧
(X 1= abs(SO ,T )⇒
(X 1 TermEq X 2⇔
(∃1 SO2 : seq1 VAR; T2 : TERM •
X 2 = abs(SO2,T2) ∧ #SO = #SO2 ∧
(∃SN : iseq1 ObjVAR •
SN = FreshVars(#SO ,ObjVarsOf (T ) ∪ObjVarsOf (T2)) ∧
subst(zip(SO ,map (var) SN ),T )
' subst(zip(SO2,map (var) SN ),T2))))) ∧
(X 1= quant(Q ,SO ,T )⇒
(X 1 TermEq X 2⇔
(∃1 SO2 : seq1 VAR; T2 : TERM •
X 2 = quant(Q ,SO2,T2) ∧ #SO = #SO2 ∧
(∃SN : iseq1 ObjVAR •
SN = FreshVars(#SO ,ObjVarsOf (T ) ∪ObjVarsOf (T2)) ∧
subst(zip(SO ,map (var) SN ),T )
' subst(zip(SO2,map (var) SN ),T2))))) ∧
(X 1= subst(S ,T )⇒ X 1 TermEq X 2⇔
(∃1 S2 : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ); T2 : TERM | #S = #S2 •
X 2 = subst(S2,T2) ∧ T TermEq T2 ∧
map(first)S = map(first)S2 ∧
ran(zip(map(second)S ,map(second)S2)) ⊂ TermEq))
∀T1,T2 : TERM • MatchTerms(T1,T2)⇔ T1 ' T2
We also define functions that compare two sequents, by promulgating term matching through
their structure.
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checker6
checker5;
MatchCondSequent : CondSequent × CondSequent → B
∀S1,S2 : CondSequent •
MatchCondSequent(S1,S2)⇔
#(CondAntecedent(S1)) = #(CondAntecedent(S2)) ∧
(CondSuccedent(S1) ' CondSuccedent(S2) ∧
MatchLists(MatchTerms,CondAntecedent(S1),CondAntecedent(S2)) ∧
(∀ i : dom(CondAntecedent(S1)) •
second((CondNFI (S1))(i)) = second((CondNFI (S2))(i))))
B.3.3 Generating a Rule Instance
To complete the instantiation of a rule, we define the function ApplyHypTrans to implement
the different types of hypothesis transformer, and use this to define the function GenRuleInst.
Given a rule body and a sequent (which supplies the list of hypotheses), GenRuleInst generates
a fully expanded conclusion and premise list. The expanded form is an object of type ThmInst
which represents the conclusion and premises of the expanded rule as sequents. Each premise
may have an associated not-free-in condition, which is a list of variables that must be not-free-
in the hypotheses of the premise. These conditions are added to any that already exist in the
supplied list of hypotheses (by ApplyNFI).
ThmInst ::= thminst〈〈Sequent × seq CondSequent〉〉
ThmInstConcl : ThmInst → Sequent ;
CondThmInstPr : ThmInst → seq CondSequent
∀T : ThmInst ; S : Sequent ; P : seq CondSequent
| T = thminst(S ,P) •
ThmInstConcl(T ) = S ∧ CondThmInstPr(T ) = P
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checker7
checker6;
ApplyHypTrans : (HypTrans × seq(TERM × seq ObjVAR))
→ seq(TERM × seq ObjVAR)
∀H : HypTrans; T1,T2 : seq(TERM × seq ObjVAR); ST : seq TERM ; T : TERM
| ApplyHypTrans(H ,T1) = T2 •
(H = addhyp(T )⇒ T2 = 〈(T , 〈 〉)〉a T1) ∧
(H = posthyp(T )⇒ T2 = T1a 〈(T , 〈 〉)〉) ∧
(H = delhyp(T )⇒ #T2 = #T1− 1 ∧
(let D1 == map first T1; D2 == map first T2 •
MatchLists(MatchTerms,
D1,D2a 〈T 〉)))
checker8
checker7;
ApplyNFI : (seq(TERM × seq ObjVAR)× seq ObjVAR)
→ seq(TERM × seq ObjVAR);
InstPrem : CondSequent → RelPrem → CondSequent ;
GenRuleInst : CondSequent × RuleBody 7→ ThmInst
∀T1,T2 : seq(TERM × seq ObjVAR); N : seq ObjVAR
| T2 = ApplyNFI (T1,N ) •
#T1 = #T2 ∧
(∀ i : dom T1 • T2(i) = (first(T1(i)), second(T1(i))aN ))
∀C 1,C 2 : CondSequent ; N : seq ObjVAR; T : TERM ;
H : seq HypTrans; C : seq VAR
| C 2 = InstPrem C 1 (relprem(T ,H ,C )) •
CondSuccedent(C 2) = T ∧
CondNFI (C 2) = ApplyNFI ((fold(ApplyHypTrans,CondNFI (C 1))H ),C )
∀B : RuleBody ; C : CondSequent ; T : ThmInst
| T = GenRuleInst(C ,B) •
Succedent(ThmInstConcl(T )) = RuleConcl(B) ∧
CondThmInstPr(T ) = map(InstPrem(C ))(RulePrems(B))
B.3.4 Checking a Rule’s Applicability Conditions
The function CheckRuleApp checks that the application conditions of an instantiated rule body
are valid with respect to a particular sequent. It uses the function NotFreeIn for checking not-
free-in conditions. NotFreeIn uses the list of global not-free-in constraints that are specified
in the statement of the theorem, since these may decide the evaluation of the condition in
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particular cases. NotFreeIn simplifies any substitutions first, before applying the lower level
function NFI for the actual checking. SimpSubs eliminates most substitutions, but may leave
some applied directly to variables. (Note that itself SimpSubs does some not free in checks –
but these are only on variables, and are performed directly, not using NFI or NotFreeIn.)
checker9
checker8;
NotFreeIn : ObjVAR → TERM → B;
NFI : ObjVAR → TERM 7→ B
NotFreeIn = (λV : ObjVAR • (λT : TERM • NFI (V )(SimpSubs(T ))))
∀B : B; TV : ObjVAR; V : VAR; C : CONST ; ST : seq1 TERM ; SO : seq1 VAR;
T ,T2 : TERM ; S : seq1(ObjVAR × TERM ); Q : QUANT
| B ⇔ NFI (TV )T •
(T = var(V )⇒ (B ⇔ V 6= TV ∧ (NFIRep? ∨ ((TV ,T ) ∈ GlobalNFI )))) ∧
(T = const(C )⇒ (B ⇔ true)) ∧
(T= func(T2,ST )⇒
(B ⇔ (NFI (TV )T2 ∧ allOK (NFI (TV ),ST )))) ∧
(T= abs(SO ,T2)⇒
(TV ∈ ran SO ⇒ (B ⇔ true)) ∧
(TV 6∈ ran SO ⇒ (B ⇔ NFI (TV )T2))) ∧
(T= quant(Q ,SO ,T2)⇒
(TV ∈ ran SO ⇒ (B ⇔ true)) ∧
(TV 6∈ ran SO ⇒ (B ⇔ NFI (TV )T2))) ∧
(T= subst(S ,T2)⇒
(∃V : VAR | T2 = var(V ) •
(B ⇔ (TV ∈ ran(map (first) S ) ∨ NFI (TV )T2))) ∧
(∀S ′ : ran S ; O ′ : ObjVAR; T ′ : TERM | S ′ = (O ′,T ′) •
NFI (TV )T ′ ∨ NFI (O ′)T2))
Checking an applicability condition that refers to a hypothesis requires that we also confirm that
any not-free-in conditions associated with that hypothesis are met. Such conditions may have
been generated by earlier steps in the proof and recorded in the CondSequent data-structure.
The function CheckCondNFI performs this check.
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checker10
checker9;
CondOK : CondSequent → AppCond → B;
CheckRuleApp : CondSequent × RuleBody → B;
CheckCondNFI : (TERM × seq ObjVAR)→ B
∀C : AppCond ; Sq : CondSequent ; T ,U ,V ,T1,T2 : TERM ;
ST : seq TERM ; O : ObjVAR •
C = ishyp(T )⇒
CondOK (Sq) C ⇔ ((∃ i : dom(CondAntecedent(Sq)) •
T ' (CondAntecedent(Sq))(i) ∧
CheckCondNFI (CondNFI (Sq)(i)))) ∧
C = rewrite(U ,V ,T1,T2)⇒
CondOK (Sq) C ⇔ ((ReplaceCheck(U ,V ,T1,T2))) ∧
C = nfi(O ,T )⇒
CondOK (Sq) C ⇔ NotFreeIn(O)T
CheckRuleApp = (λSq : CondSequent ; Rb : RuleBody •
allOK (CondOK (Sq),RuleConditions(Rb)))
∀T : TERM ; SO : seq ObjVAR •
CheckCondNFI (T ,SO)⇔ (∀O : ran SO • NotFreeIn(O)T )
B.3.5 Applying a Proof Step
A step is valid if it refers to a rule that is present in the rule database and it provides a suitable
list of instantiations for the schematic variables of the rule. We define the function IsValidStep
which performs these checks. IsValidStep has to check that, where the variable in a rule is an
object variable, its instantiation given in the step is also an object variable (coerced to a term
of type TERMOVAR).
The function InstStep applies an instantiation to give an instance of the rule body. Local rules
cannot be instantiated, so in their case we use the rule directly. Also calls to oracles and open
nodes are special cases that do not require instantiation, so the range of InstStep is steps that
refer to actual rules.
TERMOVAR : PTERM
∀T : TERMOVAR • ∃V : ProofObjVAR • T = var(V )
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StepRule : (RealIds 7→ Rule)× Step 7→ Rule;
IsValidStep : (RealIds 7→ Rule)× Step → B;
InstStep : (RealIds 7→ Rule)× Step 7→ RuleBody
StepRule = (λR : RealIds 7→ Rule; S : Step | StepRuleId(S ) ∈ dom(R) •
R(StepRuleId(S )))
∀R : (RealIds 7→ Rule); S : Step | StepRuleId(S ) ∈ RealIds •
IsValidStep(R,S )⇔
StepRuleId(S ) ∈ dom(R) ∧
#(RuleVars(StepRule(R,S ))) = #(StepInst(S )) ∧
(∀ i : dom(StepInst(S )) •
(RuleVars(StepRule(R,S )))(i) ∈ ObjVAR ⇒
(StepInst(S ))(i) ∈ TERMOVAR)
∀R : RealIds 7→ Rule; S : Step | StepRuleId(S ) ∈ DummyIds •
(StepRuleId(S ) = Oracle ⇒ IsValidStep(R,S )⇔ true) ∧
(StepRuleId(S ) = OpenNode ⇒
IsValidStep(R,S )⇔ StepInst(S ) = 〈 〉)
∀R : RealIds 7→ Rule; S : Step | IsValidStep(R,S ) •
(StepRuleId(S ) ∈ RealIds ∧ IsLocalRule(StepRule(R,S ))⇒
InstStep(R,S ) = BodyOfRule(StepRule(R,S ))) ∧
(StepRuleId(S ) ∈ RealIds ∧ ¬ IsLocalRule(StepRule(R,S ))⇒
InstStep(R,S ) = InstRule(StepRule(R,S ),StepInst(S )))
B.3.6 Checking the Proof
We now check the proof itself. This is done by iteratively checking the sequence of steps that is
recorded in the proof-object. The application of the rule at each step is checked by the function
CheckStep which checks that the current conclusion matches the conclusion of the rule instance
and that all the applicability conditions of the rule are met. (With a corresponding check for
calls to oracles.)
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checker11
checker10;
CheckStep : CondSequent × Step → B
∀CS : CondSequent ; St : Step; Rb : RuleBody | Rb = InstStep(RuleDB?,St) •
CheckStep(CS ,St)⇔
IsValidStep(RuleDB?,St) ∧
( ( StepRuleId(St) ∈ RealIds ∧
CondSuccedent(CS ) ' RuleConcl(Rb) ∧
CheckRuleApp(CS ,Rb)) ∨
( StepRuleId(St) = OpenNode) ∨
( StepRuleId(St) = Oracle ∧
(∀Z : Sequent | Z = first(OracleSeq(St)) •
(CondSuccedent(CS ) ' Succedent(Z ) ∧
MatchLists(MatchTerms,
CondAntecedent(CS ),Antecedent(Z ))))))
If a step is valid we can use it to generate a list of subgoals to replace the current goal in the
list of outstanding goals. This is done by the function GenSubGoals.
checker12
checker11;
GenSubGoals : CondSequent × Step 7→ seq CondSequent
∀X : CondSequent ; Y : Step | IsValidStep(RuleDB?,Y ) •
( StepRuleId(Y ) ∈ RealIds ⇒
GenSubGoals(X ,Y ) =
CondThmInstPr(GenRuleInst(X , InstStep(RuleDB?,Y )))) ∧
( StepRuleId(Y ) = Oracle ⇒
GenSubGoals(X ,Y ) =
(map (λS : Sequent •
SeqToCondSeq(S ))(second(OracleSeq(Y ))))) ∧
( StepRuleId(Y ) = OpenNode ⇒ GenSubGoals(X ,Y ) = 〈 〉)
The function ExtractJust generates the list of provisos. The provisos include all the rules
used, and report on any calls to oracles. ExtractJust is called for each step and appends the
justification of that step to the sequence of justifications.
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checker13
checker12;
ExtractJust : (Step × seq OUTPUTOBJ )→ seq OUTPUTOBJ
∀St : Step; S1,S2 : seq OUTPUTOBJ | S2 = ExtractJust(St ,S1) •
StepRuleId(St) = OpenNode ⇒
S2 = S1 ∧
StepRuleId(St) = Oracle ⇒
S2 = 〈stringdescr(OracleJust(St)), oracledescr(OracleSeq(St))〉a S1 ∧
StepRuleId(St) ∈ RealIds ⇒
S2 = 〈ruledescr(StepRule(RuleDB?,St))〉a S1
The function AddPrems generates the list of proof premises. The premise can be an invocation
of a local rule, or an open node. AddPrems is called for each step and appends the premise of
that step to the sequence of premises used previously.
checker14
checker13;
AddPrems : CondSequent × Step × seq CondSequent → seq CondSequent
∀ In : seq CondSequent ; C : CondSequent ; S : Step •
AddPrems(C ,S , In) = (if (StepRuleId(S ) = OpenNode)
then((〈C 〉a In))
else(if (IsLocalRule(RuleDB?(StepRuleId(S ))))
then(〈ExtLocRule(RuleDB?(StepRuleId(S )))〉a In)
else(In)))
In the proof object the theorem is represented as a rule, this is so that we have a uniform
representation of derived rules when they are being proved and when they are used as part of
the theory. For checking the proof we need to reformulate this representation to use explicit
sequents throughout (the rule representation uses hypothesis transformers). This is done by the
function GenThm which gives an object of type ThmInst – the type of a fully instantiated rule
instance.
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checker15
checker14;
GenThm : RuleBody → ThmInst ;
StripHyp : seq AppCond → seq TERM ;
ThmHyps : RuleBody → seq TERM
∀SAC : seq AppCond •
StripHyp(SAC ) = map(AppCondHyp)(SAC  {AC : AppCond |
∃X : TERM • AC = ishyp(X )})
∀Rb : RuleBody ; T : TERM ; AC : seq AppCond ;
RP : seq RelPrem; TH : seq TERM
| Rb = rulebody(T ,RP ,AC ) ∧ TH = ThmHyps(Rb) •
TH = StripHyp(AC )
∀Rb : RuleBody ; T : TERM ; AC : seq AppCond ; RP : seq RelPrem;
TH : seq TERM ; CS : CondSequent ; TI : ThmInst
| Rb = rulebody(T ,RP ,AC ) ∧ TH = ThmHyps(Rb) ∧
TI = GenThm(Rb) •
CS = condseq(T ,map(λT : TERM • (T , 〈 〉))(ThmHyps(Rb))) ∧
TI = GenRuleInst(CS ,Rb)
Finally we can use CheckStep and GenSubGoals to construct the function Check, which is applied
recursively to the sequence of the steps in the proof-object. This process terminates when the
proof is complete or an error is found. Check has four parameters:
• A list of sequents yet to be justified. This is initially the conclusion of the theorem to be
proven, and is reduced to an empty sequent at the conclusion of a valid proof. At any
point in the proof it can be viewed as a list of ‘open subgoals’ that must be justified by
the remainder of the proof.
• The remainder of the proof, as a list of proof steps. This is initially the whole proof and
is reduced to an empty sequence at the conclusion of a valid proof.
• A list of the theorem premises used in the proof checked so far. Theorem premises may be
represented in the proof two ways, either by an explicit open node or by the application
of a local rule which corresponds to a premise.
• A list of the justifications for the steps of the proof checked so far.
Check returns a triple of values. The first is a boolean indicating whether the subproof checked
by that call to Check is deemed to be valid. For the top-level call to Check to return true, all
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lower level calls must also return true, which means that all subproofs must have been found
to be valid. (For this purpose we have utilised the Object-Z extension of a boolean type (B)
and defined the element True.) The second and third values are only significant if the proof is
valid, if the proof is invalid the values returned are immaterial. The second parameter returns
the list of premises generated during the checking process, and the third parameter returns the
list of justifications for the steps in the proof. The latter is used to generate the list of provisos.
The main checking schema does not set valid! to true on completion since further checks are
required before the proof-checking is complete.
True : B
True ⇔ true
checker16
checker15;
TheoremInst : ThmInst ;
Check : (seq CondSequent × seq Step × seq CondSequent × seq OUTPUTOBJ )
→ (B× seq CondSequent × seq OUTPUTOBJ );
ThmPremises : seq CondSequent ;
ProofOK : B;
ProvList : seq OUTPUTOBJ
TheoremInst = GenThm(Theorem?)
∀X , InPrem,FinalPrem : seq CondSequent ; Y : seq Step; B : B;
InProv ,FinalProv : seq OUTPUTOBJ
| Check(X ,Y , InPrem, InProv) = (B ,FinalPrem,FinalProv) •
( B ⇔ ( (X 6= 〈 〉 ∧ Y 6= 〈 〉 ∧
CheckStep(head X , head Y ) ∧
Check(GenSubGoals(head X , head Y )a (tail X ),
tail Y ,
AddPrems(head X , head Y , InPrem),
ExtractJust(head Y , InProv))
= (True,FinalPrem,FinalProv)))
∨ (X = 〈 〉 ∧ Y = 〈 〉)) ∧
(X = 〈 〉 ∧ Y = 〈 〉 ⇒ InPrem = FinalPrem ∧ InProv = FinalProv)
Check(〈ThmInstConcl(TheoremInst)〉,Proof ?, 〈 〉, 〈 〉)
= (ProofOK ,ThmPremises,ProvList)
Provided the proof is valid we can check that the theorem proven is that declared in the proof
object. We know that the conclusion matches, it was the starting point of the proof checker, so
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we only need to the premises here. Note the we use MatchSubLists here, that is we allow that
some premises may not actually be used in the proof (in which case we have actually proven a
stronger theorem than that which is stated).
checker17
checker16
valid !⇔ (ProofOK ∧
MatchSubLists(MatchCondSequent ,
ThmPremises,CondThmInstPr(TheoremInst)))
valid !⇒ provisos! = ran ProvList
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APPENDIX C
The Prototype Proof Checker
C.1 Qu-Prolog Code
%% Reads and checks a proof-object file
%%
%% A trace is controlled by pc_log_enable/_disable (off by default)
%%
%
% Quantifier and operator declarations.
%
?- op(500, quant, lambda). % declare lambda as a quantifier
?- op(800, xfx, =>). % single reduction
?- op(800, xfx, =>*). % zero or more reductions
check_proof(Path) :-
\+ \+ check_proof_aux(Path).
check_proof_aux(Path) :-
CheckerVersion = ’1.11’,
ip_set(’NODENum’,0),
ip_set(’PREMISES’,[]),
%% stores a list of the premises from open nodes
ip_set(’RULES-USED’,[]),
%% stores a list of the names of the rules used
retractall(isRule(_,_)),
see(Path),
%% Read and display the theorem details
write_term_list([nl,’ -- Generic Proof Checker Version ’,
CheckerVersion,’ --’,nl]),
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read_term(PreAmble,[remember_name(true)]),
PreAmble = [Source,Version,Ident,Annotation],
write_term_list([’ -- Proof Generated by ’,Source,
’ --- version : ’,Version,’ -- ’,nl]),
write_term_list([’ -- Proof ID : ’,Ident,’ --’,nl]),
write_term_list([’*** Warning This version of the Checker ’,
’Does not implement ORACLES !!! ***’,nl]),
get_sem,
get_env,
read_term(GivenThm, [remember_name(true)]),
write(’Theorem:’),nl,
GivenThm = [ [InConc,InHyp], Premises , GlobConst],
set_thm_nfis(GlobConst),
( Premises == [] ; write_antecedent_list(Premises)),
(InHyp == [] ->
write_term_list([’ |- ’])
;
write_term_list([w(InHyp),’ |- ’])
),
write_term_list([’ ’,w(InConc),nl]),
(GlobConst == [] ; write_term_list([’ provided ’,w(GlobConst),nl])),
%% Collect and store the variables used in the proof statement
extract_vars(GivenThm,ConVars),
sort(ConVars,SConVars),
ip_set(’THMVARS’,SConVars),
%% sets the implicit parameter THMVARS to the schematic variables
%% used in the theorem
freeze_term(GivenThm,VarsXXX),
%% freeze all the variables in the theorem so that they cannot
%% be instantaited (returns a list of the fozen variables)
(
(with_local_exception_handler(
( Valid=’true’,
genthm(InConc,InHyp,ThisThm),
check([ThisThm]),
get_endnode ),
type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_),
((Valid=’false’,write_term_list([’**** Proof FAILED ****’,nl]))))
) ->
thaw_term(VarsXXX),
seen,
write_term_list([’Checking finished --- ’,w(Valid),nl]),
( Valid = ’true’ ->
ip_lookup(’PREMISES’,ONList),
%% retrieve the list of premises stored in the
%% implicit parameter PREMISES
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remove_duplicates(ONList,OpenNodes),
%%
%% CHECK INTEGRITY OF FINAL CONCLUSION OF PROOF
%%
%% We should have --- Proven sequent = statement of theorem
%% OpenNodes = Premises
%%
diff_list(OpenNodes,Premises,DL2),
%% Here DL2 = premises used without warrant
( DL2 \= [] ->
write_term_list([’OpenNodes:’,w(OpenNodes),nl]),
write_term_list([’Premises:’,w(Premises),nl]),
write(’*** premises used without warrant ’),nl,
write(DL2),nl ,
ewrite(’Proof Checking FAILED for theorem: ’,Ident)
;
ewrite(’Proof Checking Completed for Theorem: ’,Ident),
write_term_list([nl,
’Proof Checking Completed for Theorem:’,nl]),
( Premises == [] ;
write_antecedent_list(Premises) ),
(InHyp == [] ->
write_term_list([’ |- ’])
;
write_term_list([w(InHyp),’ |- ’])
),
write_term_list([’ ’,w(InConc),nl,
’ in file ’,w(Path),nl]),
diff_list(Premises,OpenNodes,DL1),
%% Here DL1 = unused Premises
( DL1 = []
;
write_term_list([’*** Note the following premises ’,
’were not used in the proof’,nl]),
write_sequent_list(DL1)
),
%% REPORT RULES AND DEFINITIONS USED (for auditing and dependency reasons)
%% IN FULL VERSION WOULD ALSO REPORT ANY OTHER PROVISOS --- eg ORACLES
%%
ip_lookup(’RULES-USED’,Rules),
remove_duplicates(Rules,Rule_List),
nl,write(’Rules Used:’),nl,
write_rule_list(Rule_List) ,
nl,write(’======================================’),nl
)
;
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ewrite(’Proof Checking FAILED for theorem: ’,Ident)
)
;
thaw_term(VarsXXX),
seen,
ewrite(’Proof Checking FAILED for theorem: ’,Ident)
).
get_sem :-
read_term(NFIRep, [remember_name(true)]),
( (NFIRep = ’true’; NFIRep = ’false’) ->
ip_set(’NFIREP’,NFIRep)
;
write_term_list([’*** INVALID semantic type ’,NFIRep,’ ***’,nl])
),
read_term(Eol, [remember_name(true)]),
(Eol = eol ->
true
;
write(’*** INVALID FORMAT --- semantic eol ***’),nl
).
sem_type_true :-
ip_lookup(’NFIREP’,Typ),
Typ = ’true’ .
sem_type_false :-
ip_lookup(’NFIREP’,Typ),
Typ = ’false’ .
get_env :-
get_sig,
get_rules.
get_sig :-
read_term(Sig, [remember_name(true)]),
(Sig = eol ->
write(’-------- END OF SIG -------------’),nl
;
write(’*** SIG NOT YET IMPLEMENTED ***’),nl
).
get_rules :-
read_term(Rule, [remember_name(true)]),
(Rule = eol ->
write(’-------- END OF RULES -------------’),nl
;
Rule = [Rule_ID,Kind,Concl,AppCond,PremList,VarList],
Rule_Data = [Kind,[Concl,AppCond,PremList],VarList],
logrule([nl,’ Rule : ’,w(Rule_ID),’ --- ’,w(Kind)]),
logrule([’ Premises :’,w(PremList)]),
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logrule([’ ----------------------------- ’]),
logrule([’ Conclusion :’,w(Concl)]),
logrule([’ Var List:’,w(VarList)]),
logrule([’ AppConds :’,w(AppCond)]),
( Kind = ’premise’ ->
ip_set(’RULE-DB’,Rule_ID,Rule_Data)
;
assert(isRule(Rule_ID,Rule_Data))
),
get_rules
).
genthm(InConc,InHyp,ThisThm) :-
gencondseq(InHyp,[],InCS),
ThisThm = [InConc,InCS].
gencondseq([],X,X).
gencondseq([X|Y],U,[(X,[])|V]):-
gencondseq(Y,U,V).
stripcondseq([],X,X).
stripcondseq([(A,_)|X],U,[A|V]) :-
stripcondseq(X,U,V).
stripcondseq(Y,X,X) :- logit([’stripcondseq for ’,w(Y)]).
extract_vars(T,Y) :-
collect_vars(T,X),
remove_duplicates(X,Y).
set_thm_nfis([]).
set_thm_nfis([N|Y]) :-
logit([’set_thm_nfis for ’,w(N)]),
( N = nfi(X,A) ->
X not_free_in A %% add a not-free-in constraint (for x) on A
; true ),
set_thm_nfis(Y).
%% CHECK A SEQUENCE OF NODES AGAINST THE CHILDREN OF A RULE
%%
%% Seq is the next expected sequent from the rule applied at the parent
%% it is checked against the actual adata at the current node.
%% SeqList is the list of sequents expected at the children of this
%% node --- generated as premises to the rule application
%% we process (recursively) these first and then continue
%% with the rest of the original list.
check([]).
check([Seq|SL]) :-
check_node(Seq,SeqList),
check(SeqList),
check(SL).
get_endnode:-
( read_term(Node, [remember_name(true)]) ->
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( Node == eol
; write_term_list([’******** INCOMPLETE PROOF FILE ********** ’,
w(Node),nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
)
;
write_term_list([
’******** INCOMPLETE PROOF FILE ********** final read failed’,nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
).
%% THIS IS THE MAIN CHECKING ROUTINE.
%%
%% We pass back in SeqList the result sequents from the application
%% of the rule at this node --- for checking against our children
%%
check_node(Seq,SeqList) :-
Seq = [ Succedent, CondAnt],
stripcondseq(CondAnt,[],Antecedents),
read_node(ExptRule),
( atomic(ExptRule) ->
logit([’**** Dumper reported error *****’,nl,’****’,w(ExptRule)]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
; true ),
( ExptRule = [’OPEN-NODE’] ->
ip_lookup(’PREMISES’,Onodes),
Seq=[Con,ONCondSeq],
stripcondseq(ONCondSeq,[],ONHyp),
logit([’**** OPEN NODE ’,’ Term=’,w(Seq)]),
ip_set(’PREMISES’,[[Con,ONHyp]|Onodes]),
SeqList=[]
;
%% ---------------------- All the rest is for non-open nodes ----------------
ExptRule = [Rule_ID,RuleSubs],
get_rule(Rule_ID,StoredRule),
StoredRule = [Kind,GenRule,GenRuleVarList],
( Kind = ’premise’ ->
GenRule = [Concl,AppCond,PremList],
GenRuleVars = [],
convert_local_rule(AppCond,PremList,LocHyps),
ip_lookup(’PREMISES’,Onodes),
ip_set(’PREMISES’,[[Concl,LocHyps]|Onodes])
;
ip_lookup(’RULES-USED’,Rules),
ip_set(’RULES-USED’,[(Rule_ID,Kind)|Rules]),
extract_vars(GenRule,GenRuleVars),
GenRule = [Concl,AppCond,PremList]
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),
logit([nl,’ Rule : ’,wR(Rule_ID)]),
logit([’ Premises :’,wR(PremList)]),
logit([’ ----------------------------- ’]),
logit([’ Conclusion :’,wR(Concl)]),
logit([’ AppConds :’,wR(AppCond)]),
logit([’ Subs :’,w(RuleSubs)]),
logit([’ Vars :’,w(GenRuleVarList)]),
inst_rule(GenRuleVarList,RuleSubs),
logit([’ Insts:’,w(GenRuleVarList)]),
( match_terms(Succedent,Concl) ->
logit([’** Matched term from log with rule Conclusion: ’,
w(Succedent),’ with ’,w(Concl)])
;
!,
write_term_list([’**************************************’,nl,
’ERR: FAILED rule: ’,nl,
w(Succedent),’ this term <> rule concl. ’,nl,w(Concl),nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
),
( AppCond == none
;
check_ruleapps(AppCond,Antecedents,CondAnt)
),
gen_subgoals(PremList,CondAnt,SeqList)
).
%% Get rule from fact database, or else from implcit parameter (= local rule)
get_rule(Rule_ID,StoredRule) :-
isRule(Rule_ID,StoredRule),
!.
get_rule(Rule_ID,StoredRule) :-
ip_lookup(’RULE-DB’,Rule_ID,StoredRule),
( var(StoredRule) ->
logit([’**** UNKNOWN RULE ’,w(Rule_ID)]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
;
true
).
check_ruleapps(C,[],_).
check_ruleapps([],A,_).
check_ruleapps([CH|CT],Antecedents,CA):-
check_ruleapp(CH,Antecedents,CA),
check_ruleapps(CT,Antecedents,CA).
check_ruleapp(AppCond,Antecedents,CA) :-
%% If we have a condition --- it can be:
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%% --- a list of hypotheses that must be present
%% --- an NFI Constraints (of form nfi(x,X))
%% --- a rewrite constraint
( AppCond = ishyp(H) ->
( check_hyp(H,CA)
; !, write_term_list([ ’ERR: FAILED IN HYPOTHESIS CHECK ’,
w(AppCond), ’ not in ’,w(Antecedents),nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
)
;
( AppCond = nfi(NfiVar,NfiTerm) ->
check_for_nfi(NfiVar,NfiTerm)
;
( AppCond = rewrite(U,V,X,Y) ->
( rewrite_check(U,V,X,Y) ->
write_term_list([ ’*** Rewrite check ’,w(U),’ == ’,w(V),
’ in ’,w(X),’ -> ’,w(Y),nl])
;
!, write_term_list([ ’ERR: REWRITE CONDITION FAILURE ’,
w(AppCond),nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
)
;
!, write_term_list([ ’ERR: UNRECOGNIZED CONDITION ’,
w(AppCond),nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
)
)
).
%% Check a rewrite constraint
rewrite_check(U,V,X,X) :-
X == U, X == V, !.
rewrite_check(U,V,T1,T2) :-
T1 == T2, !.
rewrite_check(U,V,T1,T2) :-
T1 == U,
T2 == V, !.
rewrite_check(U,V,T1,T2) :-
compound(T1), !,
compound(T2),
T1 =.. [F1|A1],
T2 =.. [F2|A2],
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F1 == F2,
rewrite_check_args(U,V,A1,A2).
rewrite_check(U,V,T1,T2) :-
quant(T1), !, %% check whether T1 is a quantified term
quant(T2),
quantify(T1,Q1,V1,B1), %% decompose a quantified term
quantify(T2,Q2,V2,B2),
Q1 == Q2, V1 == V2,
rewrite_check(U,V,B1,B2).
rewrite_check(U,V,T1,T2) :-
subs(T1), !, %% check whether T1 is a substitution term
subs(T2),
substitute(T1,S1,B1), %% decompose a substitution
substitute(T2,S2,B2),
rewrite_check_subl(U,V,S1,S2),
rewrite_check(U,V,B1,B2).
rewrite_check_subl(U,V,[H1|S1],[H2|S2]) :-
rewrite_check_psub(U,V,H1,H2),
rewrite_check_subl(U,V,S1,S2).
rewrite_check_subl(U,V,[],[]).
rewrite_check_psub(U,V,S1,S2) :-
parallel_sub(T1,O1,S1), %% decompose a parallel substitution
parallel_sub(T2,O2,S2),
!,
rewrite_check_subs(U,V,O1,T1,O2,T2).
rewrite_check_subs(U,V,[HO1|O1],[HO1|T1],[HO1|O2],[HO1|T2]) :-
rewrite_check_sub(U,V,HO1,HT1,HO2,HT2),
rewrite_check_subs(U,V,O1,T1,O2,T2).
rewrite_check_subs(U,V,[],[],[],[]).
rewrite_check_sub(U,V,O1,T1,O2,T2) :-
O1 == O2,
rewrite_check(U,V,T1,T2).
rewrite_check_args(U,V,[A1|TL1],[A2|TL2]) :-
rewrite_check(U,V,A1,A2),
rewrite_check_args(U,V,TL1,TL2).
rewrite_check_args(U,V,[],[]).
check_hyp(A,[X|T]) :-
X = (H,C),
match_terms(A,H),!,
logit([’*** Matched hypothesis ’,w(A),’ in ’,w(X)]),
check_cond_nfi(X).
check_hyp(A,[X|T]) :-
check_hyp(A,T).
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check_cond_nfis(none).
check_cond_nfis([]).
check_cond_nfis([X|Y]):-
check_cond_nfi(X),
check_cond_nfis(Y).
check_cond_nfi(X):-
X = (H,C),
check_cond_nfi2(H,C).
check_cond_nfi2(H,[]).
check_cond_nfi2(H,[C|Z]):-
C = nfi(X),
logit([’NFI constraint to be applied for ’,w(X),’ in ’,w(H)]),
( check_for_nfix(X,H) ->
logit([’***** Matched NFI constraint : ’,w(X),
’ nfi in hyps(’,w(H),’)’,nl])
;
logit([’***** Violated NFI constraint --- 1: ’,w(X),
’ nfi in hyps(’,w(H),’)’,nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
),
check_cond_nfi2(H,Z).
check_cond_nfi2(H,X):-
logit([’NFI constraint ’,w(X),’ FORMAT INVALID ’]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_)).
inst_rule([],[]).
inst_rule([A|GenRuleVarList],[S|RuleSubs]) :-
( obvar(A), \+ obvar(S) ->
write_term_list([’inst rule gives’,w(A),’ = ’,w(S),nl]),
write_term_list([’ERR: CAN ONLY INST OBJV WITH OBJV ** ’,nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
;
A = S,
inst_rule(GenRuleVarList,RuleSubs)
).
inst_rule(X,[]) :-
write_term_list([’ERR: VAR LIST > LIST OF INSTANTIATIONS ** ’,w(X),nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_)).
inst_rule([],X) :-
write_term_list([’ERR: VAR LIST < LIST OF INSTANTIATIONS ** ’,w(X),nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_)).
inst_rule(A,B) :-
logit([’ Inst Rule Failure :’ ,’ GenRuleVarList ’ ,w(A),nl,
’ RuleSubs ’, w(B),nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_)).
compare_lists([],[]).
compare_lists([H1|T1],[H2|T2]) :-
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( H1 == H2 -> compare_lists(T1,T2)
;
write_term_list([’** compare_lists failed trying match terms ’,
w(H1),’ --- ’,w(H2),nl]),
match_terms(H1,H2) -> compare_lists(T1,T2)
).
%% Return the main data items for a node.
%% (The first --- the node id --- is "read ahead" to provide detection
%% of the end of a node list at a higher level).
%%
read_node(ExptRule) :-
read_term(ExptRule, [remember_name(true)]),
( ExptRule == eol ->
write_term_list([
’****** INCOMPLETE PROOF FILE ******** unexpected eol ’,nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
; ip_lookup( ’NODENum’,N),
is(M,N+1),
logit([’Node ’,w(M)]),
ip_set(’NODENum’,M)
).
read_node(_) :-
logit([’!!! UNEXPECTED INPUT ERROR --- read_node ’]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_)).
%--------------------------------------------------------
%% check_for_nfi(V,T) --- checks that var V is not free in T
%% used directly in nfi(X,Y) constraints, and indirectly to check
%% "x nfi hyp" when hyp is used
check_for_nfi(V,T) :-
( sem_type_false ->
logit([’***** Invalid assumption about NFIRep ’,nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_))
;
is_not_free_in(V,T) % check whether V is not free in T
).
check_for_nfi(V,T) :-
logit([’***** Violated NFI constraint: ’, w(V),’ nfi ’,w(T),nl]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_)).
check_for_nfix(V,H) :-
logit([’***** Checking NFI constraint: ’, w(V),’ nfi ’,w(H),nl]),
\+ \+ check_for_nfix2(V,H).
check_for_nfix2(V,H) :-
( sem_type_false -> %% Isabelle
ip_lookup(’THMVARS’,ConVars),
not_free_in(V,[ConVars]),
is_not_free_in(V,H)
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;
is_not_free_in(V,H)
).
gen_subgoals([],CA,[]).
gen_subgoals([[HT,C,NFI]|X],CA,[[C,H1]|Y]) :-
apply_nfis(CA,NFI,[],CA1),
apply_hyp_trans_list(HT,CA1,H1),
gen_subgoals(X,CA,Y).
gen_subgoals([Z|X],CA,Y) :-
logit([’+++++ Invalid premise --- ’,w(Z),
’ should be of form: [Hyp,Conc,NFI]’]),
exception(type_error(recoverable,_,_,_,_)).
apply_nfis([],NFI,CA,CA).
apply_nfis([X|Z],NFI,CA1,[Y|CA2]) :-
X = (H,C),
append(NFI,C,C1),
Y = (H,C1),
apply_nfis(Z,NFI,CA1,CA2).
%%--------------------------------------------------------
apply_hyp_trans_list([],L,L).
apply_hyp_trans_list([add(A)|X],L,L2):-
apply_hyp_trans_list(X,L,L1),
L2 = [(A,[]) | L1],
logit([’** Add hyp : ’,w(A),’ to ’,w(L1)]).
apply_hyp_trans_list([post(A)|X],L,L2):-
reverse(L,RL),
reverse([(A,[]) | RL],L1),
apply_hyp_trans_list(X,L1,L2),
logit([’** post add hyp : ’,w(A),’ to ’,w(L),’ giving ’,w(L2)]).
apply_hyp_trans_list([delete(R)|X],L,L2):-
apply_hyp_trans_list(X,L,L1),
diff_list1(L1,R,L2),
logit([’** Remove hyp : ’,w(R),nl,’ from ’,w(L1),’ to ’,w(L2)]).
%%-------------- Minor utility stuff
diff_list1([],Hc,[]).
diff_list1([X|T1],Hc,Y):-
X = (H,C),
( pure_match_terms(H,Hc) ->
Y = T1
;
diff_list1(T1,Hc,T2),
Y = [X|T2]
).
my_member_eq(X,[Y|T]) :- X == Y .
my_member_eq(X,[Y|T]) :- match_terms(X,Y) .
my_member_eq(X,[Y|T]) :- my_member_eq(X,T).
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convert_local_rule(A,[],C) :-
logit([’** Local rule with ’,w(A),’ ’,w(B)]),
convert_local_rule2(A,C).
convert_local_rule(A,[B|T],C) :-
logit([’** Warning expecting no premises --- got ’,
w([B|T]),’ to local rule ’]),
convert_local_rule2(A,C).
convert_local_rule2(none,[]).
convert_local_rule2([ishyp(A)|X],[A|Y]) :-
convert_local_rule2(X,Y).
convert_local_rule2([B|X],Y) :-
logit([’** Warning ignoring AppCond ’,w(B),’ in local rule ’]),
convert_local_rule2(X,Y).
convert_local_rule2([],[]).
write_antecedent_list(L) :-
write_sequent_list(L),
write(’------------------------’),nl.
write_sequent_list([]).
write_sequent_list([H|T]):-
write_sequent(H),
write_sequent_list(T).
write_sequent([P,[]]) :-
write_term_list([’ ’,w(P),nl]).
write_sequent([P,H]) :-
write_term_list([’ ’,wl(H,’, ’),’ |- ’,w(P),nl]).
write_sequent(H) :-
write_term_list([’ ’,w(H),nl]).
write_rule_list([]).
write_rule_list([H|T]) :-
write_rule(H),
write_rule_list(T).
write_rule((Rule,Kind)) :-
name(Kind,X),
length(X,L),
( L > 12 ->
Kindx = Kind
;
name(’: ’,Y),
append(X,Y,Z),append(P,Q,Z),length(P,12),name(Kindx,P)
),
write_term_list([’ ’,Kindx,’’,w(Rule),nl]).
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
%%
%% Explicit term matching
pure_match_terms(A,B) :-
freeze_term(A,X1),
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freeze_term(B,X2),
A = B,
thaw_term([X1,X2]).
match_terms(A,B) :-
freeze_term(A,X1),
freeze_term(B,X2),
beta_reduce_term(A,A1),
beta_reduce_term(B,B1),
!,
match_terms_a(A1,B1,[],[],[],[],[],Z),
thaw_term([X1,X2]).
match_terms(A,B) :-
!, fail.
match_terms_a([], [],X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR1).
match_terms_a([H1|T1], [H2|T2],X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2) :-
match_terms_a(H1, H2,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FRX),
match_terms_a(T1, T2,X,Y,U,V,FRX,FR2).
match_terms_a(A,B,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2) :-
sub(A),
!,
substitute(A,S,T),
append(S,U,U1),
match_terms_a(T,B,X,Y,U1,V,FR1,FR2).
match_terms_a(A,B,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2) :-
sub(B),
!,
substitute(B,S,T),
append(S,V,V1),
match_terms_a(A,T,X,Y,U,V1,FR1,FR2).
match_terms_a(F1, F2,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2) :-
match_terms_b(F1, F2,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2).
beta_reduce_term(X,Y) :-
freeze_term(X,V), X =>* Y, thaw_term([V]).
beta_reduce_term(X,X).
match_terms_b(A,B,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2) :-
(obvar(A);obvar(B)),
substitute(A2,U,A),
substitute(B2,V,B),
( (obvar(A2);obvar(B2)) ->
match_terms_d(A2,B2,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2)
;
match_terms_b(A2,B2,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2)
).
match_terms_b(A,B,X,Y,U,V,FR,FR) :-
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(atomic(A) ; atomic(B) ),
!,
( sub(A) -> substitute(A,S1,A1) ; A = A1),
( sub(B) -> substitute(B,S1,B1) ; B = B1),
A1 = B1.
match_terms_b(A,B,X,Y,U,V,FR,FR) :-
(var(A);var(B)),
!,
(var(A),var(B)),
( sub(A) -> substitute(A,S1,A1) ; A = A1),
( sub(B) -> substitute(B,S1,B1) ; B = B1),
A1 = B1.
match_terms_b(F1, F2,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2) :-
( compound(F1) ; compound(F2) ) ,
!,
compound(F1),
compound(F2),
F1 =.. [L1|T1],
F2 =.. [L2|T2],
match_terms_b(L1,L2,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FRX),
!,match_varlist(T1,T2,X,Y,U,V,FRX,FR2).
match_terms_b(Q1, Q2,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2) :-
(quant(Q1); quant(Q2)),
!,
quantify(Q1,O1,X1,B1),
quantify(Q2,O2,X2,B2),
O1 == O2,
X1=[H1|T1],
X2=[H2|T2],
NX = [H1 | X ],
NY = [H2 | Y ],
(T1 = [] ->
C1 = B1
;
quantify(C1,O1,T1,B1)
),
(T2 = [] ->
C2 = B2
;
quantify(C2,O2,T2,B2)
),
trans_sub(H1,U,UX),
trans_sub(H2,V,VX),
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match_terms_a(C1,C2,NX,NY,UX,VX,FR1,FR2).
match_terms_b(A, B,X,Y,U,V,FR,FR) :-
A == B.
trans_sub(T,[],[]).
trans_sub(T,[S|X],Y) :-
( trans_sub2(T,S,S2) -> trans_sub(T,X,Z) , Y = [S2 | Z]
; trans_sub(T,X,Y) ).
trans_sub2(T,S,S1) :-
parallel_sub(V,O,S),
del_tgt(T,V,O,V1,O1),
\+ V1 = [] ,
parallel_sub(V1,O1,S1).
del_tgt(X,[],[],[],[]).
del_tgt(X,[V|T1],[O|T2],V2,O2) :-
X = O,
del_tgt(X,T1,T2,V2,O2).
del_tgt(X,[V|T1],[O|T2],[V|V2],[O|O2]) :-
del_tgt(X,T1,T2,V2,O2).
match_terms_d(A,B,[],[],[],[],FR,FR) :-
obvar(A),
obvar(B),
!,
A = B.
match_terms_d(A1,B1,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2) :-
obvar(A1),
obvar(B1),
stripsubs(A1,A2), stripsubs(B1,B2),
stripsubs(A2,U,A3), stripsubs(B2,V,B3),
!,
match_ovs(A3,B3,X,Y,FR1,FR2).
stripsubs(A,U,B) :-
substitute(A2,U,A),
( obvar(A2) -> stripsubs(A2,B) ; A2 = B ).
stripsubs(X,Y) :-
( sem_type_false ->
( sub(X) ->
stripsub1(X,Z),
beta_reduce_term(Z,Y)
;
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X = Y)
;
X = Y ).
stripsub1(X,Y) :-
substitute(X,S,Z),
reverse(S,R),
stripsub2(R,Z,Y).
stripsub2([],Z,Z).
stripsub2([H|T],Z,Y) :-
stripsub3(H,Z,P),
stripsub2(T,P,Y).
stripsub3(S,Z,Y) :-
parallel_sub(V,O,S),
( submember(V,O,Z,W) -> W = Y
; Z = Y
).
submember([V|T1],[O|T2],Z,V) :-
O == Z.
submember([V|T1],[O|T2],H,W) :- submember(T1,T2,H,W).
match_free(A,B,[],X,V) :-
V = [(A,B)|X].
match_free(A,B,[(A,B)|T],X,X) :-
true.
match_free(A,B,[(Y,Z)|T],X,X) :-
Y = A,
Z = B.
match_free(A,B,[(Y,Z)|T],X,X) :-
Y = A,
!,fail.
match_free(A,B,[(Y,Z)|T],X,X) :-
Z = B,
!,fail.
match_free(A,B,[(C,D)|T],X,Y) :-
!, match_free(A,B,T,X,Y).
match_ovs(A,B,[],[],U,V):-
!,
match_free(A,B,U,U,V).
match_ovs(A,B,[H1|T1],[H2|T2],U,U):-
A == H1,
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!,
B == H2.
match_ovs(A,B,[H1|T1],[H2|T2],U,U):-
B == H2,
!,
fail.
match_ovs(A,B,[X|T1],[Y|T2],U,V) :-
!,match_ovs(A,B,T1,T2,U,V).
match_varlist([],[],X,Y,U,V,FR,FR).
match_varlist([H1|T1],[H2|T2],X,Y,U,V,FR1,FR2):-
!,
beta_reduce_term(H1,XH1),
beta_reduce_term(H2,XH2),
( obvar(XH1) ->
stripsubs(XH1,U,YH1)
;
XH1 = YH1
),
( obvar(XH2) ->
stripsubs(XH2,V,YH2)
;
XH2 = YH2
),
( obvar(YH1) ->
!,obvar(YH2),
match_ovs(YH1,YH2,X,Y,FR1,FRX)
;
match_terms_a(YH1,YH2,X,Y,U,V,FR1,FRX)
),
match_varlist(T1,T2,X,Y,U,V,FRX,FR2).
%% lambda evaluation
A =>* C :-
A => B,
B =>* C, !.
A =>* A.
T1 => T2 :- % Beta red --- handles multiple arguments
\+ list(T1),
compound(T1), functor(T1,_,_),
T1 =.. [F1 | A1 ] ,
quant(F1),
quantify(F1,lambda,_,_),
A1 = [ H | Y ],
Y = [ _ | _ ],
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F1(H) => Z,
T2 =.. [ Z | Y ].
(lambda !x A)(B) => [B/!x]A. % beta rule
lambda !x A => lambda !x B :- A => B. % evaluation within a subterm
lambda !x A(!x) => A :- !x not_free_in A. % eta rule (optional)
[A|X] => [B|X] :- % handling of lists
A => B.
[A|X] => [A|Y] :-
X => Y.
T1 => T2 :- % Beta red of application with
\+ list(T1),
compound(T1), functor(T1,_,_),
T1 =.. [F1 | A1 ] ,
F1 => F2,
T2 =.. [F2 | A1 ].
T1 => T2 :-
\+ list(T1),
compound(T1), functor(T1,_,_),
T1 =.. [F1 | A1 ] ,
A1 => A2,
T2 =.. [F1 | A2 ].
T1 => T2 :- % Quantifiers
quant(T1),
quantify(T1,Q,V,B1),
B1 => B2,
quantify(T2,Q,V,B2).
%%
%% Debugging and tracing flags
%%
?- dynamic(logit/1).
logit(X).
logrule(X).
pc_log_enable :-
retract(logit(A)),
assert((logit(X):- write_term_list(X),nl,flush_output)).
pc_log_disable :-
retract((logit(A):- B)),
assert(logit(X)).
pc_log_rule_enable :-
retract(logrule(A)),
assert((logrule(X):- write_term_list(X),nl)).
pc_log_rule_disable :-
retract((logrule(A):- B)),
assert(logrule(X)).
%% ------- to get around a QP 4.3 bug that directs stderr to 1 ---------
ewrite(M,V) :-
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’$write_term’(2,’\n’, write, 1200, 1),
’$write_term’(2,M, write, 1200, 1),
’$write_term’(2,V, write, 1200, 1),
’$write_term’(2,’\n’, write, 1200, 1).
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APPENDIX D
Delaying Not-Free-In Checks on
Hypotheses
D.1 An Illustrative Example
In Section 4.6.4 we have described how not free in conditions on hypotheses have to be handled
by delaying them until the hypotheses are used. Here we illustrate the problem with an example.
The proof shown is of a modified version of the Ergo 5 theorem:
A => all !x A !x not free in A
This has a very simple proof which uses the rule all intro. This rule has a not-free-in constraint
on its hypotheses:
Rule: all_intro
K !x0 not free in hypotheses
--------------
!!all !x0 K
The problem associated with such constraints is illustrated by a proof of the following modified
version of this theorem:
!x and A => all !x A !x not free in A
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This is an artificial proof, but serves as a simple example of the problem which can also occur in
more plausible proofs. The theorem is a stronger version of the original theorem and therefore it
is also true. However in the corresponding proof the rule all intro is applied when the hypothesis
list is [!x, A], rather than being just [A] as in the original. At this point the hypothesis !x does
not satisfy the not-free-in constraint, and so applying the constraint immediately would fail the
proof. To avoid this we delay applying the constraint.
In both proofs the last step is an assumption step using the hypothesis A. At that point in the
proof of the modified theorem, the delayed constraint attached to hypothesis A is applied, and is
satisfied by the constraint that is part of the theorem. This single use of assumption closes the
proof, so the !x hypothesis is not used, and the constraint on it is never applied. The proof is
therefore accepted despite the fact that the hypothesis !x does not satisfy the constraint which
would appear to have applied to it if the description ‘!x not free in the hypotheses’ had been
interpreted naively. (Note that this complication could have been eliminated by removing the
!x with a delete hypothesis step prior to applying all intro, but this would have defeated our
purpose.)
The record of the proof is an edited version of the output of the prototype proof checker. The
schematic version of the rule used is shown for each step. Instantiations are shown beneath the
rule using the notation :=. The tree is a single branch with 4 nodes. Nodes are numbered and
are annotated with the sequent at that node.
Theorem: |- =>(and(!x, A), !!all !x A)
provided [nfi(!x, A)]
Node 1
Rule : imp_intro
[add(B)] | --- C
------------------------
=>(B, C)
B := and(!x, A)
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C := !!all !x A
Node 2 --- and(!x, A) |- !!all !x A
Rule : hyp_and_split
add(D),add(E),delete(and(E, D)) |- F
----------------------------------------
F provided [ishyp(and(E, D))]
D := !x
E := A
F := !!all !x A
Node 3 --- A, !x |- !!all !x A
Rule : all_intro
|- G provided [nfi(!x0)]
-----------------------------
!!all !x0 G
G := A
!x0 := !x
Node 4 --- A, !x |- A ----- Note that !x is a hypothesis here
Rule : assump
-----------------
H provided [ishyp(H)]
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H := A
Proof Checking Completed for Theorem:
|- =>(and(!x, A), !!all !x A) provided !x not free in A
Ergo 5 implements the delayed application of not-free-in hypothesis constraints by means of the
??? nfi filter on hypothesis lists. This effectively removes them from the list of hypotheses,
which does not fail the proof at that point but which does prevent hypotheses which fail the
constraint being used later in the subproof. Thus an attempt to use a hypothesis that does
not satisfy the constraint will fail in the checker because the constraint will be applied and fail,
while it will fail in Ergo 5 because the hypothesis will not be available for use later.
Isabelle uses the meta-level universal quantifier to express constraints. This is applied to the
hypothesis list of the premise to which the constraint applies. The simple artificial example
that we have used with Ergo 5 cannot be duplicated in Isabelle. It would be naturally ex-
pressed as B(x) & A --> (ALL x. A). But in the Isabelle syntax this does not identify the free
and bound occurrences of x, so the required ‘apparent violation’ of the not-free-in hypothesis
does not arise. However, we can use the partial proof (up to failure) of the invalid theorem
A(x) --> ALL x . A(x) to show how the Isabelle mechanism works. Applying implies intro-
duction followed by all introduction gives the sequent:
!! ka . A(x) ==> A(ka)
In this sequent the hypotheses have been bound by meta-quantification (!!) over ka, which
effectively applies the x not-free-in hypotheses constraint. However the next step, which is
assumption on A(x), fails because it requires that we unify A(x) with A(ka). This is prevented,
since it would involve capturing the variable x which is within the scope of the quantifier !! ka.
It can thus be seen how this mechanism, of binding hypotheses by a meta-level quantification,
is equivalent to a delayed constraint on the hypothesis list bound by the quantifier — the
constraint being enforced whenever unification occurs which involves terms within the scope of
the quantifier.
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